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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING OF JUSTICE IN TURKEY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF THE ARMENIANS AND THE KURDS IN ISTANBUL 
Hülya Delihüseyinoğlu
Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, 2014
Supervisor: Ayşe Betül Çelik 
Keywords: Turkey, Armenian, Kurd, justice, ethnic identity, conflict
The aim of this study is to reveal the understandings of justice of the Armenians and 
Kurds living in Istanbul by discussing their current  predicaments and their daily life 
experiences in Istanbul. In this way, considering the different features of Armenians and 
Kurds it becomes possible to compare their understandings of justice coming from their 
ethnic  identities.  To  achieve  this  aim,  participants  with  different  features  were 
interviewed in  depth and their  experiences were asked to comprehend their  sense of 
injustice as being ethnically different from the dominant ethnic majority in Turkey. As a 
result  of  the  study,  the  interconnectedness  between  the  sub-categories  of  justice, 
between its outcomes and processes is revealed. In this sense, this research shows how 
different forms of justice constitute a totality and how the conflicts at the state level and 
societal level interact with one another. That is why whereas this study helps to reveal 
the root causes of conflict stemming from injustice, it also underlines the dynamics that 
lead to protracted ethnic conflicts, if not sustain them.   
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE'DE ADALET ANLAYIŞI: İSTANBUL'DAKİ ERMENİLERİN VE 
KÜRTLERİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ
Hülya Delihüseyinoğlu
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014
Danışman: Ayşe Betül Çelik 
Keywords: Türkiye, Ermeni, Kürt, adalet, etnik kimlik, çatışma 
Bu  araştırmanın  amacı  İstanbul'da  yaşayan  Ermenilerin  ve  Kürtlerin  İstanbul'daki 
güncel durumları ve günlük deneyimleri yoluyla adalet  anlayışlarını açıklamaktır.  Bu 
şekilde,  Ermenilerin  ve  Kürtlerin  farklı  özelliklerini  göz önünde  bulundurarak  etnik 
kimliklerinden  etkilenen  adalet  anlayışlarını  karşılaştırmak  mümkün  olmaktadır.  Bu 
amaç doğrultusunda Türkiye'de etnik kimlikleri baskın etnik çoğunluğun dışında kalan 
farklı  özelliklerdeki katılımcılarla  görüşmeler  yapılmış  ve adalet  algılarını kavramak 
amacıyla  deneyimleri  sorulmuştur.  Bu çalışma  adaletin  alt  kategorileri,  sonuçları  ve 
süreçleri arasındaki bileşikliği ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu anlamda, bu araştırma adaletin 
farklı  formlarının  nasıl  bir  bütün oluşturduğunu,  ve  devlet  ve  toplum seviyesindeki 
çatışmaların birbiriyle etkileştiğini göstermektedir. Bu yüzden bu çalışma adaletsizlikten 
kaynaklanan çatışmaların temel sebeplerine değinirken, aynı zamanda sürüncemeli etnik 
çatışmalara ya da devam etmelerine sebep olan dinamiklere de dikkat çekmektedir.        
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INTRODUCTION
The sense of injustice can be seen as one of the causes of conflicts. Especially, in 
the  contexts  in  which  the  conflict  is  protracted,  latent,  or  embedded  within  the 
institutions, the sense of injustice perceived by people sustains conflicts for long periods 
of time by undermining social harmony. In this sense, ensuring justice within the society 
is not only a step to improve democracy, but also it  is  the only way to eliminate the 
roots of social polarization within the society and to create a space for living together. 
Otherwise, in cases where citizens do not feel a sense of social justice existent in the 
society,  and  consequently  the legitimacy of the  state  is  not  respected,  conflicts  are 
inevitable. That is why in order to grasp the root causes of a conflict and to eliminate 
them it  is  crucial to comprehend how justice is  understood by people with different 
identities,  their  experiences of injustice and  how their  expectations  from justice are 
shaped.  
Unfortunately,  the Turkish Republic  does not  present  a very good picture with 
respect to justice.  Considering the nation-state model and its relation with the ethnic 
identity groups, Turkey can be a good case to analyze the dynamics of how nation-states 
are  creating  forms  of  injustice  for  those  who  are  staying  outside  of their  national 
identity, and how those people interpret these forms. However, it is important to keep in 
mind  that  every  context  has  its  own dynamics.  In  that  sense,  the  perceptions  and 
understandings of the people living in Turkey can be considered only by a contextual 
and holistic analysis. 
The aim of this research is  to comprehend what the Armenians and the Kurds 
living in Istanbul understand by justice through their current predicaments, to look at 
how their understandings of justice differ from each other in these examples,  and to 
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compare the phenomena driven from the discussion of these justice understandings. The 
second purpose of the study is to reveal the link between the understanding of justice 
and ethnic identity by looking at how ethnic identity groups develop an understanding 
of justice and what kinds of practices they are suffering from considering their statuses, 
rights, and the historical background in a particular context. 
The reason why Kurds and Armenians are chosen for this study is the fact that 
whereas they both have perceived minorities, they have differences to influence their 
situation. Whereas the Armenians in Turkey are recognized as legal minorities in the 
Lausanne  Treaty in  1923  and  have  a  legal  status  from this  recognition,  the  ethnic 
identity of the Kurds in Turkey is not acknowledged by the state. In that sense, these 
two  ethnic  groups  can  be  differentiated  from  each  other  in  terms  of  their  legal 
recognition. Also, they have different religions; Christianity for Armenians and Islam 
for Kurds predominantly.  The rate of the population of the Armenians and Kurds in 
Turkey is considerably different. While Kurds are holding a noticeable percentage of the 
population, Armenians only constitute a small size of it. Another important difference 
between  Armenians  and  Kurds  is  political  mobilization  within  each  ethnic  identity 
group; Kurds having a high political mobilization rate as opposed to Armenians. As a 
result of these differences, the policies that they are exposed to or their experiences in 
relation to their ethnic identity are shaped. That is why their understandings of justice 
are also expected to be influenced by these differences. 
With this research, Kurdish and Armenian participants living in Istanbul but from 
different backgrounds, that is: having different income levels, education levels,  sexes, 
occupations,  sexual  orientations,  religious  preferences  and  characteristics  are 
interviewed in depth and asked to share their experiences along with their perceptions 
and understandings on the subject. In this sense, the interviews are not only designed to 
talk about the historical background of Turkey and how the participants make sense of 
it, but more importantly also to discuss their daily life experiences and practices. 
In the next sections, (1) a literature review on justice; (2) the social context that 
the research takes place in; (3) the research design and methodology; (4) the results of 
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the understanding of justice of the Armenians living in Istanbul; (5) the results of the 
understanding of justice of the Kurds living in Istanbul; (6) a discussion part where the 
understandings of Armenians and Kurds are compared; and lastly (7) a conclusion part 
to sum up the research are presented in this exact order.  
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CHAPTER I | LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1. The conceptualization of justice
Discussions  about  justice  are  not  recent;  however,  what  is  changing  in  the 
discussion of justice  is  the  meaning  that  is  loaded to  this  concept  and the ways  to 
address, if not to construct it. The meaning that is attached to justice is the determining 
factor of how the institutions are shaped and how the organization of the society is set. 
Therefore,  without  understanding  the  concepts  that  can  bring  the  parts  of  justice 
together, it is not possible for political authorities to construct a holistic form of justice 
that can protect all the citizens and non-citizens of a particular state.    
Unfortunately, it is not possible here to present all the names and discussions with 
respect  to justice.  From the early discussions of justice or more recent  ones,  several 
names can be mentioned. However, the aim of this chapter is not to map out the abstract 
conceptualizations  of justice through different  understandings articulated by eminent 
scholars. Rather,  I am aiming here to give a brief introduction to justice and its sub-
categories by referring to arguments of these scholars as they pertain to how different 
sub-categories of justice can be formed. In this way, it  will be possible to look at the 
understandings of justice empirically. 
Although I am not going to engage in a complex deliberation of justice, I think it 
is important to remember John Rawls because of his contribution to the theory of justice 
as a contemporary scholar. After a brief introduction to Rawls' statements, in order to 
map  out  the  sub-categories  of  justice  that  I  raise,  I  will  present  Deutsch's  (2006) 
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categorization of justice.    
In  A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls states that if the society or the individuals 
living  in  that  society  seek  for  their  interests  or  some  sort  of  utility,  then  social 
cooperation within that society is not possible (p. 12-14). The principles that can ensure 
the social cooperation should be arranged in a way that none is disadvantaged. That is 
why the  principles  should  be  chosen  behind  the  “veil  of  ignorance”1.  In  this  way, 
nobody is favored and the society is not structured to maintain the natural endowments 
of those  individuals.  Justice  is  taken  as  the  state  where  the  natural inequalities  are 
nullified  and  the  domination that  these  inequalities  can cause  is  eliminated  (Rawls, 
1973, p. 15). In order to nullify these natural endowments that can undermine the social 
cooperation of the society, and to create justice as fairness, the initial situation has to be 
interpreted and the principles written by the rational persons should be set according to 
this interpretation (Rawls, 1973, p. 15). 
The contract that can construct the social cooperation and assure justice should be 
based on the two principles he underlines: “(1) each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty of others; (2) social 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both reasonably expected 
to be everyone's advantage and attached to positions and offices open to all” (Rawls, 
1973,  p.  60).  Considering  these  two  principles,  it  can  be  said  that  justice  requires 
equality, rights and  distribution.  Thereby, justice means equal liberty for all citizens, 
distribution of income and wealth, and accessible institutions and political authority to 
all (Rawls, 1973, p. 61). 
Rawls states that whereas these two principles of justice must work in cooperation 
without creating any discrimination within the society, justice also has to be formal and 
procedural at the same time. In that sense, social institutions must be arranged in a way 
that  laws  and  their  actions  are  to  be  applied  equally  (Rawls,  1973,  p.  54-58).  The 
1 Rawls uses veil of ignorance as a metaphor to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just (1973, p. 136). 
It is a way of procedural justice. In this way, individuals do “not exploit their social and natural circumstances to their own 
advantage. Parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance; they do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own 
particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general consideration (Rawls, 1973, p. 136-
137)”. 
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arrangement of the institutions should allow the cooperation of the society within the 
framework of rule of law (Rawls, 1973, p. 58). In other words, formal justice is the way 
the institutions are structured and the predictability is assured; it  does not refer to the 
relationship between institutions and individuals.  Procedural justice, on the other hand, 
refers to the interaction of the individuals with the structure. It means the correctness of 
the distribution; how the claims of the individuals are answered within the scheme of the 
cooperation (Rawls, 1973, p. 88).    
As  mentioned  in  the  second  principle  of  justice,  Rawls  also  underlines  the 
importance of the role of the political economy in providing justice. Political economy 
has  to  serve  for  the  public  good  (1973,  p.  259).  However,  public  good  cannot  be 
provided through the equal distribution of goods, services and offices solely. Also those 
with fewer assets and those born in disadvantaged positions should be favored to create 
the genuine equal opportunity (Rawls, 1973, p. 100). In that sense, the ideal principle 
suggested for  the political economy is  parallel to  the  logic of his  two  principles in 
general and the nullification of the natural endowments in particular.  
Rawls conceptualizes justice on many different levels; he talks about the content 
of  justice  like  basic  liberty  rights,  redistribution,  equal  representation,  and  equal 
participation or in supplying these, he also mentions about its  forms like formal and 
procedural  justice.  Additionally,  it  is  also  possible  to  see  his  discussions  on 
compensatory or retributive justice. The multiplicity of concepts shows that justice does 
not run only within the structures but also between structures and individuals, or among 
individuals. That's why a genuine justice requires a comprehensive framework where all 
possibilities of injustice both within the institutions and as embedded within the bigger 
structure are eliminated. What  is  important  for  us to  conceive  here is  that  there are 
different types of justice and injustice. 
Morton Deutsch, as parallel to Rawls' multi-layered conceptualization of justice, 
formulates  a  combination of  six  factors  of (in)justice:  (1)  distributive  injustice,  (2) 
procedural injustice, (3) the sense of injustice, (4) retributive and reparative injustice, (5) 
moral exclusion, and (6) cultural imperialism (2006, p. 44). Distributive injustice occurs 
6
when something scarce is not distributed according to the needs of the individuals or a 
cost is  not avoided equally by all (Deutsch,  2006, p.  45).  Procedural injustice arises 
when  the  procedures  do  not  produce  reliable,  predictable,  consistent  or  unbiased 
consequences due to the channels used (Deutsch, 2006, p. 48). The sense of injustice 
varies  according  to  different  expectations  and  perceptions  of individuals  or  groups, 
because awareness of injustice changes in relation to individuals' or groups' positions in 
the relevant event (Deutsch, 2006, p. 48). The perceptions of victims and perpetrators 
are different, because they see the events from different angles and they construct their 
perceptions accordingly.  In that  sense,  the injustice felt  by a victim can be regarded 
pointless  by  her/his  perpetrator  or  disregarded  completely.  Retributive  justice  and 
reparative justice, which are usually taken as two opposite poles, have to do with the 
attitudes and behavior of people in response to moral rule breaking (Deutsch, 2006, p. 
51). Whereas retributive justice concerns with the rule breaking and see the crimes as a 
violation against the state, reparative justice focuses on the social relationships and try 
to repair them. Moral exclusion arises in relation to the political and social culture of 
that  particular  society.  It  can  be  difficult  life  conditions,  instability  of the  political 
regime, perceptions of superiority over  another group, justification or sanctioning of 
violence,  authoritative  nature  of  the  social  institutions  or  absence  of  observers  of 
violence  taking  place  (Deutsch,  2006,  p.  54).  The  last,  but  not  the  least,  cultural 
imperialism occurs when one dominant group tries to suppress the cultural existence of 
the others, which usually results in the double identity of these suppressed groups; one 
identity imposed from the dominant  group and one from their  own group (Deutsch, 
2006, p. 55). 
In order to understand what justice and injustice are and to conceptualize them 
within the particular contexts, it is crucial to map out the important concepts driven by 
the literature on justice. Since justice has many layers, without touching upon its sub-
elements, it is not possible to draw a comprehensive framework in which injustice takes 
place.  Throughout this chapter, the aim is to look at the main concepts that justice is 
associated with in the literature. Although these elements are dependent to one another, 
they are not  aiming to answer the same questions in the domain of justice.  Whereas 
some of them look at the issues like what justice requires, some of them deal with how 
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justice can be ensured. However, the main aim here is to bring the possible subjects that 
can help to comprehend people's understanding of justice. Therefore, justice is going to 
be analyzed under six sub-titles: (1) recognition, (2) rights, (3) procedures, (4) social 
inclusion,  (5)  (re)distribution,  and  (6)  retribution  and  restoration.   However,  it  is 
important to keep in mind that these concepts are overlapping at some points. Although 
here they are given under different sub-titles, it is not very likely to draw clear borders 
between these sub-titles. 
1.1.1. Justice as recognition
Justice is related to many issues like decision making, division-of-labor, culture 
and more (Young, 1990, p. 33). In order to touch upon the root causes of injustice, the 
institutional context and the social structure are the two of the main things that have to 
be considered in depth (Young, 1990, p. 15). From this perspective, social justice has to 
do with the elimination of institutional domination and oppression (Young, 1990, p. 15). 
Institutional domination is  used in this context as structural violence (Galtung, 1969) 
where  there  is  no  personal  or  direct  act;  where  the  violence  is  embedded  into  the 
structure and has a more abstract nature (p. 170-171). Structural violence shows up as 
the unequal distribution of resources and consequently unequal life chances (Galtung, 
1969, p. 170).  
If one group or groups of people are deprived of recognition and projected as 
inferior,  invaluable  or  worthless,  then this  lack  of recognition becomes  the form of 
oppression (Taylor, 1994, p. 36). Injustice is the inescapable result of this domination 
and oppression in which institutions prevent self-determination and self-development of 
some particular groups (Young, 1990, p. 37). Thus, social justice is only provided when 
the realization of these values are guaranteed by the institutions and the social structure; 
when every person and group can equally participate in  public  discussions,  decision 
making processes, and institutions of political and collective life (Young, 1990, p. 91). 
Fraser defines this form of structure as  participatory parity where all members of the 
society have a sense of being a peer in the social life (2001, p. 24). If persons or groups 
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are deprived of the means or opportunities to participate in the decisions that can affect 
them and their actions, then it is impossible to talk about social justice2.     
Recognition  requires  institutions  equally  to  acknowledge  different  needs  and 
cultures of different groups (Guttman, 1994, p. 5). That's why each group's difference 
has to be considered and, even sometimes, institutions might offer different treatment 
for oppressed and disadvantaged groups in order to fulfill and secure inclusion of each 
group (Young, 1990, p.  158).  Politics of inclusion does not  mean the elimination of 
differences  to  create  a  homogenous  society;  rather,  it  means  the  promotion  of  a 
heterogeneous society in which every difference is acknowledged and respected equally, 
even if those differences cannot be understood by others (Young, 1990, p. 119).  It is the 
recognition  and  fostering  of  particularity  as  opposed  to  a  difference-blind  fashion 
(Taylor, 1994, p. 43). Therefore, it requires first of all the social processes of assessment 
of differences within that particular society or public (Walby, 2001, p. 115).
The denial of recognition where ethnic and cultural minorities are oppressed can 
be considered as the illegitimate division of society (Habermas, 1994, p. 117). Honneth 
demonstrates that it  does not only prevent the oppressed groups' freedom to act, but it  
also  demeans  their  self-image and  the image they have  in  the  eyes  of other  people 
(1996, p. 132). Forms of disrespect to oppressed groups as a result of the denial of their 
recognition bring nothing but  a social death to that particular society by which these 
oppressed  social  groups  lose  their  social approval  within  the  society,  possession  of 
certain rights, recognition as moral beings, their sense of identity, social status or their 
dignified self (Honneth, 1996, p. 133-135). This usually happens in ethnic states where 
the majority grants limited rights to the minority groups and keeps its special privileges 
on the essential and symbolic levels (Ghanem, 1998, p. 429). 
Lack of recognition affects not only the oppressed groups but the whole society, 
because  people  with  different  identities  are  always  in  interaction  with,  or  struggle 
against  one  another  (Taylor,  1994,  p.  32-33).  Since  identities  are  not  givens,  but 
candidates of moral scrutiny and potential revisions, the act  of recognizing has to be 
2 However, unlike what Young suggests, in participatory parity, there are two different levels; institutional patterns of cultural 
value where everybody receives equal respect, and the distribution of material resources (Fraser, 2001, p. 29).
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appropriate to their characteristic (McBride, 2005, p. 505). It  should be considered in 
this respect  that  the act  of recognition is  a  relationship  through which equality  and 
inequality,  sameness  and  otherness,  homogeneity  and  heterogeneity  are  defined 
(Düttman,  2000,  p.  46-48).   Considering  identities  as  static  would  be  problematic 
because they are inter-subjective and communicational (Lash and Featherstone, 2001, p. 
17). In the cases where recognition is considered as static, it is inevitable to fall into the 
trap of social injustice, to disregard the needs of some particular groups, and to fail to 
eliminate the oppression that those groups have to face with on daily basis. Identities 
change  over  time  according  to  changing  needs  and  situations  in  those  particular 
societies. People redefine their identities over and over again according to developing 
contexts, situations, and even time frames. 
1.1.2. Justice as rights
Rights are defined as “modern understandings of what actions are permissible and 
which  institutions  are just.  To accept  a  set  of rights  is  to  approve a  distribution of 
freedom and authority, and so to endorse a certain view of what may, must, and must not 
be done.” (Wenar,  2011).  Although there is  a huge discussion on how to categorize 
rights,  In  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  Wenar  states  that  rights  can  be 
categorized according to “who is alleged to have the right,  what  actions or states or 
objects the asserted right pertains to, why the right-holder has the right, and how the 
asserted right can be affected by the right-holder’s actions” (2011).   
The discourse of rights is the main tool by which social norms of a society are set 
and social institutions are developed (Banakar, 2010, p. 19). Rights give people of that 
particular  society  a  road  map,  “they  exert  a  constraining  influence  on their  moral 
capacity” (Banakar, 2010, p. 24), thereby describing what is allowed and not allowed. 
However, it cannot be said that the main concern of rights is to define what is moral or 
what is immoral. By their normative language, rights as part of the legal system exclude 
themselves  from the  sphere  of  morality  and  fill  the  gap  morality  leaves  with  the 
construction of justice (Banakar, 2010, p. 27). In that sense, the concerns that morality is 
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expected to take care of become the issues of justice supported by rights. 
Rights  are  interconnected  with the idea  of justice  in  democracies.  In  order  to 
develop  justice  and  construct  a  system in  which  everyone  can  enjoy  resources  or 
advantages, rights emerge in the form of citizenship. In other words, citizenship rights 
ensure  every citizen  to  be  treated  equally  by the state.  However,  at  the same  time 
citizenship has to be considered as a multi-layered concept  in  order to eliminate any 
form of systemic exclusion (Bader, 1995, p. 212).  A democracy has to develop a form 
of inclusive citizenship through which every person and group of people have legally 
recognized rights on an equal basis (Kabeer, 2002, p. 1). Otherwise, partial, fragmented, 
or  incomplete  citizenship  may  reproduce  the  ascribed  statuses  based  on  religion, 
kinship, ethnicity, race, caste, or gender (Kabeer, 2002, p. 9). 
In defining rights, pre-existing differences should not be reproduced in a way that 
can harm the coherence of the society and create asymmetries of power (Kabeer, 2002, 
p.  10). Rights are important  in the sense that if  there is  no rights-based justice, then 
political  contestation,  social  inequality,  economic  dependency  and/or  cultural 
devaluation may arise or be reproduced (Kabeer, 2002, p. 10).  Also rights must be the 
protector of economic independence; rights must be the guarantor of getting, keeping, 
and disposing things and values (Michelman, 1973, p. 972). Otherwise, people whose 
even  basic  survival  needs  are  not  met  may lose  their  agency because  of economic 
dependence (Kabeer, 2002, p. 11). The social equality has to be pursued by giving equal 
access to every identity group and the values of that particular identity group should not 
be  invisibilised3 or  devalued  by the system itself  through denial  of recognition and 
degradation  (Kabeer,  2002,  p.  12).  In  that  sense,  rights  ensure  two  crucial  things; 
cultural valuation and economic independence both of which are interrelated.  
The  challenges  to  just  citizenship  or  to  the  access  of equal  rights are mostly 
prevalent for the minority groups.  In the situations where the state does not seek the 
prosperity or the equal position of particular groups within its territory, it also would not 
3 Invisibilised is a term used by Kabeer (2002) to define the disregarded statutes of groups of people. However, invisibilisation is 
different from disregarding in the sense that it also refers to the discourses to show that particular groups of people as worthless 
and non-existent.  
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hesitate to use the machinery of surveillance over these minority groups (Banakar, 2010, 
p. 23). Assimilation, exclusion, and neutralization are some of the ways of social control 
exercised by the state (Banakar, 2010, p. 23). Through these ways, the state may deprive 
the minorities of justice by means of rights by constructing normativities based on the 
hegemony of one group over the others. 
On the other hand, rights may be used to eliminate inequality or injustice within 
the  society and  to  empower  those  who  are  by  nature  in  unequal  status.  State  may 
attribute minority rights against  the preponderance of majority.  The special rights of 
minority groups can balance their relative powerlessness and protect them (Green, 1995, 
p.  263).  In  that  sense,  minority rights have  two aspects:  whereas people  within  the 
minority  groups  have  rights  because  of  their  individuality,  people  also  have  rights 
because of their minority group identity (Green, 1995, p. 259). In other words,  every 
citizen in the country has individual rights and group rights mostly based on culture. 
Thus, justice is tried to be served by the state by empowering minority groups and at the 
same time by preventing forms of dominance by the majority.   
1.1.3. Justice as procedure
Procedural justice  refers to  how social-decision-making  mechanisms  work and 
how people evaluate these processes, regardless of the outcomes (Lind and Earley, 1992, 
p. 228). According to Leventhal (1980), procedural justice has six components for the 
parties to judge if  the procedures are fair  or not: principles of third-party neutrality, 
consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, ethicality. Otherwise procedures 
are not considered as fair by the parties and the actions or decisions lose their legitimacy 
in the eyes of the people. For a procedure to be just, people should have an opportunity 
to express their views and thoughts, before the decision is made (Lind, et al., 1990, p. 
952). In that sense, Tyler (2006b) gives two types of procedural justice: justice in the 
quality of decision making processes and justice in the quality of treatment that people 
experience (p. 309). In the cases where there is a lack of procedural justice, people do 
not  recognize the legitimacy of law and legal authorities and do not  feel obliged to 
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follow their rules (Tyler, 2006b, p. 308). 
Procedural justice also has to do with the emotional concerns of people, because it 
is at the same time a way to acknowledge people as valuable (Tyler and Belliveau, 1995, 
p. 298-303). In that sense, procedural justice is not only about an arrangement of how 
things get done, but also it has to do with the social-psychology of people. The literature 
of procedural justice within the domain of social-psychology is  crucial to understand 
conflicts between people and institutions (see Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Smith, 
1998;  Tyler,  1989,  2000;  Tyler  and  Blader,  2003;  DeCrimer  and  Tyler,  2005).  By 
looking at the psychological aspects of procedural justice, the influences of procedural 
justice on the sense of obligations and responsibility can be studied (Tyler, 2006b, p. 
320). If procedural justice brings legitimacy, then people feel obliged to follow the rules 
simply because they think that regardless of the outcomes the procedures are just.  
The legitimacy of the institutions and authorities is  very much linked with the 
procedures of the authorities or the way the institutions exercise these procedures (Tyler, 
2006a, p. 392). If there is no legitimacy of the actions of authorities, then in the eyes of 
people  there  is  no  validity  of  those  particular  authorities.  Legitimacy  means  the 
rightness and properness of authorities (Tyler, 2006a, p. 376) (see Tyler, 2001). Sunshine 
and  Tyler  talk  about  the  three  components  of  procedural  justice  with  respect  to 
legitimacy:  “overall evaluations  of procedural fairness,  evaluations  of the  quality of 
decision making, and evaluations of the quality of interpersonal treatment” (p.  532). 
Although  these  evaluations  touch  upon  different  spheres  of  procedural  justice, 
legitimacy as procedural justice is particularly crucial in the sense that political and legal 
procedures can hold the state together and bring the loyalty of its citizens (Hampshire, 
2000,  p.  79).  In  that  sense,  legitimacy  can  bring  the  capacities  to  solve  the 
disagreements that ensure the togetherness of the state and the society.  
Whereas procedural justice is considered as the source of legitimacy, it also has to 
be studied by identity-based relational models of justice (Tyler and Belliveau, 1995, p. 
306). Since identity has an important place in people's perceptions towards justice in 
general and procedural justice in particular, an identity-blind form of procedural justice 
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cannot regard the potential conflicts or legitimacy crises which may create deadlocks 
within the society.  The identity relational model is  important,  because in societies or 
groups in  which there are social  and  economic  differences,  people  judge  the social 
arrangements and legitimacy of processes from the perspective of their group identity 
(Tyler,  2006b, p.  384).  Major  and Schmader  (2001)  state  that  if  people have doubts 
about  the procedural justice  of the system,  then they are more prone to  explain the 
outcomes through the discriminatory processes towards their  group identity (cited in 
Tyler,  2006b,  p.  386).  In  other  words,  the  perceptions  of people  about  their  socio-
economic conditions as a group are linked to their perceptions on the justness of the 
procedures and of the functioning of the system. If an identity group does not attain the 
procedural fairness that it  expects from the authorities, then it may choose the path to 
protest behavior or deviant behavior (Müller and Kals, 2007, p. 127). 
1.1.4. Justice as social inclusion
According to Opotow (1995), the scope of justice has three main items; “the belief 
that considerations of fairness apply to another, willingness to make sacrifices to foster 
another's  well-being,  and  willingness  to  allocate a  share of community resources to 
another” (353-354). For her, justice is a continuous process in which people shape the 
social arrangements by their behaviors and attitudes (Opotow, 1995, p. 365). It is the 
people themselves who create social norms by which it is decided on who is inside and 
who  is  outside.  That's  why  moral  exclusion  occurs  when  we  deprive  groups  or 
individuals of justice (Opotow, 1995, p. 348). 
Moral exclusion is defined as the situation in which a person or group is excluded 
because of the denial of recognition of their identity,  suffering or deprivation, needs 
and/or entitlements to basic resources (Opotow, 1990, p. 2). The morally excluded group 
is seen as “the other”, the outsider or the threat to the rest of the society (Opotow, 1990, 
p. 2). 
Whereas moral exclusion looks at the socio-psychological side of the issue, social 
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exclusion has to do with social injustice in the form of a denial of opportunities that 
should  be  open  to  all  (Barry,  2002,  p.  22).  It  can  be  political  exclusion,  unequal 
educational and occupational opportunities or opportunity to getting a fair trial (Barry, 
2002).  It  happens  when a group or groups are excluded in  multiple  ways  from the 
regular activities of the society (Stewart,  et al., 2006, p. 4). What is  crucial to know 
about  social exclusion is  that  it  is  a  feature  of the groups because of their  culture, 
gender, color, nationality and the like. Therefore, it is related to power relations in which 
the socially excluded group suffers from lack of power or unequal power (Stewart,  et 
al., 2006, p. 4). 
Social exclusion can be experienced as a result of economic stratification, when 
social oppressions with low income impede political participation (Barry, 2002; Gough, 
et al., 2006); identity politics, when a hegemonic power creates the basis of exclusion 
groups (Das,  2009); or physical separation, when some groups are confined or their 
freedom of association is  prevented (Opotow, 1995).  In either  case,  at  the center  of 
social exclusion lies social oppression (Gough, et al., 2006, p. 57). 
Since social exclusion is the product of social interactions, it  is the society itself 
that creates its own norms and defines “the unwanted”. In other words, social exclusion 
and social justice is constructed by the social order of that particular society (Opotow, 
1990, p. 5). Once individuals internalize this dominant social order and develop their 
perceptions based on the social exclusion patterns, they also produce a sense of moral 
exclusion (Opotow, 1990, p.  12). Therefore, exclusion runs at two levels: society and 
individual;  social  exclusion  and  moral  exclusion  respectively,  where  the  latter  is 
produced by the former. 
Opotow states that (1995, p. 350) as a result of the social norms through which 
people perceive excluded groups and individuals as psychologically distant, people also 
regard  those  groups  and  individuals  as  nonentities  or  undeserving.  That's  why  the 
society does not feel any obligation to improve the conditions of these excluded groups 
and to integrate them back to the society. Also the society is not bothered by the unjust 
procedures or outcomes which the excluded groups have to face with (Opotow, 1995, p. 
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350). 
The groups based on their ethnicity, gender, nationality, color, religion, language 
can be excluded either structurally or morally. Whereas the former refers to the unequal 
distribution of political and economic resources, the latter refers to an exclusion which a 
group or groups face with, when there is no recognition as equals or no willingness to 
acknowledge the dignity of the other.   
  
1.1.5. Justice as (re)distribution
Distributive justice refers to the distribution of conditions and goods which can 
affect the well-being of an individual (Deutsch, 1975, p. 137).  The well-being of an 
individual can be psychological, physiological, economic, and social aspects as Deutsch 
states (1975, p. 137) or it  can be understood as monetary based measures like income 
and consumption, as Kanbur offers (2007, p. 1). 
Redistributive justice defines justice according to the socio-economic factors. It 
assumes that injustice is stemming from the economic structure of the society (Fraser, 
1996, p. 12). Thus, if economic stratification is rearranged and the tools of exploitation 
are removed, then there can be justice with respect to redistribution. Also, other forms of 
injustice that Deutsch mentions, such as psychological, physiological or social, can be 
improved or eliminated with the change of economic structures. The logic behind this 
expectation is  the assumption that  these forms of injustice are the derivations of the 
economic injustice.   
Although scholars of distributive justice agree more or less that injustice is rooted 
in the economic structure or in the political economy, the question that they deal with is 
according  to  which  rule  the  resources  or  goods  are  distributed.  Marx  states  that 
distrbiution should  be  “from each according to  his ability,  to each according to his  
need”  (1875). On the other hand, contemporary scholars, such as Deutsch (1975) and 
Miller (1992), join this discussion through three different principles according to which 
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the distribution can take place in each and every case. Deutsch (1975) states that equity, 
equality,  and  need  -like  Miller  (1992)  who  uses  desert instead  of  equity-  are  the 
dominant principles of distribution as the logic behind the rights in practice. However, 
Miller  can be differentiated from Deutsch in  the sense that Miller looks at  what  the 
people  think  about  distributive  justice  and  conceptualizes  distributive  justice 
accordingly.  
The need principle cares about the personal development and personal welfare of 
individuals in a group or in  a society (Deutsch,  1975, p.  147).  The members of the 
society aim the equality of need fulfillment of all members since they have the sense of 
mutual sympathy and trust to one another (Miller, 1992, p. 573). Miller says that the 
society feels a responsibility to take care of its members up to a certain level (1992, p. 
573). At least, all members of that particular society should be able to meet their basic 
needs. 
On the other hand according to the  equity principle, members receive outcomes 
proportional to their contributions; therefore, equivalent contributions mean equivalent 
benefits (Folger, 1977, p. 108).  Unlike distributional justice where there is a general 
fairness in allocation, the notion of exchange is effective in equity (Cook, 1983, p. 218). 
Dugan states that  the indicators of inequity are the gross differences in  income and 
wealth; in  that  sense the distribution becomes not  only unequal,  it  is  also unfair and 
unjust  (2004, p. 1).  Also,  Miller (1992),  who defines  equity principle  as a matter of 
merit  says that it  is simply instrumental and does not concern about the relationships 
within that  particular  group or the society as the  equality  principle  does (560-561). 
Thus, the equity principle and the equality principle differ from each other with respect 
to the value given to the group relations (Miller, 1992, p. 562). 
The  equality principle  is  used in societies where the maintenance of enjoyable 
social relations is  crucial (Deutsch, 1992, p.  146).  Since the members of the society 
want  to sustain their  relationships and care about  the solidarity within,  they want  to 
make sure that every member of that particular society is enjoying the same amount of 
resources. It is also possible to find critiques to the equality principle in the literature. 
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One of the important  books that  started this discussion is  “Equality of  What”  (Sen, 
1980). As a continuation of that discussion, statements of Phillips on this subject (1999) 
can be raised here as an example. Phillips disagrees with the  equality principle in the 
sense that if economic resources are distributed equally, then we may end up ignoring 
the differences in people's capacities (1999, p. 54). That's why Phillips demonstrates that 
the principle should aim the maintenance of a decent standard of living, but at the same 
time it should reflect differences in the choices of people (1999). 
These three principles are used according to the concerns of that particular society 
or group. Those who are economically-oriented tend to use the equity principle, those 
who are solidarity-oriented tend to use the equality principle, and those who are caring-
oriented tend to use the need principle as basis of the distributive justice (Deutsch, 1992, 
p. 147). However, it should not be forgotten that justice can be regarded as a pluralistic 
concept (Miller, 1992, p. 558). In these cases, trying to develop a sense of distributive 
justice only by looking at one single value does not help to bring justice into the society. 
Therefore, different values might be used according to the purpose of that distribution. 
In order to provide the requirements of justice and prevent transmission of one 
inequality from one sphere to another, Walzer (1983) comes up with a suggestion of 
complex equalities. He suggests a distributive pluralism through which each sphere has 
its own principle. In this way, if a person has an advantage in one sphere, that person can 
not transmit this advantage to another one, because each sphere has its own value and 
principle. By trying to create an idea of equal citizenship with complex equality, he aims 
to  prevent  domination  of  goods  over  people  (Miller,  1995,  p.  11).  His  suggestion 
opposes the idea that social justice is provided by one main principle (Guttman, 1995, p. 
100). Rather, distributive pluralism provides multiplicity of principles for each sphere.  
1.1.6. Justice as retribution and restoration
Retributive justice refers to repair of justice through imposition of punishment; the 
offender who violates rules or laws deserves to be punished in proportion of the severity 
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of the wrong-doing for justice to be served (Wenzel et al., 2008, p. 375). On the other 
hand, restorative justice means a process of reparation or restoration among offender, 
victim and other interested parties through mediation and reconciliation programmes to 
reveal what was done and the ways to deal with it (Duff, 2013). 
Retributive justice and restorative justice are the ways chosen to recover a wrong-
doing after a crime is committed or somebody gets harmed. They focus on different 
sides of a wrong-doing and construct their sense of justice from different perspectives. 
Although by  definition retributive  justice  and  restorative  justice  may  seem like  the 
opposites, they are not the polar opposites of a continuum (Zehr, 2002, p. 13). Instead of 
polarization, there is balance between them. They complement each other; they should 
be taken as dependent to one another (Daly, 2002, p. 64). Thus, real world justice can 
only be  achieved,  when  the  characteristics  of both are  taken into  account  and  this 
process  is  seen as a  continuum (Zehr,  2002,  p.  60).  The differences between them, 
though, are the ways how they try to recover the broken sense of justice after wrong-
doings. 
Retributive  justice  considers  the  crime  in  terms  of  behaviors  and  attitudes  of 
people towards the state and other people (Deutsch, 2005). Therefore, crime is defined 
as violations of law and the state (Zehr,  2002, p. 21).  “Crimes are kinds of conduct 
which are condemned as wrong by some purportedly authoritative social norm” (Duff, 
2013) or what authoritative bodies claim as punishable and lawbreaking acts (Estrada-
Hollenbeck,  2001,  p.  66).  Since  retributive  justice  concerns  what  offenders  get  as 
punishment in proportion of their crimes (Zehr, 2002, 21), it fails to see the harm on the 
relationships as a result of the acts of offenders (Johnstone, 2004, p. 8). Its concern is to 
recover the authority of the state by means of punishment, while giving the offender 
what s/he deserves. That is why in response to rule breaking, retributive justice comes 
up with the solutions like arrest, going to trial, conviction, imprisonment, death penalty 
or so on (Deutsch, 2005). 
Parallel to retributive justice's definition of crime, ideal justice can only be served 
when guilty perpetrators are equitably punished and the laws and civil order are restored 
19
solely by the exclusive responsibility of the state (Estrada-Hollenbeck,  2001, p.  68). 
However, the sense of justice that retributive justice may ensure can only be short-lived, 
because it does not provide any of the needs of the victims; information, participation in 
their cases, respect, and material and emotional reparation (Johnstone, 2004, p. 9). Even 
more  importantly,  instead  of  empowering  the  victim,  it  reinforces  the  sense  of 
victimization  (Zehr,  2002,  p.  31).  Therefore,  it  is  an  important  question  whether 
retributive  justice can bring  justice  for  all;  and  restorative  justice  is  born from this 
discussion. 
Restorative  justice  reemerged  in  the  “modern”  sense  to  prevent  the  inhumane 
conditions in prisons against the prisoners, and more importantly to recover the harms of 
injustice by focusing on the victims and to transform the conditions which gave rise to 
these crimes by acknowledging them at the first place (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 564-565). 
Therefore,  the  aim  of  restorative  justice  is  to  complement  the  deficiencies  that 
retributive  justice  cannot  fulfill.  It  is  a  myth  that  retributive  justice  and  restorative 
justice  are  the  opposites  and  restorative  justice  is  a  pre-modern  form  of  justice 
composed of indigenous practices which gave its place to retributive justice (Daly, 2002, 
p. 56).  
Restorative justice focuses on the needs of crime victims that crimes create; it 
might  be  information  about  the  offense,  truth-telling,  empowerment,  restitution  or 
vindication (Zehr,  2002,  p.  14-15).  In  that  sense,  whereas most  prevailing  forms  of 
restorative justice can be  seen as apology and  reparation,  it  is  also  possible  to  find 
different ways of restitution such as shaming, remembering or compensation. The forms 
of restorative justice can be designed according to the wrong-doing or the needs of the 
victim in that  particular  context. Also at  the same time,  one of the main motives of 
restorative justice is to encourage offenders to understand the harm they created and to 
help them develop empathy and responsibility towards victims (Zehr, 2002, p. 17). In 
this regard,  it  is  a  space for  parties to  communicate each other about  the crime, its 
consequences, and the needs and the responsibilities it creates (Sharpe, 2004, p. 26). The 
main aim of restorative justice is to prevent future injustice by increasing trust between 
the  parties  (Estrada,  2001,  p.  74).  It  tries  to  build  a  form of engagement  between 
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offenders, victims, and community members by inclusive, collaborative processes (Zehr, 
2002, p. 25-26).  
Since restorative justice envisages that injustice as harmed relationships instead of 
crimes against the laws and the state, justice requires taking responsibility to heal the 
harms and to remedy the relationships rather than punishing the perpetrator (Sawatsky, 
2003, p. 5). Justice can only be restored when the violated social contract is renegotiated 
and rearranged (Sharpe, 2004, p. 24-25). However, what is also crucial at this level in 
particular and at every level in general is to keep in mind the context, culture, and the 
time  period,  because  justice  requires  a  holistic  vision  to  comprehend  the  whole 
framework (Sawatsky, 2003, p. 6-11). 
Restorative justice aims the activation of internal values within the offenders to 
engage them into self-regulatory behaviors (Tyler, 2006, p. 309). Therefore, its scope 
focuses on the psychology of the offenders and makes them understand the other side of 
the issue. However, this understanding is criticized by failing to see the fact that crimes 
emerge from a flawed society which lack wholeness (Lofton,  2004,  p.  385).  In that 
sense,  the crime does not  only belong to  the individuals  who committed that  crime. 
Rather,  they also are the victims  of the system, because crimes are produced by the 
system itself. Activation of the internal values of the offenders does not ensure justice, 
because the system through its structure and institutions runs in a way that leads some of 
its citizens to get involved in some sort of a crime. That is why in order to eliminate the 
root  causes of these crimes,  focusing only one side of the issue is  not  sufficient.  It 
requires reparation of flaws of the society and ensuring wholeness in that society.    
1.1.7. Justice as a holistic concept
Although every concept mentioned above has a particular importance in providing 
justice and creating social cooperation, what is also crucial in justice discussions is to 
evaluate justice as a totality. In a particular society or group, it does not make sense to 
focus only one dimension of justice and ignore the others. As long as these concepts, 
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mentioned above or some additional ones that are not touched upon within the above 
discussion, are taken separately, the root causes of injustice cannot be eliminated. It is 
crucial to understand that the concepts relevant to justice are intertwined to one another, 
because justice is not something from which one can choose some aspects and leave the 
others. Therefore, if justice is not taken as a holistic concept, where every dimension has 
its own importance in the bigger totality, then discussing how justice can be provided 
will be a useless discussion. 
Folger,  et  al. (1995)  state  that  since  a single  norm of justice  can overshadow 
different perceptions of justice and injustice, there has to be more grounds for justice to 
be discussed in terms of what fairness is and what it  is not (p. 278).   Since there are 
multiple perceptions of fairness, justice with respect to these perceptions of fairness can 
vary accordingly (Folger, et al., 1995, p. 278). As opposed to the static conditions with a 
monolithic sense of justice, changing dynamics require different forms of justice. There 
can  be  multiple  sources  of  disagreements  coming  from  injustice;  therefore,  the 
ambiguity that unstable conditions may cause can only be overcome by the multiplicity 
of justice conceptualizations (Folger,  et al., 1995, p. 278-280). In other words, Folger, 
et.al suggest that there have to be alternatives of the implementation of a policy in order 
to alleviate forms of injustice (Folger, et al., 1995, p. 282). 
Considering Folger, et al.'s main idea, the important point here is to keep in mind 
how justice as the combination of multiple factors is in need of divergent point of views, 
and at the same time how much it needs to be looked as a totality. In his article in order 
to construct an inclusive citizenship and to overcome possible forms of injustice, Kabeer 
(2002) strictly underlines the requirement to go beyond the simple policy analysis and 
raise the discussions about individual identity, social movements or group dynamics (p. 
13). Since all the factors affect inclusive citizenship, staying at the level of law can not 
bring genuine inclusiveness.  Rather,  inclusive citizenship  can only be possible  when 
institutions and access to them are transparently discussed; when issues of identity, how 
people define themselves and how they are defined by others are addressed; and when 
associations and collective action patterns are understood. In that sense, justice is not a 
quick-fix system; it  requires to be taken as a whole and in-depth with all its historical 
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connections. 
Amartya Sen sums up the whole idea of this section in The Idea of Justice (2010); 
where he states that injustice runs on many different levels and saying that injustice has 
one dominant reason will not be a correct diagnosis (p. 2). As parallel to what Folger, et 
al. mention above, justice does not revolve around one main idea. As long the contexts 
change,  the  components  that  justice  requires  will  change  accordingly.  That's  why 
eliminating injustice requires the multiplicity of point of views in evaluating justice and 
more importantly an approach to dwell into the depth of injustice. 
Justice  can be considered  as a  process or  as  an outcome.  In  order  to  achieve 
justice,  justice has to involve some components and a functioning mechanism at  the 
same time. It is  not  possible to talk about  justice,  if  some  factors of it  are missing. 
Likewise,  if justice does not work properly,  then it  is  not  justice at  all.  That  is  why 
justice requires the combination of processes and outcomes. 
Justice requires a holistic view, not only because every single element within the 
dynamics matter, but  also because every context  has its  own dynamics.  Therefore,  a 
monolithic view of justice will hinder to look at the particular dynamics of that situation. 
A case has  to  be  taken in  terms of its  historical bounds,  sociological dynamics  and 
cultural characteristics. Therefore, in order to diagnose injustice and recover it, justice 
has to be taken into consideration from each aspect.
1.2. Injustice as a source of conflict
One of the reasons why a conflict between groups in the same society emerges in 
the first place or is maintained is the existence of a state of injustice or the sense of it. 
Perceptions of injustice can be based on the expectations of individuals and groups or 
their comparative situations relative to the others within the same society.  Groups who 
form their group identity based on their ethnicity, religion, culture, gender, language or 
any other reason compare their 'have's or 'have-not's with other groups and shape their 
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sense of justice and injustice according to the positions and statuses of these groups. 
When the conflicts stem from the differences in ethnicity, ethnic conflicts can be 
seen in two forms; either between different ethnic groups or between an ethnic group 
and the state dominated by another ethnic group. In cases where the ethnic minorities as 
a  group sense injustice  or experience  discrimination because of their  group identity 
within  a  nation-state,  injustice  or  the  sense  of it  becomes  the  main  reason  of that 
particular conflict within the society or the conflict between a particular ethnic group 
vis-à-vis the state. 
Injustice as a  source of a conflict  can be explained through various theories of 
conflict resolution or conflict transformation. However, the main idea in these kinds of 
conflicts  is  that  one  or  more  particular  groups  suffer  from the  asymmetric  power 
relations where one dominant  group suppresses the others and becomes the source of 
injustice  where  goods,  services,  rights,  political  authority  or  any  relevant  power 
mechanism are not open to all.  
In  Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr (1971) states that if value expectations of a group 
and its value capabilities do not correspond to one another, relative deprivation arises (p. 
13). The deprivation is relative in the sense that there is a discrepancy between what an 
individual or a  group expects and what  they can get.  Therefore,  relative deprivation 
refers to the tension between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction (Gurr, 
1971, p. 23). 
The value expectations of an individual or a group are determined according to the 
value positions which that  individual or group thinks that  they are entitled to (Gurr, 
1971, p. 27). They may expect their value capabilities to be arranged according to the 
changing dynamics or they may expect to keep their capabilities as they are. What is 
common in each case is  that  the intensity of the relative deprivation is  based on the 
perception of that particular individual or the group (Gurr, 1971, p. 29). 
Gurr categorizes values into three; (i) welfare values, which refer to physical well-
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being and self-realization;   (ii)  power values,  which refer  to influence to the others, 
participation in decision making, and the security of positions; and (iii)  interpersonal 
values, which refer to psychological satisfactions,  status,  communality,  and ideational 
coherence (1971, p. 25-26). 
The values that ethnic identities expect in the context of nation-states involve all 
of the three values mentioned. In this sense,  justice can be regarded as the situation 
where these values are fulfilled. When an individual's or a group's expectations about 
justice do not correspond to what they get as a just outcome, relative deprivation arises. 
The sense of injustice or injustice itself can become the source of the conflict in some 
cases,  and  which  at  the  end  may also  evolve  into  violence.  Injustice  sensed  by an 
individual  or  a  community  can  be  resulting  from  the  physical  insecurity,  being 
suppressed by the dominant majority, dissatisfaction related to its group status within the 
bigger society,  or a combination of all.  In each case as long as the individual or the 
group who have the sense of injustice think that what they are entitled to is not met, the 
discrepancy in their perceptions and the root causes of the conflict cannot be eliminated. 
Since the injustice that an individual or a group has to face with is the outcome of the 
contradiction between the 'ought' and the 'is', as long as this expectation of justice is not 
fulfilled, the source of the conflict will be sustained.  
Deutsch  and  Steil  (1988)  state  that  injustice  can  be  the  outcome  of  a 
disproportionate distribution principle or of the methods through which the distribution 
is made (p. 5-7). The distribution and the procedures through which the decisions are 
made  could be the source of injustice.  The distribution problem may stem from the 
quality or the quantity of what is distributed, if not both. In either case, the distribution 
principle has to take into account the conceptions of the society without disregarding the 
just procedures that could bring the just outcomes acceptable by the society in question. 
In both cases, whether the source of injustice is the distribution principle or the 
procedures by which the distribution is made, those who suffer from injustice and those 
who take an advantage from the unjust situation need to maintain their self-esteem. This 
need of preserving self-esteem causes opposite reactions to injustice (Deutsch and Steil, 
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1988,  p.  9).  Whereas  one side,  because  of its  position,  does not  react  to  a  case of 
injustice and disregards it, for the other side it  can be regarded as the most important 
thing to  be fixed. Parties'  or groups' sensitivity to  injustice varies according to their 
positions  within  that  particular  conflict.  Victims  and  perpetrators  perceive  injustice 
differently, and sometimes perpetrators do not even think that there is injustice.   
Deutsch  and  Steil  emphasize  the  explanation  that  the  major  theme  for  the 
sensitivity to injustice is  the deprivation that  a  group experiences (1988, p. 11).  The 
deprivation that  they are talking about  differs from what  Gurr  theorizes in  that  it  is 
relative to others rather than relative to the expectation of the same individual or the 
group. In that sense, the group's standards, status or what they have are compared to the 
standards of other groups. 
While comparing what the group is deprived of, Deutsch and Steil also underline 
the classification which Runciman brings into the discussion; egoistical deprivation and 
fraternal  deprivation  (1966).  Egoistical  deprivation  refers  to  a  disadvantage  that  an 
individual feels relative to the other individuals; and fraternal deprivation refers to a 
disadvantage that a group feels relative to the other groups (Runciman, 1966, cited in 
Deutsch and Steil, 1988, p. 12). 
Either in Gurr's or in Runciman's conceptualization of deprivation, the sense of 
injustice deepens when the discrepancy between what a person perceives she is entitled 
to and what this person gets becomes bigger.  It  does not matter whether that  person 
compares her expectations with her capabilities or she compares her capabilities with 
the capabilities of others. Individual's or the group's sense of justice is determined by the 
perception what (s)he thinks (s)he is entitled to. 
According to  Deutsch and Steil,  there are five  factors that  can influence one's 
conception of what (s)he is entitled to; “(i) the ideologies and myths about justice that 
are dominant and officially supported in one's society; (ii) the amount of one's exposure 
to ideologies and myths that  conflict  with those that are officially supported and are 
supportive of larger claims of oneself; (iii)  experienced changes in one's satisfaction-
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dissatisfaction; (iv) one's knowledge of what others who are viewed as comparable to 
oneself are getting; and (v) one's bargaining power” (1988, p. 13-14). Different  from 
Gurr's theory of relative deprivation, what is crucial in Deutsch and Steil's argument is 
the emphasis on the institutions to eliminate the sense of injustice that  may cause a 
conflict  within the society or among the groups.  They state that  unlike the common 
assumption that the victim is the one that should be recovered, the social pathology lies 
within the institutions or in the people who built those institutions, because they are the 
ones who maintain the suppressed and suppressor positions,  create the disadvantages 
(Deutsch and Steil, 1988, p. 21) and protract the social conflict within the society. 
Deutsch  (2006),  in  his  writings  on  justice  and  conflict,  adds  that  perceived 
injustice is always the source of a conflict; if the parties think that the processes and 
outcomes of a conflict are unjust, then the instability that the conflict resolution brings 
furthers the conflict (p. 56). Since the victim's and the perpetrator's sense of justice are 
different from one another, in a case where injustice is not eliminated from the outcome 
or from the procedure, the conflict escalates (Deutsch, 2006, p. 56). 
In  addition  to  the  factors  Deutsch  and  Steil  give  that  could  influence  one's 
conception of what she is entitled to, Deutsch (2006) mentions the fact that discontent, 
social unrest, and rebellion are common after the periods of improvement in political-
economic  conditions  (p.  47).  Improvements  in  political-economic  conditions  bring 
higher expectations with respect to entitlements.     
According to Burton (1990), the cause of a conflict is the dissatisfaction of the 
basic human needs. In this sense, needs refer to basic requirements to maintain the life 
of an individual or a group.   He mentions seven of the needs as basic; consistency in 
response,  stimulation,  security,  recognition,  distributive  justice,  appearance  of 
rationality, meaning, control and role defense (Tidwell, 2001, p. 79). As long as these 
basic needs are not met, conflict may arise. It is also crucial to look at the social context 
from which the dissatisfaction arises as the cause of the conflict, while elaborating on 
needs (Tidwell,  2001, p. 77). The social context can influence how the dissatisfaction 
arising from the non-fulfillment of needs is perceived. Besides, from context to context 
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the importance of a particular can need increase or decrease.      
In addition to Burton, Tidwell (2001) emphasizes the fact that since in a conflict 
individuals or groups indicate their interests, the satisfaction of the basic needs may not 
be the source of the conflict reduction (p. 77). Meeting the basic needs would eliminate 
the root causes of the conflict.  However,  since individuals or groups do not directly 
reflect their needs within conflicts but their interests, it  may not directly eliminate the 
sources of a conflict. Another important point what Tidwell underlines is that unsatisfied 
needs are the results of the power relations embedded within the institutions; that's why 
without controlling the use of power it  is  not possible to satisfy the needs,  including 
justice (2001, p. 79). 
A conflict resulting from dissatisfaction of the basic human needs or the lack of 
justice can be transformed into a protracted social conflict. According to Azar (1990), 
the context of a conflict, the role that the state, the military or the communal groups 
play, satisfaction or the dissatisfaction of the needs of security, identity, or access play 
an important  role in the maintenance of a conflict and the transformation of it  into a 
protracted one. The conflict may become more destructive as a result of the denial of the 
basic human needs which at the end leads to further the denial of them (Miall, 2004, p. 
5).  The non-recognition and denial of the satisfaction of the basic  needs  with other 
components such as the embeddedness of this discourse within the state institutions and 
the society lead the conflict to be protracted and hard to resolve at the end. Therefore, 
eliminating  the  causes  of  a  conflict  always  requires  considering  the  structure,  the 
broader framework of the conflict not to sustain, if not strengthen, it. 
Kaldor and Luckham (2001) look at the cause of conflicts from another point of 
view. They state that the source of the contemporary conflicts is most of the time the 
desire for access to state power. Since the legitimacy of political authority is eroded and 
the state power is privatized as a result of globalization, having state power becomes 
having the means to extract the resources as a particular group (Kaldor and Luckham, 
2001, p.  48-53).  Therefore,  through access to state power,  those who can access this 
power  and  his/her  privileged  networks  acquire  all  the  opportunities  that  this  power 
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brings- jobs, enrichment, status, recognition-; this power struggle becomes a matter of 
inclusion or exclusion (Kaldor and Luckham, 2001, p. 53-54). At the same time, each 
political group's justification of the state power differs and they base their power on a 
particular form of identity, such as religion, language, ethnicity (Kaldor and Luckham, 
2001,  p.  54).  Therefore,  the  competition  for  the  access  to  the  state  power  and  its 
capabilities among the divergent political groups lead each grouping to favor its identity 
at the expense of the others. Kaldor and Luckham's discussion in the context of justice 
means that each political grouping constitutes an understanding of justice that presents 
their interests. Since rival political groupings construct their own sense of justice and 
legitimacy, and create a form of state in which the national identity is shaped through 
their needs, there will be neither equality nor justice for all. 
Unlike the theories mentioned above, in Kaldor and Luckham's explanation of the 
sources of contemporary conflicts, economic transformation and globalization become 
the main determinant of the change of the state from the societal regulator towards an 
instrument  for the extraction of resources and the creator of the privileged networks 
(Kaldor and Luckham, 2001, p. 54). In that sense, injustice does not directly play a role 
in  initiating  a conflict.  However,  as  a  result  of the competition among  the political 
groups and the unequal distribution of the resources based on identity, identity groups 
seek more power for justice and even for their survival. Justice becomes something that 
groups can achieve only when they have the political and economic power.  
In their article, on the beliefs that may propel groups toward conflict, Eidelson and 
Eidelson (2003) mention about five belief domains -superiority, injustice, vulnerability, 
distrust, and helplessness- relevant to conflicts both at the individual and at the group 
levels.  About  the  sense  of injustice,  they  state  that  the  sense  of injustice  which  is 
dependent  on the historical perspective helps to construct  an in-group and out-group 
differentiation, where the group who holds the sense of injustice has deep grievances 
against the other group or authority (Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003, p. 185). Whereas the 
past  experiences of exploitation and mistreatment  construct  a  collectivity among the 
victims as a group based on their identity, they also create “us” vs. “them” dichotomy 
which eventually puts the seeds of the social conflict into the society.
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Considering that social exclusion is one of the concepts of injustice, Stewart, et al.
(2006)'s  work  on  social  exclusion  and  conflict  is  worth  mentioning  within  this 
discussion. Whereas they are defining social exclusion as an economic deprivation and 
inaccessibility to  political power,  they also  see it  as  a  source of social mobilization 
through which deprived groups come together and create a group affinity (Stewart,  et  
al., 2006, p. 6). Cultural differences should not be taken as the source of mobilization 
though; the group mobilization starts when these cultural differences are combined with 
group deprivations (Stewart, et al., 2006, p. 6). In that sense, socio-economic exclusion 
is not enough to understand how the conflict is emerged and how the dynamics of the 
conflict work (Stewart, et al., 2006, p. 10). 
Sen (2008) in his article,  Violence, Identity, and Poverty, shows the relationship 
between poverty, injustice and rebellion. He states that deprivation or poverty makes a 
person or a group outraged. The injustice and the inequality that a group of people are 
experiencing are the reasons for anger and fury, which appear in the form of rebellion, 
and sometimes even as bloody rebellion (Sen, 2008, p. 7). A group who is deprived of 
some resources of who is  compelled to poverty will eventually feel desperation and 
anger; the helplessness with the rage causes violence which will seem as the only option 
for  survival.  In  that  sense,  he  also  criticizes  the  theory  of  clash  of  civilizations 
(Huntington, 1996) through which violence is tried to be explained at the global level.  
In  order  not  to  be  trapped  into  economic  reductionism,  Sen  emphasizes  the 
importance of an integrated picture of a conflict and dynamics of it (2008, p. 11). Ideas 
of identity,  culture,  and political economy are integrated into one another; therefore, 
instead  of an  'either-or'  approach,  one  has  to  embrace  a  comprehensive  framework 
where  cultural,  social  factors  and  political  economy  are  important  elements  to 
understand why violence takes place (Sen, 2008, p. 12). In a system where poverty and 
inequality are associated with racial or ethnic groups or other non-economic identities, it 
is a must to avoid isolationist programmes of explaining violence (Sen, 2008, p. 15). 
It  is  crucial  to  emphasize  that  justice  is  a  totality.  Every aspect  of justice  is 
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important in order to provide a comprehensive framework of justice. In this discussion, 
what is also important is to understand how justice is constructed within that particular 
society.  What  determines justice is  the meaning that people in that particular society 
attaches to it. In that sense, justice is contextual. It recreates and reproduces its meaning 
within the societies and in interaction to them. That's why it is important to keep in mind 
that the perceptions of injustice change from context to context or even from individual 
to individual.
By looking  from a psychological  perspective;  since  the  sense  of injustice  and 
justice is subjective, this subjectivity may also be the source of the conflict. Mikula and 
Wenzel (2000) state that one of the functions of justice is its trigger function, by which 
perceptions of injustice can cause the social conflicts (p.  127).  Even if  the sense of 
justice and injustice is  socially shared, individuals may have different  perceptions of 
injustice (Mikula and Wenzel, 2000, p. 127). From the individual to individual what he 
or she understands by injustice can vary and this subjectivity itself may lead to a social 
conflict.    
What  is  more  important  in  this  context  than subjectivity  is  to  understand  the 
variations among groups' sense of injustice. However, instead of a purely psychological 
understanding,  this  time  the  access  to  power  is  a  significant  factor  to  understand 
different  perceptions of injustice across groups.  Access to power brings the issues of 
social subordination or exposure to harsh crime control with it, besides the equal access 
to resources or goods (Buckler et al., 2008, p. 37). Also asymmetric power may lead to 
an unjust distribution, procedure or treatment that is also the cause of a social conflict 
(Mikula and Wenzel,  2000, p.  128). Since groups are prone to pay attention to their 
deprivations based on their group identity, factors relevant to power relations influence a 
group's sense of injustice and reshape their positions as individuals vis-à-vis the power 
holders.    
Considering  the  perceptions  of  injustice  of  groups  relevant  to  their  access  to 
power,  the historical and social perspective  through which the whole process of the 
conflict  evolves has  to  be considered.  As  Buckler,  et  al.  mention,  minority citizens 
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perceive injustice with respect to the historical and social context that they have been 
exposed to (2008, p. 38). In short, in addition to the subjectivity of the perception of 
injustice, there are many variables which have an impact on the conflicts, such as class 
or economic status of minority groups (Hagan, 1982; Buckler, et al., 2008). That's why 
it is worth restating that the sense of injustice which is taken as the potential source of 
social conflicts is a totality composed of many elements and influenced by many factors. 
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CHAPTER II | THE SOCIAL CONTEXT 
In the earlier chapter, I mentioned about the contextuality of justice. Considering 
that discussion, in order to understand what  people mean by justice or to reveal their 
understandings,  as  much  as  covering  the  elements  through  which  justice  can  be 
discussed, considering the context is crucial. In that sense, throughout this chapter I am 
going to  present  the social context  of Turkey and the experiences  of the Kurds and 
Armenians in Turkey.  
2.1. The Turkish Nation State
The Ottoman Empire, which the Turkish State claims to be the successor of, was 
using  the  millet  system  to keep all the communities together as the Ottoman nation 
within  the  Empire.  This  system was  providing  the  ground  for  the  organization and 
integration of different social and ethnic groups within the Empire (Akman, 2004, p. 
33). The traditional  millet system  based on the religious and ethnic differences of the 
communities was not working any more to keep them together under the umbrella of an 
Ottoman nation. Particularly the non-Muslim communities in the empire was rebelling 
against  the  state  and  making  necessary for  the  reformist  elites  to  come up  with  a 
different solution to integrate them back (Kushner, 1997, p. 219). The Empire had to 
reform some elements in the organization of communities and to give up on the old 
system.  With this aim, the Ottoman state undertook reforms between the years of 1839 
and 1876 resulting with an end to the millet system (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 368). However, 
after the nationalist challenges and the defeat of the Empire in the Balkan Wars of 1912 
in particular, this system became something very hard to sustain (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 369). 
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The tool of the new Turkish reformist elites to integrate all the communities in the 
empire into one identity was nationalism. They used this ideology to reshape the nation, 
after they consolidated the state (Ergil, 2000, p. 46). The new Turkish State is a model of 
nation-state, whose nationhood was based on the ethnicity, religion and cultural identity 
of one majority group (Ergil,  2000, p. 46). They borrowed this idea mainly from the 
experience of advanced industrial European societies (Akman, 2004, p. 29). However, 
this nationalism should not be taken only in a patriotic form; it also carries cultural and 
racial elements of one dominant group (Kushner, 2000, p. 220).  
Turkish nationalism had been created by the Young Turks to preserve the Turkish 
identity within the Ottoman Empire,  which aimed to converse the communities with 
different cultural backgrounds to Turkism (Kushner,  1997, p. 221). However, even if 
Turkish  nationalism can  be  regarded  as  the  continuation  of  the  Ottoman  reformist 
tradition,  it  also  differed  from  it  by  being  order-in-progress  as  opposed  to  the 
unchanging order of millets (Akman, 2004, p. 34). 
Turkish nationalism is associated with the Ottoman reforms in the sense that they 
were  both  trying  to  create  a  sense  of  cohesion  among  the  remaining  peoples  and 
emerging out of the fear of partition and subversion (Ergil, 2000, p. 49). The fear that 
Christian, Kurdish or Armenian minorities would ally with the foreign powers to divide 
the  country,  later  known  as  the  Sevres  Syndrome,  influenced  the  way the  Turkish 
nationalism evolved  (İnce,  2012,  p.  122).  As  a  result,  Turkish  nationalism became 
something  that  imposed hegemonic  Turkish  identity on its  ethnically  heterogeneous 
population (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 364). 
The new Turkish state was established as a hegemonic nation-state (Yeğen, 2007, 
p.  126;  Ergil,  2000,  p.  43).  It  denied  the  existence  of  multi-ethnicity  and  multi-
culturality of the country,  except the religious minorities who were recognized in the 
Lausanne Treaty (Kirişçi, 2000, p. 1). Apart from the religious minorities, all citizens 
were regarded constitutionally as Turkish (Kushner, 1997, p. 222). 
Although all citizens were regarded as equals before the law, in practice they were 
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not  using equal democratic  rights.  There was a gap between substantive and formal 
citizenship (Kirişçi, 2000, p. 18). Kemalism, as the ideology of the new Turkish state, 
claimed that all the past inhabitants of the country were ethnically and racially Turkish 
and it  would  stay so (Çagaptay,  2004, p.  93).  The state  refused to  acknowledge the 
demands of the periphery (Akman, 2004, p. 38) and maintained its unmediated role by 
staying as uni-dimensional; transforming its ideology from the state to the society only 
(Ergil,  2000, p.  44-46).  The democratic  demands for the free expression of cultural, 
political and ethnic differences were denied and repressed (Akman, 2004, p. 44). The 
state did not only refuse to recognize these rights, but also it invited people demanding 
these rights to become Turks (Yeğen, 2007, p. 127), whereas non-Muslims stayed fully 
at  the periphery and were excluded from the country with respect  to  their  religious 
preferences (İçduygu, et al., 2008, p. 365). 
Although the roots of the Turkish nationalism were based on racial and linguistic 
factors (Kushner, 1997, p. 228), the new Turkish identity emerged as the combination of 
two essential factors: religion (Sunni sect of Islam) and language (Turkish) (İnce, 2012, 
p. 119). Non-Muslim minorities were regarded as “others” who did not belong to the 
new nation (İçduygu  et al., 2008, p. 359). In that sense, non-Muslim peoples were an 
obstacle.  As  opposed  to  non-Muslim  minorities,  Muslim  minorities  were  granted 
Turkishness (Ergil, 2000, p. 51). However, since this ethnicity was constructed through 
language; those who did not speak Turkish were openly harassed (Çagaptay, 2004, p. 
98). This was the period of a social and political transformation of the country with the 
discourse of westernization (Akman, 2004, p. 25) and the aim was to rip all the ethnic 
and cultural differences off the country to create a homogenized society (Ergil, 2000, p. 
51). 
In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne recognized 3 minority groups: Armenians, Greeks 
and Jews. The main motivation behind this recognition was the fact that non-Muslim 
minorities were regarded as potential enemies of the Turkish nation (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 
363).  Therefore,  this  recognition was  the confirmation of the fact  that  they did  not 
belong to Turkey; they were outsiders. This was not the only attempt of the state for the 
homogenization of the population.  Right  before the Lausanne  Treaty,  the state  used 
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some  methods  like  expulsion  or  killing.  Armenians  were  massacred  during  the 
deportations of 1915-16, Greeks were exchanged or they were all forced to leave the 
country by  further  threats  or  enforcements  (Yeğen,  2007,  p.  125).  The  aim  was  to 
subtract them from the picture.  
The way of assimilation was open to those minorities, who were not ethnically 
Turkish (Çagaptay, 2004, p. 97). Their citizenship rights were granted as long as they 
were assimilated into Turkishness (Yeğen, 2007, p. 138). Kurds also were in this group. 
They were seen as future-Turks since the foundation of the Republic (Yeğen, 2007, p. 
137).  Since  the  national  identity  was  not  negotiated  with the  groups  with  different 
cultural backgrounds, the situation created its neglected and excluded groups, who were 
going to struggle for their rights (Ergil, 2000, p. 47). 
The Kurdish question can be defined as a resistance against the modern state and 
society, which were not recognizing Kurdish identity and cultural rights (Yeğen, 2007, 
p. 124). However, it  was regarded as the conservation of the past to the present by the 
nationalists of that time (Yeğen, 2007, p. 128).  Later, the movement was started to be 
seen as the discontent of the Kurdish people of their economic and social conditions 
(Kushner,  1997,  p.  224).  As  a  result  of the lack  of acknowledgment  for  years,  the 
struggle of the Kurdish people for their democratic rights and for the recognition of their 
identity evolved into a conflict that led to so many violations of rights and freedoms (see 
Bozarslan, 1992; Yavuz, 1998, 2007; International Crisis Group Report, 2011, 2012).  
Turkish political leaders  are still  reluctant  in  resolving  the former  conflicts  or 
acknowledging  their  devastating  results.  They  still  refuse  to  grant  cultural, 
administrative, political rights of Kurdish people or to acknowledge the past atrocities 
and violations of rights (see Oran, 2004). Turkish state still denies the massacres of 1915 
(see Dixon, 2010). However, since 1998 with the EU integration process, the EU has 
been using some leverage on Turkey for the extension of official recognition to  the 
Kurdish,  Alawite,  Assyrian groups  and  other  ethno-cultural  claims  (İçduygu,  et  al., 
2008, p. 378)4.  
4 For further information see Kaya, A.; Tarhanlı, T (Eds.). (2005) Türkiye'de çoğunluk ve azınlık politikaları: AB sürecinde 
yurttaşlık   tartışmaları.Tesev Yayınları.
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To sum up,  considering  aforementioned discussions,  the identity of the  ethnic 
minorities in Turkey were constructed as opposed to the Turkish state.  The conflicts 
between the Turkish state and ethnic groups did not only influence their sense of identity 
and how these identities were shaped, but  all this process of nation-building had an 
impact on their conceptualizations of justice. The ideology of Turkish State and all the 
actions  of the state  accordingly polarized  the  society by emphasizing  their  cultural, 
religious, linguistic differences by marginalizing them.   
2.2. Armenians in Turkey
Before presenting the features of the Armenians in Turkey, it can also be helpful to 
remind some historical information about the past of the Turkish Republic. Although the 
national identity policies of the Turkish Nation-State were mentioned above, there were 
also a couple of things specific to the Armenians or non-Muslim populations during this 
establishment period. 
Although the 1915  Meds Yeghern is crucial to comprehend the dynamics, while 
discussing the existence of the Armenians in the new Turkish Republic, we also need to 
remember the policies or events caused Armenians to lose their properties, or to leave 
their homeland and migrate.  It is not possible here to mention all the major events or 
policies. However, I want to remind Varlık Vergisi  (The Law on Capital Tax) in 1942, 
because  it  was  a turning  point  in  the creation of the  national economy of the  new 
Turkish Republic.  It  forced mainly non-Muslim people to pay for their “undeserved” 
income that they gained from the black market during the war by taking advantage of 
war time conditions (Kuyucu, 2005, p.  370).  With this tax,  the real intention was to 
eliminate the non-Muslim bourgeoisie by taking over their properties.  The law led those 
non-Muslims who could not pay the high amounts of money either to end up in working 
camps or to sell their properties. In that sense, law on capital tax in particular, along with 
the other  policies  regarding private property,  is  crucial  to  understand  the change of 
property in  Turkey,  which meant  creating a new bourgeoisie  or Islamification of the 
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bourgeoisie (İçduygu, et al., 2008, p. 366-367).  
As much as the historical background of the relationship between Armenians and 
the Turkish State, major features of the Armenians in Turkey and their identity should be 
mentioned to grasp the picture of the Armenians in Turkey and in  Istanbul.  It  is  not 
possible to give an exact  number for the Armenians population in Turkey. However, 
according  to  the  unofficial  sources,  it  is  estimated  that  there  are  50.000  to  70.000 
Armenians  living  in  Turkey today (Aljazeera,  26 Nov.  2009).  Whereas most  of the 
Armenian population is living in Istanbul, there are still Armenians living in Anatolia, 
where they migrated from at the first place. However, again it is not very likely to give a 
number of the Armenians living in Anatolia or to specify them. It is  estimated that a 
considerable number of Armenians in Anatolia were Turkified or Kurdified or integrated 
into the society by hiding their Armenian identity.  In that  sense, Istanbul became the 
center  for  Armenians  where they could find  the means  to  sustain their  identity  and 
existence (Yumul, cited in Özdoğan et al., 2009, p. 339).  
Whereas  it  is  possible  to  mention  the  differences  between  the  Armenians  of 
Istanbul and the Armenians of Anatolia heavily based on urban-rural distinction, there 
are also some cultural variations among them (Özdoğan et al., 2009, p. 339). Most of 
the Armenians of Anatolia  cannot  speak Armenian because of the lack of Armenian 
schools in the cities they emigrated from, and even if they are living in Istanbul now, 
they do not prefer to send their children to Armenian schools (Özdoğan et al., 2009, p. 
339).  Also the Armenians of Anatolia differ from the Armenians in Istanbul in that they 
are holding and maintaining Anatolian customs and traditions (Özdoğan et al., 2009, p. 
339). Even if the most of the Armenians of Anatolia are living in Istanbul now, there are 
still differences between their Armenian identities. In that sense, it is not possible to talk 
about  homogeneity  among  the  Armenians  in  Istanbul  considering  urbanization  and 
modernization practices. 
The urban-rural distinction is not the only criterion that creates diversity among 
Armenians.  Also  there is  diversity  in  terms  of religion.  Although the  Armenians  in 
Turkey vary in  terms  of their  religious  sect  as  Apostolic  (Gregorian),  Protestant  or 
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Catholic,  they  unify  under  the  roof  of  Christianity.  Undoubtedly,  there  can  be 
exceptions; however,  the strong link between the Armenian identity and Christianity 
cannot be denied (Özdoğan et al., 2009, p. 319). The church has a considerable authority 
upon Armenians. 
On the other  hand,  the language  is  losing its  power  among the Armenians  in 
Turkey. According to Özdoğan  et al.'s (2009) research, the majority of all age groups 
speak Turkish better than Armenian (p. 309). They state that the rate of those who are 
better at Turkish than Armenian is even higher among the youth (19-24 age) (2009, p. 
309).  Even in the cases where members of the family are good at Armenian, they either 
prefer to talk in Turkish or Armenian and Turkish mixed at home. This research also 
reveals  three  problems  for  the  sustainability  of  the  Armenian  language:  the 
marginalization of the Armenian language in  the daily life,  the lack of teachers who 
know Armenian, and the lack of education materials in Armenian (Özdoğan et al., 2009, 
p. 313).   
Despite the low rate of the Armenian population in Turkey, the interaction among 
the members of the ethnic identity is not that low. They owe this intense communication 
to being a community and staying in the same surroundings. Arus Yumul, in “Religion,  
Community and Culture: The Turkish Armenians” (1992)5 states that the Armenians in 
Turkey  have  four  elements  to  be  named  as  cemaat  (community):  “1.  in-group 
preferences,  2.  in-group  marriages  (endogamy),  3.  rites,  4.  social  audit”  (cited  in 
Özdoğan  et al.,  2009, p.  350). Although the Armenians in  Istanbul live in  ethnically 
diverse  districts,  according  to  assessments  of Gülüm Şener,  they  are  still  living  in 
particular  districts  such  as  Feriköy/Şişli,  Kocamustafapaşa,  Yeşilköy,  Bakırköy, 
Beyoğlu, Kumkapı, Üsküdar and Kadıköy (Özdoğan et al., 2009, p. 350).  Additionally, 
community foundations, churches, and summer houses in the same districts help them to 
maintain their Armenian identity and its cultural traits. 
In addition to the aforementioned events in the past and general information about 
Armenians, recent incidents deserve to be mentioned in this context to understand the 
5  Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Oxford University
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experiences  of  the  Armenians  in  Turkey from a  broader  perspective.  One  of  these 
incidents is the assassination of Hrant Dink, who was an executive editor of Armenian 
newspaper Agos (Hurriyet, 19 Jan. 2007). Hrant Dink was a journalist and columnist 
writing  on  human  rights,  peace,  and  reconciliation  between  Armenians  and  Turks. 
Before he was shot by Ogün Samast, he was notified the relevant authorities that he was 
being  threatened  constantly  because  of  the  accusation  against  him  of  denigration 
Turkishness according to article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code6. That is why after the 
murder,  it  was  alleged that  the nationalist  cadres made  him a target  by twisting his 
statements.  Samast  was  regarded  only  as  the  triggerman;  the  public  regarded  the 
assassination as an organized crime involving political authorities.  Also the incidents 
following the assassination created a huge discussion. The officers who took a picture 
with Samast in front of a Turkish flag with proud created a huge repercussion in the 
media and caused reactions from the public. People as “Friends of Hrant” marched to 
draw attention to the court case, perpetrators and the search for justice for Hrant. The 
court case is still not closed and the perpetrators are not revealed yet. That is why the 
march on the 19th of January is repeated every year since 2007 to show the demand for 
justice.       
In 2011, the Monument of Humanity in Kars which was symbolizing the peace 
between two peoples, Armenians and Turks after the horrific past, was demolished by 
the prime minister's request  (Bianet 29 April 2011).  After his visit  to the city,  Prime 
Minister  Erdoğan  called  ucube  (freak)  to  the  sculpture  and  requested  it  to  be 
demolished. The demolishment not only hurt the sense of justice of people in Turkey in 
general because a prime minister could simply request a monument to be demolished, 
but more importantly because this monument was presenting peace and good relations 
between two peoples and it was a way of remembering the past atrocities. 
Again in 2011, a solider of the Turkish Army with an Armenian descent, Sevag 
Balıkçı (age 25), was killed during his military service on the 24th of April in Batman 
(Radikal,  26  April  2011)7.  Initially,  according  to  the  testimonies  of officers,  it  was 
6 Article 301 of the penal code was on the denigration of Turkishness.It was amended in 2008. 
 
7 The date is specifically important here, because 24 April is the remembrance day of The 1915 Armenian Massacres. Sevag's 
death on this day is regarded as very suspicious and reinforced the allegations that he was murdered because of his Armenian 
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claimed  to  be an accident  and the soldier  shot  him unintentionally  while  they were 
“joking around” (Today's Zaman, 27 Jan. 2012). Then, one of the officers changed his 
testimony and  stated that  it  was  an intentional  act  (Today's  Zaman,  27 Jan.  2012). 
Although the legal expert  drew attention to the suspicious elements in  the incidents 
(Agos, 7 April 2012), and it was strongly alleged that he was murdered because of his 
Armenian descent, the prosecutor decided that there was no intention to kill and it was a 
reckless  homicide  (Agos,  26  March  2013,  2  April  2013).  The  court  sentenced  the 
perpetrator, Kıvanç Ağaoğlu for four years and five months in prison (Today's Zaman, 
26 March 2013).   The decision is  considered as unjust  by a considerable amount of 
people, including Sevag's family (Bianet, 4 May 2011). 
In 2012, Maritsa Küçük, an old Armenian woman, was killed brutally in Samatya 
at her home (Birgün, 19 Nov. 2013). First, it  was thought that it  was a theft murder. 
However, the way she was killed and the evidences in the crime scene were suspicious. 
The  incident  was  followed  by  similar  cases.  It  is  alleged  that  these  murders  were 
committed because of victims' Armenian descent and it was a hate crime. Eventually, the 
incidents created uneasiness among the Armenians.    
It is also possible to mention some other incidents that hurt the sense of justice or 
help to explain the experiences of Armenians in relation to their ethnic identity. I prefer 
to pick the incidents that can come up during the interviews, and have a place in people's 
memory or in their daily life conversations. However, undoubtedly there are also other 
incidents not mentioned in the historical documents or newspapers but still hurting the 
sense of justice of people in general or some identity groups in particular.       
2.3. Kurds in Turkey
Before looking at the Kurds in Turkey, it is important to consider the distribution 
of the Kurdish  population across  states (see  Figure  1).  Kurdish identity  or  Kurdish 
culture cannot be thought separate from the dynamics in the region. Although there are 
differences  in  the  understandings  and  conceptions  of Kurds  about  their  culture and 
descent.  
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identity depending on the region and the state they are living in, it is still a fact that they 
are sharing a sense of togetherness as Kurds.    
Figure 1: Distribution of Kurds in Middle East and Vicinity 
Source: Gulf/2000Project Change, Communication and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf. 
Online source. http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml 
On the other hand in the context of Turkey, according to the findings of KONDA 
(2010);  whereas  73,6  %  of  the  population  is  composed  of  Turks,  18,3  %  of  the 
population is  composed of Kurds and Zazas and the rest  8,2 % of the population is 
composed of other ethnicities (see Figure 2). In that sense, statistics indicate that Kurds 
and Zazas have a considerable proportion in Turkey, also seen in Figure 1. However, it 
is not possible to say that all Kurds in Turkey are living in a specific area. Although it is 
possible to talk about a region where the rate of the Kurdish population is higher and 
regarded as the Kurdish homeland because of their long existence,  and historical and 
cultural bonds with the region,  Kurds are scattered across the country as a result  of 
economic and political reasons, or personal preferences.  
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As  a  result  of  the  waves  of  migration  stemming  from economic  or  political 
reasons,  that  will  be  discussed  in  advance,  or  for  other  reasons  such as  university 
education, the Kurdish population in Turkey is scattered across regions. In addition to a 
region where the rate of the Kurdish population is higher, the big cities in particular are 
also rich in terms of ethnic diversity. The map prepared by KONDA (2010) shows how 
the Kurdish  population in  Turkey scatters across twelve  regions  (see  Figure 3).  By 
looking at the map, it is seen that Istanbul is an important immigration center for Kurds 
by holding 18 % of the Kurdish population in  Turkey.  In that  sense,  14,8 % of the 
population of Istanbul is Kurdish (KONDA, 2010, p. 19).  
Figure 3: Distribution of Kurds across twelve regions
Source:KONDA. (2010). Kürt Meselesini Yeniden Düşünmek, p. 20. 
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Besides  the  population  rate,  also  KONDA  research  (2010)  gives  some 
demographic  information,  while  comparing  Turks  and  Kurds  in  Turkey.  This 
comparison reveals the inequality between Kurds and Turks by showing the relevant 
data such as their income level, education level, employment, access to social security 
and the like.  Another factor to understand the inequality that Kurds are facing with in 
the regional scale can be the socio-economic development index (see Figure 4). In the 
figure,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  cities  with  higher  Kurdish  population  have  lower 
development indexes. The inadequate redistribution policies of the state, or as the state 
authorities claim the devastation that the ongoing war lasting for the last thirty years led 
to can be regarded as the results of this situation. In either case, this picture reflects the 
situation working to the detriments of Kurds. 
Figure 4: Provinces according to socio-economic development index levels
Another  important  information to  understand  the  context  can be  the  religious 
preferences of Kurds in Turkey. It is not possible to give a number or percentage about 
the religious preferences of people in general. However, it is possible to say that the high 
percentage of Kurds is Sunni or Alawite, following with a low percentage of Yezidis. It 
is  possible  to  find  people  with  other  religious  preferences  or  people  without  faith; 
however, they do not constitute a considerable percentage in the Kurdish society. 
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In addition to the demographics, what can also helps us to understand the Kurds in 
Turkey is the historical background. The relationship between the Kurds in Turkey and 
the Turkish State is  a  crucial part  of this historical background,  which can give the 
components to understand the Kurdish identity and the experiences of Kurds. As much 
as what Kurds are experiencing in today's context, what they were exposed to in the past 
shapes their understandings. That is why it is crucial to visit the literature on the Turkish 
Nation State and Kurds.  
After the Turkish identity construction with the new Republic,  Kurdish revolts, 
which started in  the 19th century against  the centralization policies of the Ottoman 
Empire, went to another level. Whereas the aim of the revolts was more or less the same 
with the earlier ones, with the establishment of the Republic in 1923 they also gained a 
nationalist tendency (see Yavuz, 2007). In 1925, under the leadership of Sheikh Sa'id, 
Kurdish groups revolted; however, at that time revolts had a religious tendency, which 
aimed to preserve the religio-tribal structure of the region (Yavuz, 2007, p. 62). In order 
to stop the revolt, the Turkish Army captured and hanged Sheikh Sa'id in Diyarbakır in 
1925. The revolts did not stop and strengthened its identity aspect and were transformed 
into a nationalist movement in reaction to the assimilationist policies of the state (Yavuz, 
2007, p. 62-63). 
The  revolts  against  the  Turkish  State's  assimilation  policies  continued  in  the 
following  years;  revolts  of  Ararat  between  1930  and  1931,  and  revolts  of  Dersim 
between 1937 and 1938 were the major ones. In order to prevent the revolts and change 
the  demography  of  the  region,  in  1934  law  on  settlement  organized  a  selective 
deportation,  deciding  who  could move to  where  (Yavuz,  2007,  p.  62).  In 1938,  the 
Turkish army took extra-ordinary measures against revolts and bombed the villages of 
Dersim.  The  Turkish  state  erased  Dersim from the  map  and  renamed  it  as  Tunceli 
(Yavuz,  2007, p.  62).  After  the defeats,  starting from the 1950s,  Kurdish population 
started to migrate to the big cities because of financial reasons (Çelik,  2010, p. 154). 
Later these migration flows were used as a base to say that the Kurdish question was 
resulting from the socio-economic reasons (Kushner, 1997, p. 224).
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The conflict between the Kurdish people and the Turkish state took a new form, 
after the 1980 coup d’état, when extra-ordinary measures were taken. A national quota 
had been imposed to prevent political parties to enter into the parliament, if they took 
less than 10 percent  of the national votes (Çelik,  2010, p. 160).  The Kurdish parties 
which were taking the 60-80 percentages of the votes in the region had to stay outside of 
the parliament  because they could not  pass over the electoral quota (Çelik,  2010, p. 
160). This in itself was an impediment for Kurds to enjoy their democratic rights and to 
state their demands in legal ways.  
After the establishment of the PKK in 1978, and especially after the 1980 coup, 
the conflict escalated and became violent. 1984 was acknowledged as the cornerstone of 
the start of the armed conflict because of the high numbers of deaths and violence in the 
region. As a result of this,  in 1987, the martial law which put 13 cities under OHAL 
(state of emergency) region was declared. OHAL regions were subject to decrees which 
were not tied to the decision of the constitutional court; which meant that there were 
special forms of legal and administrative laws exercised in the region different from the 
rest of the country (Yavuz, 2007, p. 67). State of emergency, which was renewed for 46 
times, lasted 23 years in some OHAL regions (Hurriyet, 30 Nov. 2002). 
One  of  the  tools  of  the  Turkish  State  in  the  1990s  to  suppress  the  Kurdish 
movement  was  enforced  disappearances.  Mainly  between  the  years  of  1980-2000 
around 1,353, people were taken into the custody by the security forces and disappeared 
under the custody (for detailed analysis see Hafıza Merkezi Report 1&2). These people's 
bodies  were  not  given  to  their  families,  if  not  the  body  turned  up  in  rural  areas 
(Whitman, 1993, p. 15).  
In the 1990s, also internal displacement policies were used to make Kurds move 
from the region. They were either forced to become village guards under the order of the 
military (put into action in 1985) or to leave their villages. They moved to nearby cities 
or settled down in big cities such as in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana (Çelik, 2010, 
notes). From 1985 to 2005, the estimated number of people who were forced to migrate 
in  Turkey's  migration  and  displacement  report  by  Hacettepe  University  is  between 
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953.680-1.201.200 from rural and urban areas (Tezcan, 2005).  However,  GOC-DER 
demonstrates that people who were forced to migrate because of security reasons were 
more than three millions (Akdeniz GOC-DER, October 2004).  
Kurdish IDPs who came to  the big  cities in  the 1990s settled down mostly in 
gecekondu's  (shantytown areas)  or  in  the  deprived  inner-city  areas  of the  big  cities 
(Yukseker,  2006, p.  41).  It  is  not  wrong to say that  forced migration ended up with 
spatial concentration of the displaced population (Adaman and Keyder, 2006, p. 21). At 
the same time, socio-economic and political processes of neoliberalism initiated by the 
state  reinforced this social  and  spatial  segregation of emerging  groups  (Candan and 
Kolluoglu, 2008, p. 9). Contemporary cities became the spatial forms of social exclusion 
and poverty through creating their own urban marginals (Candan and Kolluoglu, 2008). 
In that sense,  the internal displacement created a new generation; The Kurdish youth 
who  are  deeply  affected  by  the  state  of  emergency  and/or  displacement  becomes 
individuals who are jobless and little hope for the future (Yavuz, 2007, p. 68). 
On the other hand, forced migration also had an impact on the region where no 
likelihood is left for stock-breeding and agriculture (Yavuz, 2007, p. 68). That is  why 
the economic development of the region was interrupted. Although recently the state is 
trying  to provide the requirements for  victims of forced migration to return to their 
homes, this situation does not give enough confidence to people who have concerns of 
security and employment.    
There  are  countless  things  that  can  be  mentioned  in  this  context  in  order  to 
understand the Kurds in Turkey. However, it is not possible here to present every bit of 
it.  I tried to give the major events and important  points in the literature.  My aim by 
giving  these  events  and  points  is  to  show  the  links  and  interactions  between  the 
historical background and the understanding of justice of Kurds and discuss them in 
advance.  
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CHAPTER III | METHODOLOGY
The  purpose  of this  chapter  is  to  show how  the  data  were  collected  for  the 
research, which methods were used, and why these methods were chosen. After brief 
information why Kurds and Armenians were chosen for the research, the methods were 
introduced below. At the end of the chapter, a discussion on ethical concerns about the 
research and the limitations of the methodology are also included.  
The historical background of the relationship between the Turkish State and its 
ethnic minorities8 was already given in the literature review chapter. However, in order 
to understand why Armenians and Kurds were chosen to be compared in this study I 
again  tried to  present  the main  differences between these ethnically  and religiously 
diverse populations. 
Three ethnic identity groups, Jews, Greeks, and Armenians, of the new Turkish 
Republic were recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne, in 1923. Only these three ethnic 
minorities were provided their cultural rights based on their legally recognized minority 
status.  However,  the  new  Turkish  Republic  did  not  recognize  these  three  ethnic 
identities with the intention of ensuring the well-being of its citizens.  The state was 
aiming to marginalize these ethnically and religiously diverse populations by pointing 
them as potential enemies of the newly established Republic and of the construction of 
the new Turkish nation (Kuyucu, 2005, p. 363). By recognizing these identities, the state 
in  fact  was excluding  those whose identity components did not  fit  into  the Turkish 
national identity.  
8 “Minority” here is conceptualized with respect to the national identity definition of the Turkish State. Since those who hold the 
Turkish national identity, composed of the elements of Turkishness and Islam, are entitled to the power of the state, throughout 
this research other ethnic and religious identities are regarded as minorities. In that sense minority, in addition to being a legal 
term, means lacking access to the state power.
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On the other hand, for those ethnic groups whose religion was Islam, the situation 
was different. These ethnic identities were exposed to assimilation policies as the first 
step,  instead  of  expulsion  or  extermination  policies  as  in  the  case  of  non-Muslim 
minorities9.  Rather  than  marginalization  and  exclusion  practices,  the  state  chose  to 
assimilate their ethnic identity by holding their religion constant and to transform their 
ethnically and linguistically  different  identity (Çagaptay,  2004, p.  97).   The Turkish 
State  considered  ethnicity  as  something  that  could  be  easily  erased  as  long  as  the 
religion of that particular population was Islam. That is why the citizenship rights of 
Kurds  were given them on the condition of accepting  Turkishness  (Yeğen,  2007,  p. 
125). If they gave up on their language, there would be no obstacle for them to become 
members of the national identity. 
The aim of the new Turkish Republic was to homogenize the society by ripping 
off all the ethnic and cultural differences (Ergil,  2000, p. 51). In that sense, whereas 
Armenians were sacrificed because of their religion, the state tried to include Kurds by 
eliminating their cultural differences. That is why although both Armenian and Kurdish 
identities were not welcomed by the Republic, they were subjected to different policies 
during  the  construction  of  the  Turkish  national  identity.  Whereas  Armenians  were 
allowed to sustain the institutions through which they could enjoy their cultural rights 
deriving from their identity,  the existence of Kurds as a separate identity was totally 
denied. In that sense, whereas Armenians were excluded explicitly and discarded in the 
new Turkish Republic, Kurds was tried to be included into the new national identity by 
assimilation. In each case, the identity construction of the state caused sufferings for 
these two peoples in particular and the society in general. 
The aim of this research is to understand how the different backgrounds of these 
ethnic identity groups and their  relations with the state shape their  understanding of 
justice. The perspectives of the subjects are taken as the basis to reveal how the sub-
categories of justice are considered and how justice can be ensured by the state and 
9 In fact this is not completely true. In the history of the Turkish Republic, extermination or expulsion was practiced against the 
Muslims depending on their ethnic identity or which sect of Islam they were holding. However, the major tendency of the state 
was to assimilate these ethnic identities whose religion was Islam. In the conditions where the assimilation policies did not work 
or where the state could not prevent reactions against its authority, it used the methods of extermination or expulsion.    
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society.     
3.1. Research Design
In  order  to  fulfill  the  aforementioned  aim  and  collect  information  from the 
subjects, the research was designed with the interview method. After the data collection, 
the narratives of the interviewees were analyzed. In order to  give some information 
about how the interview method was designed and implemented, I am presenting a short 
information part below.  
3.1.1. Interview Method
In the interview method, the data are obtained from face-to-face interviews with 
the  participants.  The  main  difference  between  conversations  and  interviews  is  that 
interviews are structured forms of conversations whose questions are prearranged and 
usually  the answers  of the participants  are voice/video-recorded (Neuman,  2006,  p. 
305).  The  main aim of the interview method is  to  get  subjective  viewpoints of the 
participants  or  social  groups  (Flick,  2002,  p.  79).  Usually  studies  whose  research 
questions  focus  on  the  impact  of  a  concrete  event  or  the  subjective  handling  of 
participants  prefer  this  methodology  (Flick,  2002,  79).  Since  the  purpose  of  this 
research is to understand how the Armenians and Kurds living in Istanbul understand 
justice and how they perceive the forms of injustice, interview method is chosen. 
After choosing this methodology, the researcher also has to decide on the structure 
of the interviews. Based on the purpose of the research, interviews can be structured, 
semi-structured, or unstructured in terms of their questions, schedule and format (Berg, 
2009). Since justice is a broad term and the understanding of the participants are tried to 
be analyzed, semi-structured interview method was chosen for this research. 
In  semi-structured  interviews,  although  there  are  prearranged  questions,  the 
researcher can also probe on and digress from the prepared schedule (Berg, 2009, p. 
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105).  Open  questions  or  topics  raised  by  the  researcher  are  answered  by  the 
interviewees freely (Flick, 2002, p. 91). Therefore, what interviewees are going to say is 
completely up to their  decision (Gillham,  2000, p.  41).  Also in  order to reconstruct 
interviewees' subjectivity, different kind of questions can be asked (Flick, 2002, p. 80). 
In that way, the researcher can look at the data from a holistic perspective, while she can 
test the reliability of the questions. 
In this research, the interviews were prepared in a semi-structured way through 
which probing, follow-up questions and some digress were possible. In that way, I could 
find some chance to gain the confidence of my interviewees' to make them talk about a 
relatively sensitive  topic.  Derived  from the  literature,  the  interview  questions  were 
designed to ask the understandings of justice for each sub-category and the ways to 
ensure these sub-categories of justice. That's why I ask the participants to tell their own 
experiences of injustice for each sub-category. In that way, it became possible to discuss 
the issues explicitly.        
The  venues  were  chosen  according  to  the  request  of  the  interviewees.  The 
meetings  lasted  approximately  one  hour  without  a  break  and  were  conducted  in 
Turkish10. In order to prevent any bias, the interviewees were asked in which language 
they preferred to be interviewed. However, since as the researcher I did not have any 
Armenian and Kurdish language skills, participants were told that they could choose to 
be  interviewed  in  English  in  the  case  that  they  did  not  prefer  to  talk  in  Turkish. 
However, none of them chose this option since they all were comfortable with talking in 
Turkish to me.    
10 I as the researcher am not able to speak either Armenian or Kurdish. Since all my interviewees were aware of this fact, they 
preferred to talk in Turkish so that we could understand each other more clearly. It is also worth to mention here that with a 
couple of exception the interviewees are better at speaking Turkish than Armenian or Kurdish depending on their ethnicity. 
Although some of them can express themselves both in Turkish and in the language of their ethnic identity equivalently, it is not 
the case for all.  
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3.1.2 Sampling
  
3.1.2.1 Sampling Procedure
All the interviews were conducted in Istanbul and the interviewees were those 
who were living in  Istanbul.  However, they all were not born in  Istanbul.   Whereas 
some of them were born in  Istanbul,  there were also  interviewees  who  migrated to 
Istanbul with the purpose of starting their university education or as a  result  of the 
economic and political reasons. However, this variable created a significant difference 
between Armenians and Kurds. Whereas most of the Armenian interviewees were born 
in Istanbul,  for  Kurds this was not  the case.  In that  sense,  Kurds were also  sharing 
stories that  they experienced in  other cities where they were born or raised till  they 
moved to Istanbul.   
On  the  other  hand,  the  reason  behind  choosing  Istanbul  was  to  benefit  from the 
multicultural  and  multiethnic  character  of  the  place  as  a  metropolitan  city,  where 
participants could interact with other identity group members. In this way, the relations 
between ethnic groups, the patterns of social polarization and discriminatory treatments 
against them would be more observable as a result of the daily life interactions between 
different identities. 
I started my research with the self-identified Armenians and Kurds that I could reach in 
the first place from my close surroundings. However, I did not prefer to talk to people 
whom I personally knew well.  Instead I used those people as my gatekeepers. I used 
more than one gatekeeper from different  surroundings to ensure the diversity among 
interviewees. After I finished the first tour with the people that I reached through my 
gatekeepers, I used snowball sampling to contact more people. 
I  preferred  snowball  sampling11,  because  in  a  research  like  this  where  I,  as  the 
11 It is a way of non-random sampling that begins with one or two people and spreads out based on the information and 
interrelationships from these cases (Neuman, 2006, p. 223). With the contact information that the first round interviewees 
provide, the researcher contacts more people with the desired qualifications for the research. 
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researcher, have to earn the confidence of my interviewees, finding participants through 
reliable contacts helped them believe in my confidentiality and good intention.   Also 
another reason why I chose snowball sampling was to have a diverse group of people 
whose only common characteristic  was their  ethnicity.  In  that  way,  I  could  contact 
people from different places, socio-economic conditions, income levels,  backgrounds, 
genders, sexual orientations, ages, occupations etc. 
3.1.2.2 Sample Size
I  interviewed  13  Armenians  and  14  Kurds  living  in  Istanbul,  in  total  27 
participants, living in Istanbul. Since I could find patterns for each sampling group, I 
decided to stop with these many participants for each group.  As mentioned above the 
samples were composed of people with different characteristics. In that sense, in each 
sample  group  the  only  common  characteristic  of  the  interviewees  was  their  ethnic 
identity.  
Table 1: Distribution of the interviewees by sex
Sex/ethnic identity Kurdish Armenian
Woman 4 7
Man 9 6
Those who  did not  want  to  be 
categorized as either woman or 
man 
1 -
 
Table 2: Distribution of the interviewees by age range
Age/ethnic identity Kurdish Armenian
15 – 24 7 4
25 – 34 2 2
35 – 44 4 3
45 – 60 1 2
60 + - 2
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Table 3: Distribution of the interviewees by the place of birth
Place of birth/ethnic identity Kurdish Armenian
Istanbul 4 11
Outside of Istanbul 10 2
 
3.2. Ethical Issues
In this study,  all participants voluntarily agreed to  join the research and to  be 
interviewed. After the interviewees were informed about the study, they were also told 
that  they  could  leave  the  interviews  any  time  they  felt  uncomfortable.  After  the 
interviews,  each  interviewee  signed  the  consent  form.  A consent  form means  that 
interviewees are participating in the study by their choice and that they are free from 
fraud,  deceit,  duress,  or  similar  unfair  manipulation (Berg,  2009,  87).  Whereas  the 
consent  form that  they  signed  showed  that  they  voluntarily  became  a  part  of  the 
research, it also meant that their transcripts could only be used with their permission for 
the purposes of this research.  
This study acknowledges the fact that justice is a sensitive topic in the contexts 
where  people  do  not  feel  comfortable  enough to  talk  about  their  past  experiences. 
Considering the violent past that the Armenians and Kurds in Turkey suffered from, it 
would be very understandable if they did not want share their thoughts and feelings on 
justice in relation to their ethnic identities. Therefore, it  was very important for me to 
assure  the  interviewees  about  the  confidentiality  of the research.  The  names  of the 
participants are kept anonymous and I, as the researcher, am the only person who owns 
their transcripts and knows their real names. In order to protect the interviewees, their 
identities are kept hidden and pseudonyms are used to cover their real identities. 
Another  ethical  concern  during  my  interviews  was  about  the  trauma  that  the 
interviewees might have been going through as a result of the violations of their rights, 
the lack of recognition, unjust procedures, social exclusion from the broader society, the 
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lack  of  a  compensation  after  a  wrongdoing,  the  deprivation  of  resources  or 
opportunities, or the lack of access to institutions and power positions.  Therefore, I put 
extra care not to hurt the interviewees psychologically or to intervene into their rational 
integrity according to which their reality was constructed. To achieve this, I tried to be 
caring and to be a good listener as much as possible. 
3.3. Limitations of the Study
Since the study was conducted in Istanbul, it could be said that the mobilization of 
the interviewees was higher than those who were living in other cities of Turkey or who 
did not leave their homes for various reasons. Those who were immigrated to Istanbul 
changed their way of living, their livelihoods or maybe even their behavior patterns to 
fit  into  a  more  multi-ethnic,  multi-cultural  society due  to  the  diversity  in  Istanbul. 
Therefore, the relations between identity groups and the definitions of these identities 
can be different in Istanbul from the other cities in Turkey.  
Since  identity is  contextual and  is  influenced by exogenous  factors,  identities 
differ  from context  to context. In that sense,  the experiences of the members of that 
particular identity in big cities in general, and in Istanbul in particular have to be taken 
into account while discussing the identity.  Therefore, in this case it  is not possible to 
generalize the results of the study to Turkey, because the interviewees are influenced by 
the factors of urbanization or other city dynamics specific to Istanbul. That is why this 
study acknowledges the fact  that some results  of the study can only be seen in  this 
context and cannot be generalized to Turkey.      
Another limitation of the study may stem from the fact that there were only 27 
interviewees, 14 and 13 participants for Kurds and Armenians respectively. The number 
of the interviewees may not be sufficient to present data on the relationship between the 
ethnic identity and their understanding of justice, and to generalize the data to the whole 
members of the identity group. Also since these participants were contacted through 
snowball sampling, the collected information could be biased. Although the participants 
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have different characteristics, in terms of their gender, class, political participation, age, 
occupation, neighborhood, etc,  still it  cannot be said that all parts of the society are 
presented in the study. 
Another very important limitation of the study is the fact this research is trying to 
grasp a data that can be generalizable to the all members of the ethnic identity group. 
However, neither the Kurds not the Armenians in Istanbul or in Turkey are homogenous 
populations. By keeping the variable of the “city” constant, it still cannot be possible to 
assume that the data collected reflect the Kurds or Armenians living in Istanbul. In the 
result and discussion chapters, the data are presented as if it reflects the identity group; 
however, in fact the results do not go beyond inferences of the interviewees' narratives. 
Although the samples are diversified and include various preferences and features, the 
collected data cannot present more than the thoughts of each individual participated in 
the research. 
Last but not the least, the credibility of the methodology can be questioned in that 
since justice is a sensitive topic, it is possible that the interviewees do not choose to be 
sincere or share their genuine thoughts and feelings on the issue. However, this is one of 
the problems that  we have to acknowledge if  we are looking at  the perceptions and 
individual experiences of people from their perspective. In that sense, even the silences, 
the things they choose not to say or choose to say implicitly mean something about the 
general context that the study takes place in.  
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CHAPTER IV | ANALYSIS:  ARMENIANS IN ISTANBUL 
Before starting to  talk  about  what  ethnic  minorities  in  Istanbul understand by 
justice,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  how  important  their  ethnic  identities  are  for 
themselves  and  most  importantly  how they see  their  membership  to  that  particular 
ethnic  group.  For  these  reasons,  I  asked my interviewees  how it  felt  like  to  be  an 
Armenian in  Turkey and  what  kind  of their  daily  experiences  they had  as  being  a 
member  of that  particular  ethnic  group.  Let  us  analyze  these  in  the  context  of the 
Armenian identity in the section below.       
4.1. Identity
Political  events  influence  identity  formations  in  the  sense  that  they  lead  a 
particular group to develop group awareness in contrast to the others. Considering the 
history and particular events in the context of Turkey, it  is  possible to mention some 
main points through which the Armenians in  Istanbul construct their  identity.  These 
points can either be their daily life experiences, perceptions within the family towards 
other people, stories told by the older members of the family, events that could find a 
place on the agenda of the broader society or any other event that could be linked to the 
identity formation in some way. 
The 1915  Meds Yeghern12 could be regarded as one of those points, or even the most 
prominent  one.  Since Armenians  were exposed to  the  1915 events  because of their 
ethnicity and religion, it could be said that they developed a group identity based on the 
characteristics through which they were excluded. This identity formation occurs in this 
12 Meaning Great Crime in Armenian. 
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way either because these people see those characteristics as the source of an exogenous 
pressure to  create a  group  for  themselves  or  because  the  trauma that  the  incidents 
produce leads them to develop an identity for themselves where they can feel safe.   
Those who could remember the 1915  Meds Yeghern or listen to them from the 
firsthand, feel like distancing themselves from the Muslim population or refraining from 
any confrontation with the Muslims. For example, Vartanuş13 (age 75) whose mother 
was a direct victim of the 1915 Meds Yeghern remembered that her mother was talking 
about the 1915 events at home. By sharing the reason why her mother did not want to 
get married to a Muslim man, Vartanuş was implying how much she was affected by her 
mother's trauma. Therefore, the psychology of her mother influenced her interpretation 
of events in general:   
 
“At that time, my mother said that she did not want to marry that Muslim  
man. [She said] 'They have done this much to us. We were walking through  
the dead bodies.' My mother was crying a lot. She lost her sisters, brothers,  
mother and father. Only she was left, alone.”14 
Although the impact of the 1915 Meds Yeghern is considerably visible in the discourses 
of the primary victims of those events and their children, it is not very common to hear 
stories of 1915 from the third or fourth generations. Most of the Armenians in Istanbul 
no longer talk at home what had happened to the older members of their family during 
the incidents. Only some of them remember their grandparents telling their stories in 
their childhoods. Most Armenian interviewees in Istanbul do not prefer to transform the 
stories of past atrocities from generation to generation. Most of the time, it is the older 
members of the families, not the younger ones, who are stuck in the past and cannot 
move on because they are going through a severe trauma15.  However, it is important to 
13 All names in this chapter are pseudonyms.
14 Original: “Annem demiş ki ben müslümana gitmem demiş. Yani bu kadar ettiler bize, ölülerin içinden geçiyorduk diyor. Çok 
ağlardı anam, çok ağlardı. Kızkardeşlerini, kardeşlerini, anasını, babasını... Bir tek bu kalmış.”
15 Özdoğan et al. (2009) in their book “Türkiye'de Ermeniler: Cemaat-Birey-Yurttaş” state that although it is a fact that Armenians 
in Turkey, who were exposed to the massacres or not, are holding a chosen trauma (see Volkan, 2001), the young Armenians in 
Turkey narrate the stories from a distanced perspective, like the incident occurred to a third party. In that sense, whereas those 
who listen to stories from their family members consider the incidents more like an outsider with sediments of trauma, those 
who did not listen to any 1915 stories at home learn them at their later ages by reading books. Another important finding in this 
research is the fact that while telling their stories, the family members put extra care for these stories and information not to 
cause any vengeance among the youth (Özdoğan et al., 2009, p. 394). 
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remember that this situation cannot be generalized to the Armenians across the world. 
Their  conceptions  of the past  are probably different  from the Armenians  in  Turkey. 
Especially, for Armenians in the diaspora who have to live away from their homelands, 
the situation might be a whole different thing. 
Another  consequence  of  the  1915  Meds  Yeghern might  be  its  effect  on  the 
perceptions of daily life interactions within the society. Older members of the Armenian 
families refrain from any confrontation that can reveal their ethnic identity or they do 
not want to have close relationships with the Muslims. However, most of the members 
of the third and the fourth generations of the 1915 Meds Yeghern do not need to do so, 
although we can find contrary examples of those who want to stay in the Armenian 
population and form their  interactions accordingly.   Since there are some differences 
among age groups in terms of their relations with the Muslim part of the society,  in 
families sometimes there can be disagreements in  cases of inter-ethnic  marriages in 
which the older  members do not  prefer  a  Muslim bride or groom. In the following 
example,  the difference of the perceptions between the generations can be observed. 
Victoria (age 53), who states that an inter-ethnic marriage is not an issue for her, also 
claims  that  her  mother-in-law is  against  this kind of a  marriage.  Her  mother-in-law 
bases her reluctance on the past atrocities that Armenians went through:     
“For example,  my mother-in-law's nephew married a Turkish girl.  She is  
educated, has a very good family. My mother-in-law said the bride-to-be  
was  a  daughter  of  a  soldier,  I  would  prefer  at  least  she  was  from  a  
“normal” family. Did not my nephew know what they did to us?'”16 
Although for the older members of the family the 1915 Meds Yeghern is a factor 
to  differentiate  themselves  from the  rest  of  the  society and  the  Muslim  society in 
particular, for those who did not experience these events or who were not told by the 
primary victims of the events, it is part of the history that can be known, but not a thing 
which they can directly hold resentment  against.  Most of the time,  it  is  a source of 
curiosity towards the family stories or recent history. For example, Tamar (age 28) said 
16 Original:”Mesela kaynanamın yeğeni Türk kız aldı. Çok tahsilli, çok iyi bir aile. Yok o asker kızıdır, askeriyeden dedi. Bari, 
normal bir ailenin kızı olsaydı, diyor. Yani bize zamanında neler yaptılar, o bilmiyor mu falan filan.”
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that  her  parents  did  not  mention  anything  about  the  1915  Meds  Yeghern until  she 
personally got curious and started to ask questions about the 1915 Meds Yeghern. Only 
after  that,  her  family  told  some  stories  about  what  had  happened  to  their  family 
members during those events.  
“When I asked them [my parents], they started to tell the stories one by one.  
Then  I  started  to  wonder  about  my  own  family  stories;  where  my  
grandmother came from, where my grandfather was from. So the stories go 
somewhere and complete one another.”17    
There is no doubt that the family has an influence on how a person builds her 
relation with the rest of the society in terms of her identity. Even if a person cannot 
make sense  of the difference that  she holds  towards other  identities,  the instruction 
within the family gives the clues of it.  What  is  taught within the family in terms of 
differences does not necessarily lead that child to behave discriminatory towards other 
people.  The essence of this teaching is  basically to be careful outside of the family. 
Ümit (age 44), for example, is one of those children, who were warned by their family 
not to discuss over these topics in the public: “'If somebody asks you your faith or your  
religion, do not answer them, do not push for it. If somebody calls you  gavur18,  then 
ignore them, it is OK that they may be ignorant.' They always warned us not to discuss  
or fight over these kinds of issues.”19 This kind of teaching shows us that the fear which 
the parents carry can have an impact  on the perception of the children towards the 
others. In this way, whereas on the one hand children construct an identity of who they 
are, on the other they shape the image of the other as to be afraid of. The childhood 
story of Victoria (age 53) is a very good example of the fear which an Armenian family 
in Turkey can hold towards the rest of the society. In that sense, the psychology of the 
parents  can  be  transformed  to  their  children  and  cause  them to  behave  suspicious 
towards non-Armenians within the society and be uneasy most of the time:  
17 Original:”[Aileme] sorunca yavaş yavaş anlatmaya başladılar. Sonra aile hikayeni merak ediyorsun, anneannem nereden gelmiş, 
babaannem nereli, dedem nereli falan oradan hikaye böyle bir yere varıyor, tamamlanıyor.” 
18 Used for non-Muslim, non-believer in a pejorative way. 
19 Original:”Dışarıda dini inancını bilmem neyini sana sormazlarsa sen kimseye cevap verme, bunun üstüne gitme. Hani birisi 'vay 
gavur' falan derse bile boşver, olabilir onlar cahildir. Kimseyle bu konularda tartışma yaratma, kavga etme, her zaman anlayışlı 
ol, Bunlar tabii ki bu şekilde uyarı aldık.”
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“I was little,  5-6 years old,  was rummaging through drawers,  I  found a  
postcard. There was another flag on it; it was not one in red with a star and  
crescent, another one. I ran to my mother asking in Armenian what it was.  
'- What, how did you find it, hide it. 
- But why?
- Hide it.
- If you don't want it, we can throw it away.
- No, no, if we throw it away, they [some people or neighbors] can find it at  
the garbage.'
So we could not throw it away, because there was this possibility that [some  
people]  could find it  in  the  garbage.  You  know what  it  was.  It  was  an 
Armenian flag.”20  
There is this fear21 within the families, which makes the parents constantly remind 
their children to be careful. Before the children understand what the case is all about or 
why that is  dangerous, they are told to be careful and to cover up their identities as 
much as possible. Nevertheless, it  is possible to say that the attitude of the families is 
softened now. However, Christianity still can be regarded by the families as an element 
that should not be revealed publicly. The impact of Christianity on the daily lives of the 
Armenians in Istanbul will be discussed in more detail under the sub-heading of justice 
as social inclusion.   
Speaking of visibility, the first thing most of Armenians is faced within the society 
is to be asked about their names. Their non-Turkish names lead other people to think 
that they are foreigners.  On the other hand, because of Armenians' long existence in 
Anatolia, they have a powerful attachment  to the land. That is why most of the time 
being exposed to such a question is regarded as highly offensive.  It causes disturbance 
among Armenian interviewees due to the fact that they are seen as outsiders, although 
they belong to this land and see themselves as being among the rightful owners. Kirkor 
(age 65) and his family were born in Istanbul and they have been living in Istanbul for 
their whole lives. He states that he felt highly offended once a guy asked for his origin 
20 Original:”Ta rahmetli annem seneler önce ben ufağım böyle 5-6 yaşlarındayım çekmeceleri karıştırıyorum. Bir kartpostal 
buldum. Üzerinde başka bir bayrak vardı, kırmızı ay-yıldız değildi. Başka bir bayraktı. Ermenice sorarak annemin yanına 
koştum. '-Ne, nerden buldun onu, sakla onu -Niye ama -Yok onu sakla -E istersen atalım – Yok,yok atarız çöpte de bulunur'. 
Atınca öçpte de bulunabilir korkusuyla atamıyoruz da. Neydi biliyor musun? Ermeni bayrağı.”
21 To be honest, I am not sure whether it is a paranoia or not. The Armenians in Istanbul have this natural instinct to hide 
themselves against any possibility of insecurity. However, I am not sure how much they feel threatened or whether they are 
hiding themselves just in case. 
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and treated him as if he was a foreigner. Kirkor cannot understand how some people 
regard the Armenians  living  in  Istanbul  as foreigners in  Turkey in  spite  of the fact 
Armenians  had  kingdoms  and  civilizations  in  Anatolia  older  than  the  empires  or 
principalities of Turks:   
“A pizza seller asked me who I was, where I was from. And I said to him 
that I had been here for 1500 years, maybe more. Our kingdoms built up 
Urfa, we have Ani, Kars, Ardahan, 1500-200 year-old churches, they built  
kingdoms there. But now this guy asks me where I came from.”22 
The issues here are not only about the fact that Armenians have been living here 
for such a long time or longer than most of the peoples, but also about the fact that most 
people think that there have been only Turks and Muslims living in this land and all the 
others do not belong here. Therefore, this kind of confrontation unintentionally brings a 
tension; who owns Anatolia more, who the rightful owner is and so on. Like Kirkor (age 
65), Arno (age 20) is also one of those who feel uneasy about the fact that some people 
think that  there have only been and always will be Muslim Turks in  Anatolia.  What 
disturbs  Armenian interviewees is  that  some  people forget  that  the existence of the 
Armenians in Anatolia is older than Turks:    
“[They ask,] 'Why is your name like this? Are you a foreigner?' No, you are  
a foreigner [I say], I am from here. Of course, [I am saying this] not in an  
arrogant way  Rather,  [I  am trying to  explain] we have been living here  
together for a long time, but we were forgotten that we had lived together.  
When [some people] see such a name, they think how this can be possible.  
[They think] there have been only Turks and Muslims here.”23 
Armenian interviewees construct their identity in relation to the fact that they have 
been living in Anatolia for centuries. Since the land is very important for their identity 
construction,  the  attachment  to  the  land  strengthens  the  feeling  to  be  Armenian. 
However, it may also work the other way around. Attachment to the land may also lead 
22 Original:”Basit bir pizzacı bana kim olduğumu sordu, nereden geldiğimi sordu. Ben dedim 1500 yıldır belki çok daha fazla en 
1500 sene diyeceğim ben buradayım. Urfa'yı bizim krallıklar meydana çıkarmışlar. Bizim Ani, Kars, Ardahan biz orada 1500-
2000 senelik kiliselerimiz var, krallıklar kurmuşlar orada. Ama şimdi bana adam diyor ki sen nereden geldin diyor.”
23 Original:”A adın diye böyle ki falan, yabancı mısın? Hayır arkadaş, sensin yabancı yani. Ben zaten buralıydım. Tabii asla ukala 
bir yerden değil. Hani biz çok uzun zamandır birlikte yaşıyoruz ama bize birlikte yaşadığımız dahi unutturulmuş ve böyle bir 
isim görünce bu ülkede zaten işte Türk ve Sunni Müslümanlar yaşıyor, nasıl böyle bir isim olabilir ki.”
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a person to feel less Armenian, if that person defines ethnicity based on where one is 
born in. However, in either case irrespective of how strong the Armenians in Istanbul 
feel their ethnic identity, belonging to the land means a lot to the interviewees. That is 
why  the  Armenian  interviewees  in  Istanbul  differentiate  their  identity  from  the 
Armenian identity in the Republic of Armenia because their customs and traditions have 
been mixed with the traditions of peoples living in Anatolia. For example Selin (age 23) 
is among those who do not feel Armenian that much, because she thinks that ethnicity is 
related to the country where one is born and grows up. Since she was born in Istanbul, 
she states that she feels like Turkish:     
“Saying  that  I  am  Armenian  makes  me  feel  weird,  because  if  being  
Armenian is a race, then it also means belonging to Armenia, I think, if it is  
related to a country, to a race. We have no connection to Armenia either 
close or distant; no relatives either now or in the past. We have nothing to  
belong to there. Therefore, if it is a race, then I feel like I am a Turk. It is 
absurd to say that I am Armenian then. I think it is related to where I live or  
how many generations I have been there.”24 
 
In spite of the similar characteristics of the cultures in Anatolia and in spite of the 
fact  that  these  cultures blend  their  traditions,  Armenians  along  with the  other  non-
Muslim peoples in Turkey detach themselves from the rest of the society in terms of 
their religion. Since religion, Christianity in this case, is a differentiating factor from the 
dominant majority, most of the time Armenian interviewees need to attach their religion 
to their Armenian identity; as if the two are connected, if not seen as the same thing. As 
a reason of setting a connection between the Armenianship and Christianity, Sesil (age 
24) asserts that since there are not many Christian or non-Muslim peoples in Turkey, 
this religious difference emerges as one of the major dividing factors within the society. 
When Christianity of a  person becomes the source of a difference in relation to the 
broader society, that person feels her Christianity more strongly and attaches it  to her 
ethnic identity: 
“I experience here more that the Armenianship goes along with Christianity 
in Turkey. But I do not feel abroad this much, for the matter of fact. How 
24 Original:”Ermeni'yim demek bana çok garip geliyor çünkü Ermenilik ırk demekse eğer demek ki Ermenistan'a ait demektir diye 
düşünüyorum, ülke ile ırkla alakalıysa. Bizim Ermenistan'la şu an yakından uzaktan hiçbir tanıdığımız, hiçbir akrabamız yok. 
Hiç oraya ait bir şeyimiz yok. O yüzden eğer bir ırksa şey o zaman Türk'üm gibi geliyor yani o zaman Ermeniyim demek bana 
biraz saçma geliyor açıkçası. Nerede yaşadığımla ya da kaç kökendir orada olduğunla alakalı olmalı diye düşünüyorum.”
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many Christian communities are there living here? That is why I see them  
[Christianity and being Armenian] as connected.”25 
The  reason  why Armenian  interviewees  feel  that  being  Armenian  also  means 
being  Christian  and  they are inseparable  can  also  be  the  fact  that  the practices  of 
Christianity are more visible for other people. Therefore, in the public Armenians are 
defined  through  their  Christianity  frequently.  When  Armenians  feel  this  religious 
difference within the society more, then they may construct their identity including this 
criterion,  if  not  making them integral to  one another.  This  connection may also  be 
strengthened  by  the  fact  that  the  exogenous  pressures  make  Armenians  attach  this 
religious difference to their identity more strongly, because external pressures, most of 
the time, lead groups hold onto that difference more tightly.  
On the other hand, the authority of the church and its connective aspect within the 
Armenian  population  cannot  be  disregarded.  The  church  can  either  be  seen  as  an 
authority  that  has  a  religious  power  over  Armenians  or  as  a  mean  bringing  them 
together and making them share some sense of similarity. To put it differently, even if 
Armenians do not visit the church for religious reasons, they can come together there 
and share their sense of togetherness. In that  sense, churches can be regarded as the 
places of communication where Armenians can interact with each other. They are the 
places of socialization for the Armenians living in Istanbul.  On the other hand, in the 
following example Ümit (age 44) argues that the church has an indispensable part in the 
Armenianship, because it both has a unifying feature for Armenians and is a legitimate 
authority for them to sustain their existence:    
“For us the Armenian patriarch at the same time is the head of the state, the 
head of the nation. Therefore, the church is a religious institution and a civil  
institution at the same time. It still keeps this feature; there is an Armenian  
state, but it is the church which brings us today. That is why we cannot talk  
about the existence of Armenians without Christianity.”26 
25 Original:”Burada daha fazla yaşıyorum aslında Ermeniliğin Hristiyanlıkla beraber olmasını, Türkiye'de. Ama yurtdşında o kadar 
bir şey hissetmiyorum açıkçası. Burada kaç tane Hristiyan topluluk var ki yaşayan. Onun için birbirine bağlı şeyler olarak 
görüyorum.” 
26 Original:”Bizde aynı zamanda Ermeni patriği, başpatriği aynı zamanda bir devlet başkanıdır, bir millet başıdır. Onun için kilise 
bizim için aynı zamanda hem dini bir kurum hem de sivil bir kurumdur. Bu özelliğini hala korur kilise. Onun için Hristiyanlık 
dışındaki Ermeni'nin varlığından pek bahsedilmez.”
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Undoubtedly,  this  point  of  view  cannot  be  generalizable  to  all  Armenians  in 
Turkey. It cannot be expected that all Armenians have the same faith or the same level 
of affinity.  However, still it  is  a fact that the Armenian identity is  highly attached to 
Christianity;  even if  the persons are not  religious  at  all.  In that  sense,  the unifying 
characteristic of the church is crucial to understand the importance of the church and 
religion for the Armenian identity in Turkey.   
In  addition to  the internal  components  of the  Armenian  identity,  also  outside 
factors contribute to the construction of in-group awareness. In this case, confrontations 
with people with other identities on the street or at the school make an impact on this 
awareness.  Whereas in public schools all classes are held in Turkish and all children 
irrespective of their ethnicity can be registered, in the minority schools27 classes are held 
in the language of that particular minority and only the children of that minority group 
are allowed to be registered. The students in these schools can be aware of their ethnic 
identity,  because  they  are  in  an  environment  with  the  students  who  share  strong 
similarities  with  them.   Minority  schools  must  have  a  Turkish  vice  principal  to 
investigate whether everything is run in accordance with the regulations. Also in these 
schools, history and literature classes are held in Turkish by a Turkish teacher appointed 
by the Ministry of Education. Since school curriculums in general emphasize Turkish 
nationalism especially in Turkish literature and history classes, in the minority schools 
this  kind  of  incoherency brings  curiosity  for  the  students  about  their  identity.  The 
internal conflict that a student can experience is explained very well by Victoria (age 
53) who could not make sense of this situation back then in her student years:   
“For  example,  in  the  school  we  have  a  history  class,  [there  is  this  
expression of] driving the enemy forces into the sea. By enemy, it  means 
Rums and Armenians there.  The more  you paint  this story with glowing 
colors, the higher point you get in the exam. At that time I was having a 
huge inner conflict. I was saying we drove the enemy forces, Armenians into  
27 Minority schools are the schools of Armenians, Greeks and Jews in Turkey. Since these three peoples are recognized as 
minorities by the Lausanne Treaty, their schools are named as minority schools. These schools have a different status and are 
only open to their communities by law. 
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the sea. I am an Armenian. What kind of a thing is that? It is absurd.”28  
In addition to  the school experiences,  also being questioned within the society 
about the visible differences makes the child feel that there is something wrong with 
this situation.   When things that  one person learns within the family or  within that 
person's  ethnic  group  are  conflicting  with  what  the  others  say,  this  incoherency 
strengthens the feelings towards one's identity. Therefore, the identity production cannot 
be seen separate from the out-group pressures. Especially if it is a minority by number, 
then the pressure is felt more strongly and more effectively in identity construction. For 
instance, Sesil (age 24) who was born in Istanbul says that as a result of the questions 
that she faces with, she needs to express her Armenianness. In a way, people force her to 
express her identity and define herself with respect to an ethnic identity.  Even if the 
people are asking questions with a good intention or out of curiosity, it creates a feeling 
on that questioned person that she is regarded as strange. This feeling in itself produces 
the  need  for  that  person to  define  herself.  That  is  why the  identity  becomes  more 
important to that person:     
“My identity carries a lot of importance to me in my daily life. First of all,  
when I meet a person, she says how different my name is. They ask, – 'Are  
you from Istanbul', - 'Yes', - 'Are you from Turkey', - 'Yes'. Then when the 
number of questions increases, I need to say that I am Armenian.”29 
The confrontation or socialization process can be  either  in  the form of asking 
questions  that  makes  the  person feel  obliged  to  explain  some  characteristics  about 
herself or in the form of a hate speech. In either case, that person who feels or sees 
herself  different  from  the  dominant  group  starts  to  position  herself  accordingly. 
Therefore,  that  person  eventually  reproduces  her  identity  and  even  strengthens  the 
characteristics  that  constitute  that  identity.  Especially  in  the  cases  that  are  directly 
related to an ethnic identity, hate speeches generate the need that group members should 
28 Original:”Okulda mesela tarih dersi okuyoruz; düşmanlarımızı deniz döktük. Düşman dediğin Rumlar ve Ermeniler orada. Bu 
konuyu sınavda ne kadar ballandıra ballandıra anlatırsan o kadar iyi puan alıyorsun. O anda müthiş bir iç çatışması yaşıyordum. 
Diyordum ki Ermenileri, düşmanlarımızı denize döktük. Ben Ermeniyim. Nasıl bir şey bu? Acayip bir şey.”
29 Original:”Bence önemli. Zaten ilk başta bir insanla tanıştığımda aa ne kadar değişik bir ismin var. İşte – İstanbullu musunuz, 
diye soruyorlar, - Evet, - Türkiye'den misiniz?, - Evet. Daha sonra sorular çoğalınca ben de Ermeniyim deme ihtiyacı 
duyuyorum.” 
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stick together; otherwise, their existence will be under threat.  
“Against the 'we are all Hrant30, we  are all Armenians'  slogan, they started a  
hashtag on twitter saying 'you are all Armenians, you are all bastards'”31 (Tamar, 28).  
Like in Tamar's example, among Armenians, most of the time, being insulted results in 
coming closer and sharing their experiences. This is one of the reasons why they feel 
their Armenian identity in their daily lives powerfully. In that sense, the assassination of 
Hrant  Dink  on the  19th of January in  2007 had  a  huge  impact  particularly  on the 
youth32. The youth who had not embraced their Armenian identity before,  started to 
think about it and at the end they were attached to that identity. Below, you can see three 
persons sharing the process of how they try to make sense of the assassination and its 
impact on them:    
“I  am  one  of  those  who  realized  that  they  were  Armenian  after  the  
assassination  of  Hrant  Dink.  Before  then,  yes  I  was  speaking  another 
language and speaking Turkish,  but I  was not able to see the difference.  
After  that  incident,  I  learned  what  Armenian  meant,  what  they  did.  My 
Armenian  identity  comes  into  prominence  after  Sevag  Balıkçı  murder33,  
Samatya incidents34, and hate speeches.”35 (Arno, 20) 
“There had been many things we had heard, but we were saying no way,  
everything would be better.  However,  when Hrant Dink was shot,  all the  
things they [Armenians living outside of Turkey] said... [were verified]. We 
all have someone in the Diaspora in France or in the US; I have my cousins  
30 Referring to Hrant Dink.
31 Original:”'Hepimiz Hrant'ız, Hepimiz Ermeni'yiz' sloganına karşı 'Hepiniz Ermeni'siniz, Hepiniz piçsiniz' hashtagi açılmış 
twitterda.”
32 Here the definition of youth is taken from UN General Assembly, World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and 
Beyond, A/RES/50/81 and A/RES/62/126 (14December 1996 and 18 December 2007). According to this definition, those who 
are between the ages 15 to 24 are considered as youth. 
33 During his military service on the 24th April 2011, Sevag Balıkçı was shot by a soldier who was doing his military service at the 
same time. There are allegations that he was murdered because of his Armenian identity. During the investigation it was revealed 
that he was being harassed verbally by a couple of soldiers with respect to his Armenianness. The court decided that it was an 
accident. However, some people think that it was a hate crime.   
34 In 2012, Maritsa Küçük in Samatya, Istanbul was killed brutally. Since she was Armenian, there were suspicions in the murder. 
Some believed that she was murdered because she was an Armenian. It was claimed that the murderer was there for theft; 
however, different blood samples and the way of murder are suspicious. The court case still continues. This incident was 
followed by similar incidents, in these cases also the victims were Armenian women.
35 Original:”Ben aslında Ermeni olduğunu Hrant Dink'in öldürülmesiyle fark edenlerdenim. Çünkü o zamana kadar evet farklı bir 
dil daha kullanıyordum işte Türkçe de konuşuyordum ama bunların arasındaki ayrımı yapamıyordum. Ondan sonra biraz Ermeni 
nedir yani kimdir bize Ermeni diyorlarmış onu öğrendim. Sonra arkasından gelen Sevag Balıkçı cinayeti, Samatya olayları ve 
işte bir sürü hani nefret söylemleri derken aslında Ermeni kimliği biraz daha önplana çıkıyor.”
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for example. It turned out to be right when they questioned why we were still  
living here,  in  Turkey.  After that,  something different has started.  All the  
experience and what you have experienced that day evolved into something  
else.”36 (Tamar, 28)37
“I got awareness with the death of Hrant Dink. In 2007, I was 15 and we  
would go out to celebrate my birthday. When I was leaving the school, I 
heard the news. Our whole life went upside down...Then I, as a person who  
puts her Armenian identity into prominence, attached it to myself.”38 (Katia,  
22) 
Needless to say, the situation in Turkey has changed over time. Consequently, the 
relation that  the Armenians have with their  identity was altered accordingly.  In that 
sense, the new AKP government ruling for 12 years after the rule of the Kemalist party 
CHP changed the perception of some Armenians. Victoria (age 53) states comfortably 
that the attitudes towards her and how she feels in terms of security change with the 
AKP government.  Since some issues  are  opened to  discussion,  like  Kemalism,  this 
atmosphere makes her more comfortable with her Armenian identity:  
“For example; there was this taboo of Ataturk. People started to get over  
that taboo. We said that Ataturk who has been taught us for years was a  
human being after all; he drank alcohol, he got drunk, he loved a woman. It  
became  sweet  to  think  him  like  that;  he  was  like  a  sculpture,  a  bust  
before...It started with the discussion of Ataturk. Talking about Armenians,  
Kurds parallel to that is also started. In other words, even the expression of  
'Ataturk is the next important after God' got loose, it lost its importance to 
reveal that I was Armenian.”39(Victoria, 53)   
36 Original:”O zamana kadar dinlediğimiz bir sürü şey vardı ama böyle insanlara yok canım artık bundan sonra artık her şey daha 
iyi olur falan filan dediğimiz biraz daha şey baktığımız zamanlardı. Ama 19 Ocak 2007 Hrant Dink vurulduğunda bir anda şey 
oldu hani bize bunu söyleyenler ya işte atıyorum hepimizin diyasporada Fransa'da mesela Amerika'da kuzenlerim var. Hani 
onların bize hala nasıl orada yaşayabiliyorsunuz deme şeyi bir anda haklı çıktı gibi oldu. Ondan sonra başka bir şey başladı. Yani 
bütün o geçmişten gelen deneyim ve o gün yaşadığın şey bambaşka bir şeye evrildi.” 
37 Although she is not at the age range (15-24) to be defined as youth, she is included here because she was in that age range when 
the incident occurred (on the 19 Jan. 2007).  
38 Original:”Ben biraz farkındalığı Hrant Dink'in ölümüyle yaşadım. 2007 yılında ben 15 yaşındaydım ve benim doğum günümü 
kutlamak için o akşam biz Osmanbey'de dışarı çıkacaktık. Ama okuldan çıkarken duydum ve bütün hayatımız alt üst oldu. 
Ondan sonra ben zaten Ermeni kimliğimle önde olan bir insanken bunu daha çok attach etmiş oldum kendime.”
39 Original:”Mesela bir Atatürk tabusu vardı, o tabu tartışılmaya başlandı. Dedik ki senelerdir bize öğretilen Atatürk aslında bizim 
gibi bir insan, adam alkolünü de içmiş, sarhoş da olmuş, kadın da sevmiş. Ne kadar tatlı oldu yani hep heykel gibi bir şeydi, 
büsttü Atatürk. Atatürk'ün tartışılmasıyla birlikte başladı zaten onunla birlikte de bu Ermeniler, Kürtler onun paralelinde 
konuşulmaya başlandı. Yani şu oldu Atatürk hani Allahtan sonra Atatürk gelir şeklinde önüne sunulan şey yerinden oynadıktan 
sonra aman ben de Ermeniyim yani o kadar da önemli olmadı.”
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Either  because  of the new government  as  mentioned  above or  because  of the 
altered domestic politics with the impact of international factors, Turkey has had new 
subjects that could not be discussed before. The reason can be the spread of the ideas or 
the impact of the international organizations.  The Kurdish conflict or issues related to 
the Armenians in Turkey can be taken as examples of the subjects that are opened to 
discussion. As another example to the issues related to the Armenians in Turkey; the 
AKP government  also  reinstated  ways  for  legal  entities  of  churches  and  minority 
schools to reclaim their property that was occupied during the early years of the Turkish 
Republic. These policies and altered dynamics within the society led the Armenians in 
Turkey to express themselves more freely and comfortably because they started to feel 
less threat in revealing their  identity with the discussions about ethnic identities, the 
democratization process, the weakening of Kemalism or the changing perceptions of the 
broader society towards differences. 
  
4.2. Justice
It is important to keep in mind the fact that the understanding of justice is also 
shaped by how the identity is constructed among that group. Therefore, what justice to 
that group of people means is  specific to that particular context, among other factors. 
Understanding how Armenian identity is shaped for a particular person can help grasp 
that person's understanding of justice. As it will be discussed below, the analysis of the 
interviews  show that  what  the Armenian  interviewees  understand  by justice  can be 
roughly grouped under three main focuses; (1) justice as equality, which is to be treated 
equally, to enjoy the rights that others enjoy, to be respected and to be embraced equally, 
(2) justice as a penalty process or (3) justice as being granted basic survival needs by 
the state.  In order to reveal what  they mean by these  concepts and its  components, 
justice is analyzed from different angles along with the literature.
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4.2.1. Justice as recognition
The Lausanne Treaty in 1923 recognized the rights of the Armenian population 
that were also recognized by and practiced during the Ottoman Empire. Although this 
can be regarded as the legal recognition of the Armenians in the new Republic, when 
Armenian interviewees are asked about recognition and its implementation in Turkey, 
their thoughts on this subject vary. Whereas some of them are content with the situation, 
some others state that the implementation of the treaty does not fulfill the expectation or 
the requirements of recognition. For example Ari (age 25) argues that even though there 
is  legal recognition,  rights gained  through recognition are not  implemented  making 
recognition  meaningless.  “There  is  recognition  [of  the  Armenians  in  Turkey  as  a  
minority]. [As an Armenian] I have a difference, I have an existence. It feels like... [that 
we,  Armenians are different].  But  how much can you enjoy [the privileges]  of  that  
recognition here?”40 
At the implementation level, the citizens do not feel the sincerity of the state when 
it  comes to the recognition of the identities that  stand outside of the dominant  state 
ideology.  Armenian  interviewees  think  that  rights  driven  from  recognition  are  not 
implemented, because in fact the state does not embrace those who are considered to be 
minorities.  Tamar (age 28) as an NGO employee is able to follow the processes and 
events related to  this  topic.  She states that  the state  only offers  minor  privileges to 
minorities. Although offering these minor privileges, the Turkish state is not considering 
the well-being of its Armenian citizens. On the contrary, it  is only acting for its own 
interests. That is why recognition does not penetrate into the state institutions or into the 
society, which will be discussed subsequently.    
“Although  it  is  shown  that  they  [the  political  authorities]  are  doing 
something to protect  your cultural rights,  this is  never sincere.  They are 
doing what they are doing out of an interest; they are picking something to  
realize that interest, but either at the societal level or at the level of power  
holders, there is no such thing.”41 (Tamar, 28)
40 Original:”Tanınma, evet. Benim bir varlığım, benim bir farkım var. Bunu hissettiriyor. Ama hani oradaki tanınmayla buradaki 
karşılığını ne kadar yaşayabiliyorsun aslında.”
41 Original:”Kültürel haklarını korumak için de bir şey yapılıyormuş gibi gösteriliyorsa bile bu hiçbir zaman samimi olmuyor 
zaten. Mutlaka oradan bir çıkarı oluyor, sırf o çıkarı şey yapmak için içinden bir şey seçiyor ve bak bunu böyle yaptım deniyor. 
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We can classify Armenian interviewees' arguments under three discussion points 
when it comes to discuss what recognition means to Armenians, how it can be achieved 
or what lacks in implementation: (1) the tools to sustain and protect the culture, (2) the 
ways to support the feeling of belonging, and (3) the recognition of the past violations. 
One  of the  main  elements  to  sustain  a  culture  are  schools.  However,  the  minority 
schools in  Turkey are not  treated in  the same  way as public  schools.  They are not 
funded by the state; they are expected to cover all their expenses by themselves. These 
expenses  can be  supplied  through their  properties,  if  they were not  taken away,  by 
volunteer fundraisers among Armenians or through the money that the parents of the 
students  agree  to  give.  For  this  purpose,  these  schools  are  organizing  fundraising 
dinners every year and try to cover all the expenses of the schools. Kirkor (age 65) is 
complaining of this situation. Although he is a tax giver, he is not able to benefit from 
the opportunities that the state offers to the students in public schools. He still has to pay 
for the expenses of the school, since he is sending his grandchild to an Armenian school. 
In that sense, he feels like discriminated against, because the state does not recognize 
his needs:  
“The state does not cover the cost of  electricity,  water [of the Armenian 
schools] or any support for the teachers [working in these schools]. It gives 
nothing. However, I am also a citizen. Since I am a citizen who gives his  
taxes, then [the state should] cover some of my needs.”42 (Kirkor, 65) 
Although the minority schools are run like private schools, they are at the same 
time under the control of the state and have to use the curriculum that the state obliges 
them.  They  are  not  allowed  to  teach  the  conception  of  history  of  their  culture. 
Armenians themselves are expected to prepare the materials in the way the state obliges 
them to do. However, they do not have a source to manage this process. Therefore, they 
are  having  financial  problems  as  well  as  problems  stemming  from finding  proper 
educational  materials  that  are  pedagogically  suitable.  Tamar  (age  28)  remarks  that 
Armenians are not allowed to use books of their preference. The teachers are obliged to 
Ama ne toplum nezdinde ne de iktidarda böyle bir şey yok.”
42 Original:”Elektriği vermiyor, suyu vermiyor. Öğretmene bir destek vermiyor. Hiçbir şey vermiyor. E halbuki ben de vatandaşım. 
Mademki ben de bir yurttaşım e ben de bir vergi veriyorsam e benim de bir karşıla bir şeyimi.”
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use the same books with the books in the public schools.  This creates a problem not 
only because these students are learning Turkish history and Turkish culture instead of 
theirs,  but  also  it  takes  so  much  time  and  energy  to  translate  these  materials  into 
Armenian without any resource to do so:  
“In  our  Armenian  schools,  math,  science  are  all  taught  in  Armenian.  
However,  there are no books to teach [because the state does not allow 
Armenians  to  choose  their  own  educational  materials].  They  ask  us  to  
translate the books that are taught in the public schools into Armenian. OK.  
We translate the books, send them to the Directorate of National Education  
and wait for the approval. We have experienced this for one time; while we 
were waiting, they changed the curriculum again. They said we could not  
use  these  books  either.  [We  have  to  follow  the  same  procedure  all  
over]again. Who is going to run this? There is this cost. We are a minority  
group, how long we can maintain this?”43       
Since  their  history  and  literature  courses  are  taught  in  Turkish,  Armenian 
interviewees see this situation itself as interference to the sustainability of their culture. 
It is not possible to learn the Armenian literature or history in these schools. In addition, 
it  is  also difficult  to find teachers to recruit for these schools because of the lack of 
Armenian  philology  departments  at  the  universities.  Therefore,  now  the  Armenian 
community itself  is  educating  their  teachers  who  have taken certificates from other 
educational departments so that these teachers can hold their classes in Armenian. 
While talking about  the sustainability of the Armenian culture,  it  is  also worth 
mentioning  the  historical  ruins  in  Anatolia  that  belong  to  the  Armenian  culture. 
Armenian interviewees draw attention to the fact that these ruins are not seen as a part 
of the history and are not taken under preservation. One may say that the state does not 
pay enough attention and respect to the historical places and ruins in general; however, 
it  is a fact that the places that can be associated with Islam are most of the time taken 
care  of,  particularly  in  the  last  ten years.  Still  this  does  not  mean that  there  is  no 
advancement for some Armenian historical places. For example Surp Giragos Church in 
43 Original:”Bizim Ermeni okullarında matematik, fen bilgisi bunlar da Ermenice işlenir. Fakat bunu işleyebilecek kitap yok ve 
diyor ki bizim kitabı alacaksın, aynen çevireceksin, Tamam, peki. Alınıyor, aynen çevriliyor, tekrar Milli Eğitim'e gidiyor. 
Onaylanması bekleniyor. Mesela bir kere bunu yaşadık; onaylanana kadar müfredatı değiştirdiler. Dediler ki, hayır bunu da 
okutamazsınız hadi bir daha. Bir de bu işi kim yürütecek, sürekli bir zaman maddi şey falan. Hani bir azınlık grubusun ne kadar 
bunu sürdürebilirsin?”
72
Diyarbakır and Ahtamar Church in Van have recently been restored. However, even in 
these cases there have been problems concerning religious representations or symbols, 
such as the placement of a cross at the top of the church44. Discussions around these 
topics lead Armenian interviewees to regard that their cultural heritage is not taken care 
of properly, if not it is tried to be ignored.  
The feeling of belonging on the other hand is shaped by how a particular group or 
identity is  represented in the state and by its attachment  to that  particular state.  The 
bond between the state and its citizens is crucial, because only by establishing a bond 
the state can ensure trust among its citizens towards itself. Otherwise, members of that 
identity group feel that they are unwanted. How Sesil (age 24) and Katia (age 22) feel is 
a good example of this argument. They express that the lack of the recognition of a 
group means that the state does not respect that group and this attitude hurts their sense 
of belonging: “The state needs to recognize a group, so that it can learn how to respect  
that group. [In order to protect that group's] faith, traditions, their recognition by the  
state are a need"45 (Sesil, 24). “Ignoring an identity kills the sense of that particular 
individual's, group's sense of belonging”46 (Katia, 22).  In other words, the need of all 
identities  is  to  be  embraced.  This  embracement  will  eventually  bring  loyalty  or 
belonging  to  that  particular  country.  Otherwise,  not  only  does  the  state  isolate  its 
citizens by treating them differently than the dominant group, but also it forces them to 
refrain themselves  from joining  the  society as  equal citizens.  However,  if  the state 
would be welcoming towards differences, then its citizens will be happier as Victoria 
(age 53) states. Happy people will create happy societies at the end:  “People will be 
happier, be more active, be involved into daily life more, and embrace the flag. When 
they sing the national anthem, they will  sing it,  [they will]  not  move their lips and  
pretend that they are singing.”47 
44 Habervesaire. (16.05.2010). Akdamar'a Haç Koyma İzni.  http://www.habervesaire.com/news/akdamar-a-hac-koyma-izni-
1687.html. 
45 Original:”O grubu tanınması gerekir ki ona da saygı duymayı öğrensin, onun inancı ne dini ne. Yani inancı nedir, gelenekleri 
nedir o bakımdan tanıması gerektiğini düşünüyorum.”
46 Original:”Biri kimliği yok saymak bir kere o insanın, o grubun aidiyet duygusunu öldürüyor bence.”
47 Original:”İnsanlar daha mutlu olacak, daha aktif olacaklar, daha hayatın içine girecekler, daha bayrağa sarılacaklar. İstiklal 
Marşını söylediklerinde söyleyecekler, uyduruktan ağızlarını sallamayacaklar.”
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The experiences at the state institutions or the discourse of the politicians are also 
crucial in understanding the sense of belonging of a group which is feeling ignored by 
the state. While on the one hand Armenians have some problems at the state institutions 
as a result  of the lack of recognition, on the other hand the discourses of the prime 
minister, ministers, the president or the politicians can be problematic for some of them. 
Discourses and public speeches of officials may create the perception within the society 
that some of the citizens are favored, while some other citizens are tried to be pushed to 
the edges. This also hurts the feeling of togetherness within the society. Vartanuş (age 
75) claims that she is offended, when the prime minister does not mention the existence 
of  the  Armenian  identity  or  does  not  embrace  it:  “Erdoğan  has  never  said  that  
Armenians were his brothers and sisters.”48 When the governors do not raise the sense 
of togetherness, then the link between the citizens and the state will be eventually weak. 
For Arman (age 38), the legal recognition is not important when the politicians do not 
respect  who  you  are.  A legal  recognition  becomes  meaningless  when  you  as  an 
Armenian  see  that  even the  politicians  in  your  country regard  Armenianness  as  an 
unwanted identity:      
“Neither  your  minister,  nor  your  prime  minister,  or  your  president  
recognizes you. They [some people in the media] said once that the mother  
of the president was Armenian, he responded wildly to prove the opposite.  
How is he going to recognize you?”49 
Beyond the  lack  of recognition,  the  problem is  also  the speeches of the  state 
representatives  that  make  the  Armenian  interviewees  feel  like  their  identity  is  not 
rightfully recognized by their governors. In addition to an unwelcoming atmosphere as 
above, there are also cases where the speeches are insulting or even can be considered 
as hate speeches.    
At the same time, some Armenian interviewees say that there must be a balance 
that the state needs to set while recognizing the identities. Otherwise, recognition may 
48 Original:” Erdoğan bir gün de dememiştir Ermeniler de bizim kardeşlerimizdir.”
49 Original:”Ne bakanın tanıyor, ne başbakanın tanıyor, ne cumhurbaşkanın tanıyor. Cumhurbaşkanının annesine Ermeni dediler, 
kalktı hop oturdu hop kalktı öyle bir şey yok diye. Nasıl tanıyacak?”
74
turn into stigmatization for some parts of the society and can cause fear among those. In 
other words,  recognition should not be an “exclusive recognition”50. Roy (age 43) is 
uncomfortable with the fact that the state is creating an atmosphere by marginalizing 
some identities in which people with these identities feel under threat. In that sense, 
their lack of recognition by the state creates the basis of their  exclusion or the vice 
versa:  “The state says that you are Kurdish, you are Armenian, you are Sunni, you are  
Alawite. We all see that by experience. You may say this is none of your business. Yes, it  
is none of my business, but then we have to live at the edges.”51 In order to prevent this 
result, while recognizing differences, the state also has to be careful about the fact that 
this  may also  cause  some forms  of discrimination,  which at  the end  feeds the fear 
among those who are already suffering from this kind of a problem.  
As  a  third  component  of  recognition,  Armenian  interviewees  also  see  that 
recognition of a violation is  an indispensable part  of the recognition process.  In this 
subject, the main focus is on the property of the Armenian foundations that were taken 
away or occupied during the process of nationalization in the early years of the Turkish 
Republic52.  In  recent  years,  legally  the way to  make a reclaim on the properties  is 
opened; however, most of the time the remedy cannot be possible or is partly possible. 
It  is  also controversial that  you as the victim have to start  a court  case,  prove your 
properties instead of a restitution process run by the state. Although the state has all the 
documents to designate the rightful owners of the properties,  it  does not grant  those 
documents to the public. Even in the cases where the properties are known and their 
past ownership can be proved, not the entire property is returned to the owners. These 
all create the feeling among Armenian interviewees that the state is not sincere and it 
50 Saracoglu, C. (2009). ‘Exclusive recognition’: the new dimensions of the question of ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey. Ethnic  
and Racial Studies, 32(4), 640-658. By exclusive recognition, he means that a particular group, Kurds in his case, is known or 
recognized by the society through exclusive and discriminatory attitudes and treatments. 
51 Original:”Devlet işaret ediyor buna. Diyor ki işte sen Kürtsün, sen Ermenisin, sen Sunnisin, sen Alevisin. Bunu hepimiz 
yaşayarak görüyoruz. E bu da diyeceksin sanane. Evet, bize ne ama biz daha çok köşelerde yaşamaya başlıyoruz.”
52 A couple of policies or laws can be mentioned here. The first is the law on capital tax in 1942, through this law non-Muslims 
were forced to pay high taxes in return of their their income during the World War I. The state claimed that these people earned 
undeserved money from the black market; that is why, they had to pay in exchange to their incomes. Those who could not pay 
these taxes were forced to sell their properties. The second can be the 6-7 September incidents in 1955, in which the shops of 
non-Muslims were looted and their properties were taken forcefully. Additionally, it is also possible to talk about some other 
unofficial acts or the looting after the 1915 massacres.     
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does  this  for  its  own  good53.  Arman  (age  38)  who  thinks  that  there  has  been  an 
enormous injustice against Armenians states that it  becomes possible to reclaim some 
part of these properties only because of the European Union integration process.  He 
cites one of the examples:   
“For example, Yedikule Surp Pirgiç Hospital had a 100-150 thousand m2  
land that could not be reclaimed for years. They gave only 42.500 m2 of it.  
This was because of the EU integration process; they had to.”54  
Armenian interviewees do not regard themselves as the only sufferers of the lack 
of  recognition.  They  also  think  that  other  non-Muslim,  non-Sunni,  non-Turkish 
identities,  and  mostly  women,  gays,  lesbians,  bisexuals,  or  transsexuals  have  many 
problems  regarding  recognition.  However,  interestingly,  Alawites  are those who  are 
seen as having  the worst  condition most  of the time  when it  comes to  recognition. 
Armenian interviewees see that Alawites suffer as much as they are, or even more. The 
reason  behind  Armenian  interviewees'  acknowledgment  of  the  sufferings  of  other 
identities stemming from recognition is the fact that they feel like they are sharing the 
sorrow  of  being  the  unwanted  and  unwelcomed  in  Turkey.  Being  outside  of  the 
dominant ideology of the state creates a basis for Armenian interviewees to sympathize 
for the problems that other people are experiencing.    
Although some Armenian interviewees consider recognition as an indispensable 
need, some of them hold suspicion against it. Skeptics of recognition think that it may 
not be possible to set a balance among diverse identities when it comes to satisfy their 
needs  stemming  from  their  identities.  For  example,  Selin  (age  23)  asks  whether 
recognizing an identity would increase the polarization within the society by producing 
so many identities:  “I believe that recognition is a need, but I am not sure if it leads to  
a chaos in the long run. I am not sure whether everyone creates an identity after their  
own heart and tries to take an advantage of it.”55 For skeptics, it is better to unify the 
53 By “the good of the state” here, I mean the aim to accelerate the integration process to the European Union and electoral 
interests of the government. 
54 Original:”Mesela Yedikule Surp Pirgiç Hastanesinin senelerdir alamadığı 100-150 bin m2lik bir arsası var . Onun da 42.500 
m2sini verdiler. O da Avrupa Birliği uyum yasaları içinde oldukları için, zorunda kaldıkları için vermek zorunda kaldılar.”
55 Original:”Yani olması gerektiğine inanırım ama bu uzun vadede bir kaosa yol açar mı ondan çok emin olamıyorum. O zaman 
şey mi olur herkes kafasına göre bir grup kimliği yaratıp bu sefer o şeylerden bir şekilde yararlanmaya çalışır mı, onda emin 
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needs  of everyone under  the roof of citizenship,  instead  of granting  them different 
cultural rights.  They think that  granting cultural autonomy may lead to  polarization 
within the society or the state may lose control over them.   
4.2.2. Justice as rights
Moving from the domain of recognition to the domain of rights with reference to 
the understandings of Armenian interviewees does not give that much a colorful picture. 
Armenian interviewees  do  not  express  a  strong  sense  of inequality with respect  to 
rights.  Armenians  living in  Istanbul do not  think that  some parts of the society are 
discriminated  because  they  lack  some  rights.  We  can  find  exceptions  to  this 
understanding  undoubtedly.  However,  considering  my  small  sample  size,  my 
interviewees did not mention about rights that some people were deprived of, whereas 
others could enjoy.  
On the other hand, in the discussion of rights, most Armenian interviewees raise 
the definition of citizenship in the constitution56 as an issue. Although in the constitution 
Turkishness is defined as civic and territory-based regardless of the ethnic roots of its 
subjects, in practice it is used and perceived as an ethnic identity57. That is why people 
with other ethnic identities feel that they are not equal before the law. The definition in 
the constitution is regarded as a cause of inequality before the law. Even if Armenian 
interviewees cannot give examples to this inequality as rights, they discuss it under this 
topic.  The  reason  of  this  tendency  is  the  fact  that  Armenian  interviewees  see  the 
constitution as the basis and the ground of all rights. Therefore, the invisibility in the 
constitution towards non-Turkish identities is taken as a lack of a right. That is why I 
am presenting concerns about the definition of citizenship here, under the heading of 
rights. 
olamıyorum.”
56 Article 66 of the 1982 constitution of the Turkish Republic: “Türk Devletine vatandaşlık bağı ile bağlı olan herkes Türk'tür.” 
(translation: The one who is the citizen of the Turkish Republic is Turkish.)  
57 See Kirisci, K. (2000). Disagregating Turkish citizenship and immigration practices. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol 36(3).
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The  citizenship  definition  in  the  constitution is  actually  tightly  related to  the 
recognition of other ethnic identities in the Turkish Republic. In that sense, it is hard to 
differentiate the spheres of recognition and rights. Justice as recognition and justice as 
rights are overlapping in this context. The reason behind it is the fact that a problem in 
one of them can easily penetrate into the other. Here, since there is no recognition by the 
state, it eventually causes a problem in the constitution where all basic human rights lie. 
Coming back to the discussion of the definition of citizenship, Tamar (age 28) is 
only one of the many who assert that the definition of citizenship in the constitution is 
problematic. She states that while this definition is disregarding the existence of other 
ethnic  identities,  it  is  also  depriving  them  of  some  rights.  For  example  religious 
institutions of these ethnic identities are not seen as the state institutions. Thereby, they 
cannot enjoy the rights that the state institutions can enjoy. Covering the expenses of 
these institutions or appointing officials can be regarded in this context. However, in the 
below quotation, the point that Tamar is trying to raise is slightly different. She is trying 
to say that her existence and her rights are defined through something that she is not. 
This quotation in itself can be directly linked to the topic of recognition. Therefore, it 
again clearly shows the close relationship between recognition and rights:         
“First of all, everyone is Turkish, from the start [the constitution] says so,  
which in fact you are not. The definition of non-Muslim means something by  
itself; why I am defined as non-Muslim, and that I am Christian as the name  
implies or Jewish.”58 (Tamar, 28) 
However,  the  problem  is  beyond  the  definition  of  the  citizenship.  Although 
Armenian interviewees do not say much about the inequality when it comes to rights, 
they have a perception that these rights are not enjoyed equally. For example Roy (age 
43)  rather  than the equality in  rights discussion,  emphasizes  these  rights  cannot  be 
enjoyed in practice by different parts of the society: “For sure we have equal rights.  
Everything is equal. But I do not know what we have equal.”59 Therefore, the problem 
58 Original:”Bir kere herkes Türk zaten en baştan böyle sana ne olduğunu söylüyor ki zaten sen o değilsin. Gayrimüslim 
tanımlaması kendi başına bir şey ifade ediyor zaten. Niye ben Müslüman olmayan diye tanımlanıyorum ki, Hristiyan'ım işte adı 
üstünde ya da Yahudi.”
59 Original:”Eşit haklara sahibiz tabii. Yani her şey eşit. Ama eşit olan ne var bilmiyorum.”
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becomes something not about how rights are written, but how they are implemented. 
Before talking about whether the implementation of these rights creates injustice or how 
the procedures are run, it is also important to underline the fact that the state is seen as 
the reproducer of inequality among peoples. Arno (age 20) argues this point. Although 
he  could  not  give  a  concrete  example,  he  thinks  that  the  state  produces  the 
discrimination through its policies, regulations, codes and the like:    
“There is this 10th article of the constitution60; everyone is equal, but no one  
is  equal  in fact.  On purpose,  the state instigates this discrimination and  
today it still continues.”61  
In other words, even if the Armenian interviewees cannot give concrete examples 
of discriminative practices,  their perceptions are on the contrary. This also has to do 
with the fact  that  there is  no  law that  prevents hate speeches or  crimes  against  the 
minorities who are discriminated on the basis of their ethnicity, sexual orientation or the 
like.
4.2.3. Justice as procedure 
When the topic comes to injustice,  procedures become the main point  that the 
discussion of Armenian interviewees  focuses on.  However,  before jumping  into  the 
relationship  between  identity  and  procedural  justice,  procedural  justice  in  the  state 
institutions in general has to be discussed. 
The  Armenian interviewees  do  not  see  the  state  as  legitimate  in  terms  of its 
procedures, because it  is commonly and strictly believed that the state  par excellence 
and its institutions are not free from any pressure or interests of the power holders. Like 
Silva (age 51) who works at a private company mentions, nepotism and favoritism are 
the ways in Turkey for people to make their work done in the state institutions: “More 
60 Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution: “Herkes, dil, ırk, renk, cinsiyet, siyasi düşünce, felsefi inanç, din, mezhep ve benzeri 
sebeplerle ayırım gözetilmeksizin kanun önünde eşittir.” (Every single person regardless of his/her language, race, color, sex, 
political ideology, philosophical belief, religion, religious sect and the like is equal before the law without any discrimination.) 
61 Original:”Anayasanın bir 10. maddesi var işte herkes eşittir vs. der ama aslında kimse de eşit değildir yani. Devlet bilerek bu 
ayrımcılığı körüklemiştir ve bugün hala buna devam ediyor.”
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than having money, having acquaintances [to make your work done] is important in  
Turkey. Membership to a political party is very important. Other than that, bribery still  
works,  so  we  know that  some businesses are run  with  bribery.”62 This  is  only one 
example, but Armenian interviewees commonly accept that the one who has political 
power or who follows the dominant ideology is favored during the procedures within 
the state institutions. 
Judiciary is one of the domains that are not immune to favoritism that commonly 
runs in the state institutions. Selin (age 23) as a university student argues that judiciary 
in Turkey does not stand at an equal distance from every person; that is why it is not 
free at all:   “Everyone should be litigated. I  believe that judiciary is supposed to be  
distanced and free from any pressure; everyone should be treated equally.”63 Although 
ideally Armenian interviewees expect that judiciary should be unbiased and should not 
be influenced by any authority, in reality they all think that procedures in general and 
judiciary in particular favor a group of people. However, this favoritism is not based on 
any ethnic or religious identity necessarily. Rather, it is related to the relationship either 
with government authorities or a group that has some sort of political power. Therefore, 
Armenian  interviewees  consider  the  experienced  injustice  as  something  that  every 
person can experience, unless that person is in one of those favored groups. At the end, 
this way of thinking leads to the normalization process of this form of injustice among 
the Armenians in Istanbul. People are not surprised by this fact any more.  
For  Armenian  interviewees,  the  perceptions  on  injustice  experienced  in  the 
judiciary are strengthened by the Hrant Dink court case running since 2007. In addition 
to the common belief that there is an organized crime supported by the state authorities, 
also the attitude of the state officers during this process reinforces the idea that judiciary 
is not independent. Beside the general idea among Armenian interviewees that judiciary 
is not independent; Hrant Dink court case adds another factor. Armenian interviewees 
think that the due process is running even worse than regular because the victim is an 
62 Original:”Türkiye'de devlette bir kere tanıdıksa paradan belki daha evvel tanıdık olmak çok önemli. Belli bir partiye mensup 
olmak çok önemli. Bunun haricinde de rüşvet hala çalıştığı için bazı şeylerin de parayla döndüğünü yani bunu biliyoruz.”
63 Original:”Herkesin yargılanabilir olması gerekiyor bir kere, ve bunun kesinlikle şeyden uzak, bir güç etkisinden uzak, herkesin 
aynı şekilde muamele görmesi gerektiğine inanıyorum.”
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Armenian. In that sense, what Silva (age 51) brings about is crucial to consider in this 
context.  According  to  her,  in  addition to  the unjust  atmosphere of the murder,  how 
policemen treated the perpetrator showed the perceptions towards Armenians  by the 
state institutions, and law enforcement agencies in particular64:  “In the case of Hrant  
Dink,  they might applaud the murderer secretly. I had this kind of feeling [that there  
was a discrimination], but when the people took a photograph with the murderer, my  
feeling was solidified”65 (Silva, 51).  In other words, the assassination of Hrant Dink is 
the case which proves the concerns of people who think that they are under threat in 
some way.  In short, when Armenians in particular and the society in general started to 
evaluate  the  assassination  considering  its  precarious  due  process,  they  felt  severe 
injustice in procedures. 
Other than judiciary, it  is also possible to see other cases of procedural injustice 
that  can be  directly  linked to  the Armenian identity.  These  cases  include treatment 
towards  Armenians  in  the  police  stations  or  legal  implementations  in  other  state 
institutions. Roy (age 43) raises an example of how an Armenian might be treated in a 
police station, when there is a dispute in which the other party is Muslim: “When you  
have  an  argument  on  the  street  and  be  99%  right...  [And  if]  the  other  person  is  
Muslim... When you go to the police station and when that person says that you swear  
at his religion or the flag, whom the policeman is going to believe in?”66  Being non-
Turkish and non-Muslim in these cases emerges as an impediment to be treated fairly. 
Since  there  is  a  specific  place to  specify the religion of the  person in  the  Turkish 
identification cards, religious choice is visible and may become a discriminative feature 
in some occasions. Also the name of the person strengthens the visibility of the person's 
religious and ethnic difference. That is why cases like above can easily happen. 
Although Armenian interviewees argue that procedural injustice is not specific to 
64 When the hitman of the murder, Ogün Samast, was arrested by the police and taken to the police station, some police officers 
had a photo taken with him in front of a Turkish flag to show how much they were proud of him in the name of Turkishness. It 
created so much discussion in the media and in the public.   
65 Original:”Hrant Dink'in olayındaki gibi aslında yani belki içten içe alkışladılar bile onu. Böyle bir duygu zaten vardı bende ama 
Hrant Dink'te işte gidip de o insanlar hatıra fotoğrafı çektirince işte pekişiyor.”
66 Original:”Sokakta bir kavga yapın, %99 haklı olun. Karşınızdaki insan müslüman. Karakola girdiğin zaman benim dinime, 
bayrağıma küfür etti dese kime inanacak.”
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their group and that all groups suffer from it, they at the same time claim that they stay 
in  their circles of trust.  Some Armenian interviewees are asserting that  they are not 
trying to do something different or experience new things. Rather, they are more prone 
to follow the advices of their family members and be careful about their choices. This 
emerges as “knowing one's place”67;  these people set limits for themselves to define 
what is appropriate or safe for them to do and what is not. From this perspective, the 
Armenian identity emerges as a limit to define the capabilities of a person who holds 
that identity.  Therefore,  those who think in this way decide their workplaces or jobs 
accordingly, most of the time.    
Particularly,  Armenians  refrain  from employment  in  the  state  institutions  and 
military. Also they feel violated because of the treatments during their military services 
or the troubles in birth, death and marriage registration offices.  Although there is  no 
legal  limitation  against  the  employment  of  Armenians  in  the  state  institutions,  the 
interviewees  are  complaining  about  the  fact  that  there  is  no  Armenian  policeman, 
soldier, public prosecutor, judge or the like. They assert that there is no chance that they 
can work at the state institutions and become officers. This feeling becomes stronger for 
men during their  military services68.  For  instance; Roy (age 43) who served for  the 
military as a soldier narrates his story occurred during his military service:  
“We were standing at attention, shaking out of fear. The lieutenant colonel  
said they thought of me as an operator, but the chain of command did not let 
them  [to  recruit  me  as  an  operator].  I  said  there  was  no  need  to 
mention...Why is he not taking me as an operator? You are taking me to the  
military service, using my labor, making me work, giving a gun, educating 
me,  but  you  do  not  let  me  be  an  operator.  Why  not?  Since  it  is 
communication, there may be concerns about intelligence security. Can this 
be possible? They are sending me to the military service, taking taxes and 
[even] sending me a fine, when there is a delay on the tax.”69       
67 Original: “Haddini bilmek”. 
68 The military service in Turkey is mandatory for men. Unless the person has a strong medical excuse, it is not possible to be 
exempt from it.
69 Original:”Esas duruştayız, tir tir titriyoruz. Yarbay, dedi, oğlum, dedi, biz seni santrale düşündük ama, dedi, emir komuta zinciri 
izin vermiyor kusura bakma, dedi. Dedim, komutanım ne demek, yani olur mu öyle şey. Santrale beni niye almıyorsun sen? Beni 
askere alıyorsun, kullanıyorsun, çalıştırıyorsun, silah veriyorsun, eğitim veriyorsun, sen beni santralci yapmıyorsun. Neymiş? 
İşte haberleşme yeri olduğu için istihbarat kaygısı olabilirmiş. Böyle bir şey olabilir mi ya. Askere yolluyorsun, vergi alıyorsun, 
vergiyi bir kere aksatırsan ceza yolluyorsun.”
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As another point, the problems at the birth, death and marriage registration offices 
can be regarded in this context.  Armenians are exposed to arbitrary behaviors of the 
officers working in these offices. The officers may create troubles, when they see that 
the proposed name of the newborn child is not Turkish or Turkic. Although there is no 
restriction or regulation against it, the officers can arbitrarily keep Armenians who apply 
to the office waiting, if not prevent the process completely. 
It  is  crucial  to  mention  the  fact  that  not  all  Armenians  feel  that  they  are 
discriminated against in the state institutions due to their ethnicity or religion. Some 
Armenian  interviewees  confidently  say  that  they  do  not  experience  such  things. 
However,  all  my  interviewees  accept  that  procedural  injustice  is  something  that 
everyone is faced with in Turkey because of high nepotism and favoritism in the state 
institutions. In that sense, whereas it is possible to say that some Armenian interviewees 
think  that  they are  discriminated  against  solely  because  of their  ethnic  identity,  all 
Armenian interviewees state that procedural injustice based on favoritism and nepotism 
is  something that  every citizen in  Turkey has to  live  with.  Beyond that,  Armenians 
interviewees normalize procedural injustice and regard it  as the irreversible part of the 
culture in the state institutions.     
4.2.4. Justice as social inclusion
When injustice is considered in the form of social exclusion, the logic does not 
differ  from what  is  found  in  the  procedural injustice.  However,  the  experiences  of 
Armenians vary widely considering the divergent nature of the society in Turkey. Again 
some Armenian interviewees claim that they are not experiencing any form of social 
exclusion. This can be either because simply there is no discrimination against them or 
because they are choosing their surroundings accordingly. Those Armenian interviewees 
who claim that there is social exclusion against them exemplify their argument most of 
the time through the discourses in the mass media, social media or the discriminatory 
expressions within the society.  
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The older Armenian interviewees who think that there is social exclusion argue 
that there was no such thing in the past because of good neighbor relations. As a result 
of the urbanization now people do not have a chance to get to know each other or each 
other's  culture.  Therefore,  social  exclusion  is  seen  as  a  result  of  the  lack  of 
communication in urban places. On the other hand, there are also some Armenians who 
think that the experiences of social exclusion are diminishing in the last ten years. The 
reason of that can either be the replacement of the Kemalist ideology in the state with 
the more liberal but Islamic one, or because of the changing conjuncture of Turkey with 
the impact of the spread of ideas and its integration to other cultures through the EU 
process.  However,  in  each  case  the  influence  of  the  state  on  the  society  is  not 
underestimated by Armenian interviewees. The state is  always seen as the power that 
can influence how the society thinks and behaves. 
Armenians  interviewees  regard  social  exclusion  as  something  that  every non-
Turkish, non-Sunni citizen suffers from. Again like in the procedural injustice, Alawites, 
gays,  lesbians,  bisexuals  and  transsexuals  are  seen  as  the  main  targets  of  social 
exclusion according to the perception of Armenian interviewees. Most of the Armenian 
interviewees state that since these identities are regarded as outside of the normativity of 
the  dominant  majority,  they  are  exposed  to  such  social  exclusion.  Armenian 
interviewees can be aware of this fact, because they know how the dominant majority 
marginalizes people with different identities.  
When it comes to social exclusion that people are experiencing because of their 
Armenian identity, Armenian interviewees raise more or less the same issues. The first 
thing has to do with their language. Although most Armenians talk Armenian at their 
homes, they do not prefer to speak Armenian outside of their homes. Parents warn their 
children not to speak Armenian among strangers. Some Armenian interviewees say that 
although it is not the case any more, in the past they had some bad experiences, such as 
some reactions from other people not to speak a non-Turkish language. However, it  is 
worth mentioning here that when people on the street hear someone is talking in,  for 
instance,  English,  German or French they do  not  react  in  the same  manner  as they 
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behave towards people speaking Armenian. 
Besides, regarding the language, the accent of Armenians causes strangers to ask 
where they are from or any further questions that imply that they are foreigners. This, 
combined with the Armenian names, leads those Armenians to feel like others do not 
see them to belong to this land but only stay as guests. Katia (age 22) brings about the 
issue that she always needs to hide her identity to feel secure and prevent questions like 
mentioned above. This, in itself, creates the idea for her that she is not embraced by the 
society or she is not sharing the same sense of belonging with them:  
“In general outside of my group, while walking on the street, I have to hide  
myself. I have to take the risk, when I do not hide my identity. This means  
that the society did not accept me, does not recognize me, ignore me, or  
wants to destroy me. The scariest feeling is the feeling that I do not belong  
to here.”70    
Revealing  the  identity  is  regarded  as  a  risk  because  of  what  Armenians  are 
experiencing in their daily lives. Some people do not want to maintain their relationship 
with Armenians or parents of some Armenians want  their children to stay within the 
community and do not want to interact with Muslims. However, the most striking and 
hurtful  experiences  of  social  exclusion  are  those  which  are  embedded  within  the 
discourses  of people.  Ari  (age  25)  and  Roy (age  43)  give  the  examples  of  social 
exclusion with respect to discourse below in different contexts. Whereas Ari shares an 
event taking place when he was sitting at the stands of a football stadium and watching 
the match, Roy narrates a dialogue between his commander and him during his military 
service. In each case, the hurtful and exclusionary thing was the expressions of people 
and the logic behind these expressions:     
“One day,  there  was  a football  match between  the teams  of  Elazığ and  
Malatya.  And the  people who  were  sitting at  the  stands  of  Elazığ were 
cheering to their teams by saying 'Armenian Malatya'.  Think of that; the 
swear in their mind, the Armenian, is me.”71 (Ari, 25) 
70 Original:”Genel baktığım zaman sokakta yürürken yine gizlenmek zorundayım, yine gizlenmediğimde başıma gelecekleri göz 
almak zorundayım. Bu demek oluyor ki; beni genel toplum kabul etmemiş, saymıyor, yok sayıyor veya yok etmek istiyor. Ben 
buraya ait değilim hissiyatı bence en büyük yani en korkutucu hissiyat zaten.”
71 Original:”Bir gün Elazığ-Malatya maç yapıyor. Elazığ tribünü Malatya'ya şöyle bir tezahürat yapıyor. 'Ermeni Malatya' diye 
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“When I was at the military service, he [the commander] said 'stand up' to 
me, among two thousand people. ‘The non-Muslim’, said he. He made me 
stand up and said to me 'You cut us off'. Think of this, imagine. I came to do  
my  military  service,  did not  escape,  went  there  with  joy,  and  the  great 
officer stands and says that 'in the past, you the non-Muslim, you cut us off'.  
Among two thousand people, I am the only non-Muslim, the only Armenian.  
I said 'there is no such thing my commander; I cannot say anything about a  
subject  that  I  know nothing about'.  Plus,  'I  am a Turkish citizen,  and a  
soldier here. So do not ask me this'”72. (Roy, 43) 
Armenians  may also  experience  social  exclusion through their  religion.  Since 
religion, Christianity, is seen as an indispensable part of the Armenian identity most of 
the time, as mentioned above, the unpleasant  experiences linked to their religion are 
also shared in this context. Although there is no limitation against visiting churches as 
religious  institutions,  sometimes  there  can  be  hate  speeches  against  Christians  or 
members of any other non-Muslim religion. This often occurs by saying gavur73. These 
kinds of confrontations either lead the person to be highly offended or cause them to 
leave the country permanently. What happened to Victoria (age 53)'s brother perhaps is 
the best  example to  this situation. Since he could not  take hostile  attitudes of other 
people against his religion any more, he left Turkey and move into another country:  
“I have a brother. 30-40 years ago he said that he would leave.  They [a  
soldier and he] had a fight during their military service,  and they [other  
soldiers] said  gavur  to  him [to my brother].  He could not stand it,  they 
punched each other,  they beat  each other.  My brother got  a punishment.  
Then, when his service was done, he came and said that he would not stay  
here [in Turkey]. He said that he did not want to be called as gavur and left.  
There  have been emigrations like this.  It  is  [only]  an example  from my 
family.”74 (Victoria, 53) 
tezahürat yapıyor. Düşün; oradaki adamların düşüncesindeki küfür olarak kullandığı Ermeni aslında benim.”
72 Original:”Askerde, 2 bin kişinin arasında 'sen' dedi, 'kalk ayağa' dedi, 'gayrimüslim' dedi. Kaldırdı, 'sen bizi kestin' dedi. Düşün 
yani, kafanda canlandır. Askere gitmişim, hiç kaçmamışım, severek gitmişim ve koca assubay çıkıyor diyor ki, sen, diyor, 
zamanında, diyor, gayrimüslimsin bizi kesmişsin, diyor. 2 bin kişinin arasında bir tek gayrimüslim benim, Ermeni benim. 
Komutanım, dedim, yok öyle bir şey ben bilmediğim bir konu hakkında sizle bunu paylaşamam, dedim. Artı, ben, dedim, Türk 
vatandaşıyım burada askerim. Yani, dedim, bana bunu sormayın.”
73 It means unbeliever in a pejorative way. However, it is used for those who are non-Muslim to state that if someone is not a 
Muslim, this means that that person does not believe in God either.  
74 Original:”Abim var. Abim 30-40 sene önce ben, dedi, gidicem, dedi. Askerde kavga yapmış, gavur demişler. Bu da içine 
sindirememiş yumruk yumruğa girişmişler, birbirlerini güzel dövmüşler. Ceza almış abim. Ondan sonra askerden kalktı geldi. 
Ben, dedi, burada kalmayacağım, dedi. Ben bana gavur denilmesini istemiyorum, dedi, gitti. Buna benzer göçler oldu yani. 
Abim kendi ailemden bir örnek.”
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Most of the Armenian youth also have this wish to leave the country. However, 
their will is not directly linked to their experiences related to their Armenian identity. 
Even  if  they  are  experiencing  such  things,  their  desire  is  stemming  from  the 
hopelessness towards the future of the country and the opportunities it can give. There is 
no  denial  that  there  are  some  cases  which  the  Armenians  in  Turkey  are  socially 
excluded; however, these examples should be regarded in a broader framework, which 
implies that the nature of the society is not very inclusive towards the differences and 
not very tolerant to the demands of the youth.  
4.2.5. Justice as (re)distribution
When justice is considered in terms of economic equality, there is no clear link 
between  the  Armenian  identity  and  what  interviewees  understand  by  redistributive 
justice.  Comments  on  redistributive  justice  vary  among  the  Armenians  living  in 
Istanbul. Instead of thinking a connection between an ethnic identity and perceptions on 
economic  inequality,  in  this  context  it  makes  more  sense  to  connect  thoughts  on 
redistributive justice to the class.  Mostly,  Armenian interviewees who run their  own 
businesses  state  that  those who  work more should earn more money;  therefore,  the 
distribution of income should be based on merit  or labor.  Those people further their 
argument with that; if the state does not discriminate against its citizens based on their 
identities, there will be no problem with respect to justice. The state should be refrained 
from any interference to its citizens.
On the other hand, the majority of Armenian interviewees thinks that the state has 
to be a welfare state; it is supposed to take care of its citizens. This is the primary duty 
of a  state.  However,  still  we are not  talking about  redistribution as equality.  Rather, 
those  people  think  that  redistribution  should  be  implemented  according  to  a  need 
principle; those who are in need should be taken care of. These Armenians who are for 
the welfare state are not talking about a system where everyone has equal resources or 
equal amount of income; rather, redistribution is seen more like a charity work. Victoria 
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(age 53), like most of the interviewees, underlines the importance of taking care of the 
poor. The state is obliged to provide the basic needs of its citizens: 
“A person is supposed to get some support from the country she is living in.  
The state will either offer a job or will give 500 liras and say 'in return you  
are going to fix this'. If you [as the state] cannot find a job for them [those 
who are in need] or create something [for them to sustain their lives], then 
again your citizen will not be hungry75.” 
Although interviewees claim that the economic inequality in Turkey makes them 
uncomfortable and creates a  sense of injustice for  them,  they do not  state  that  it  is 
discriminatory against some group of people on the basis of their identities. However, 
what is seen as unjust is the way the state works when it comes to collecting taxes and 
redistributing them back to the society. People do not trust the state institutions in terms 
of managing money and  other  resources.  Selin  (age  23)  and Arman (age 38)  while 
having different sexes, having different backgrounds and being at different ages share 
the same concern, that the state is not reliable. Therefore, Armenian interviewees do not 
want to give their money into the state or its institutions. The state cannot assure them 
by its acts that the taxes will be used for the well-being of the society:   
“People have concerns about to whom this money goes, to where; therefore,  
this is  where all  these create a  problem. You are giving high taxes,  but  
people have the doubt whether this money goes where it is supposed to go. If  
there  is  no  such  doubt,  then  this  logic  of  redistribution  makes  
sense.”76(Selin, 23) 
“When there is so much theft, for sure there will be high taxes. I said this 
before, again we are coming to the same thing; the state is a thief. It is not  
only what we experience, everyone, it is doing to its own [citizens]...It [the  
state] is stealing.”77 (Arman, 38) 
75 Original: “Hangi ülkenin sınırları içindeyse onun yardım alması lazım ya da iş sunulacak. Al kardeşim ben sana 500 lira 
veriyorum bunun karşılığında buraya bunun tamirini yapacaksın denilecek. Üş bulamıyorsan öyle bir rant sağlayamıyorsan da o 
zaman senin vatandaşın aç kalmayacak.”
76 Original:”Kime gidiyor, neye gidiyor kaygısı var o yüzden zaten bence asıl olay burada patlıyor. Şimdi yani sen devlete vergiyi 
çok daha fazla veriyorsun ama bu gerçekten gerekene gidiyor mu, bunun şüphesi var insanlarda. Onun şüphesi olmasa bence 
teoride çok doğru bir mantık.”
77 Original:”Zaten bu kadar hırsızlık varken vergi nasıl yüksek olmasın ki yani. İşte demin söyledim ya yani demin dediğime 
geliyoruz yani devlet zaten hırsız. Sadece bize yapılmış bir şey yok ki herkes, kendi şeyine de yapıyor aynı şeyi...Hırsızlık 
yapıyor yani.”
88
     
4.2.6. Justice as retribution and restoration
Last but not the least, Armenian interviewees were asked how it could be possible 
to achieve justice after a violation of a right or a crime; which mechanism they would 
prefer;  retributive  or  restorative.  When the crime  or  violation is  an individual case, 
when the wrongdoing is directly related to an individual or the victim is an individual, 
then the ways of retributive justice seem more just to Armenian interviewees. In these 
cases, Armenian interviewees do not seek for restorative justice, because they think that 
it is not possible to restore the feeling of injustice. Restorative justice, on the other hand, 
is preferred in case of past atrocities where it is not possible to find the perpetrators any 
more or the perpetrator is not an individual. 
Retributive justice is seen a way to hinder future wrongdoings or crimes. In that 
sense,  it  is  regarded  as  a  way  of  dissuasion  and  a  way to  prevent  future  crimes. 
However, the feeling of injustice is prevailing among Armenian interviewees because of 
the lack of punishment in Turkey. Especially, the cases of women murders, rapes, and 
the assassination of Hrant Dink are given as examples. Since the state or the judiciary in 
particular is expected to protect the security, impunity shakes the legitimacy of the state 
from the ground. 
When it  comes to  restorative justice,  for  the 1915  Meds Yeghern in particular, 
apology, truth-telling, remembering are desired for the healing of the society in general 
and for Armenians in particular. For example, Roy (age 43) considers apology as a way 
of showing some respect to those people related to those events in one way or another 
and acknowledging their sufferings:  
“Apologizing means to show respect to that  particular people.  When the  
head of a country apologies to a minority, to a race, it feels like putting a 
scarf onto the shoulders [of those people] in the cold.”78  
From the above perspective,  Armenian interviewees do not  seek for a material 
78 Original: “Özür dilemek; o halka saygı göstermek demek. Bu ülkenin başı, bir ırktan, bir azınlığa özür diliyorum dediği zaman, 
o halkın üzerine soğukta bir şal atmış gibi olur.” 
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compensation, money or land. On the contrary,  their main expectation by restorative 
justice is to lead the state to create trust within the society and to embrace Armenians as 
a people that have experienced wrongdoings. In that sense,  in addition to an apology 
and remembering of the past  events,  the state  should also name public  places after 
victims and remove any signs or names which praise the perpetrators. Also, it is highly 
crucial that  the authorities not  to  politicize the whole process  or use it  as a  tool to 
acquire some interest. All acts should be implemented for the sake of the people whose 
rights were violated.   
4.3. Injustice as a source of conflict
Considering the understanding of justice in different forms, among the Armenians 
in Turkey the experiences of injustice create the feeling of fear and uneasiness. Most of 
the time, the Armenians in Turkey share a fear that leads them to refrain from actively 
taking part in societal issues.  However, this does not necessarily mean that every single 
Armenian  thinks  that  she  or  he  is  discriminated  against,  exposed to  some  form of 
injustice. It is inevitable to see different cases among Armenians, because Armenians in 
Istanbul is not a homogenous population.  
Although the feeling of injustice among Armenian interviewees is influenced by 
their ethnic identity, in general they do not perceive injustice directly on the basis of 
their ethnic identity. Rather, it  is  a feeling that the Armenians interviewees think that 
they share with the rest of the society. Also those Armenians who claim that they are 
discriminated against  based on their  ethnic  identity think  that  there is  no  justice in 
Turkey in general. Armenian interviewees who see injustice in Turkey also predict that 
these forms of injustice will not be eliminated, because Turkey will never change for 
good when the topic comes to justice, equality and so on. 
The  discussion  on justice  explained  above  shows the  fact  that  the  feeling  of 
injustice among Armenian interviewees is  predominantly based on values instead of 
material things. What Armenian interviewees are looking for is not materially-based. In 
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that sense, it can be said that what they understand by justice is mostly based on social 
inclusion and procedural justice. The experiences that Armenian interviewees share with 
respect to injustice are mostly linked to these forms of justice. They are more sensible to 
the issues of social exclusion and procedural injustice in general in the discussion of 
justice. 
4.4. Discussion 
To sum up, when we look at the Armenians living in Istanbul, it can be seen that 
what they understand by justice is mostly influenced by their group identities. Although 
as the self-defined members of an ethnic group they do not link injustice directly to their 
ethnic  identity,  their  identity  leads  them to  share  corresponding  examples  to  their 
experiences. Since they were exposed to exclusion and extermination in the past, what 
they understand by justice is shaped accordingly. They are picking examples from these 
spheres of injustice.  
The Armenian interviewees are more prone to see the forms of injustice stemming 
from social exclusion and procedural injustice. What they express as injustice or their 
examples of injustice can be  categorized under  these forms  of injustice.   It  is  very 
crucial to see the dynamics within this understanding. In other words,  in addition to 
their experiences of injustice stemming from social exclusion and procedural injustice, 
we have to consider the fact that the lack of implementation of recognition reinforces 
the  perceptions  of  these  forms  of  injustice.  Since  the  lack  of  implementation  of 
recognition  penetrates  into  the  society  and  state  institutions,  social  exclusion  and 
procedural  injustice  become  unavoidable  for  the  Armenians  in  Istanbul  or  maybe 
Turkey. Therefore, when patterns of social exclusion and procedural injustice are taken 
into  account,  it  is  crucial  to  consider  the  fact  that  the  lack  of  implementation  of 
recognition is one of the reasons why these forms of injustice are this much strong.   
On the other hand, Armenian interviewees do not necessarily see issues they are 
experiencing, they also see other group identities facing with similar things. Armenian 
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interviewees  can  extend  the  forms  of injustice  that  they are  experiencing  to  other 
identities who are also suffering from those.  In other words, Armenian interviewees are 
more prone to see the forms of injustice stemming from social exclusion and procedural 
injustice,  because their  perspective is  shaped accordingly.  They are sensible when it 
comes to social exclusion and procedural injustice. However, this does mean that they 
only identify these forms of injustice with them.   
The reason behind how and why the Armenian interviewees could extend their 
perspective to other identities -be ethnic, religious, sexual orientation, sex and the like- 
is the notion that the state is not welcoming to its citizens if they do not fit into the ideal 
citizen definition of the state. That is why for the Armenian interviewees, it is easier to 
sympathize with those who might be suffering as they do. 
In conclusion, in order to understand the way the Armenians in Istanbul think, it is 
not necessary to look at the individual cases or statements. Rather, a holistic view is 
crucial to understand the societal dynamics within the Armenians in Istanbul and within 
the society in Turkey in general.  Otherwise, it  would not be possible to see what the 
Armenians in Istanbul understand by justice as a whole.        
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CHAPTER V | ANALYSIS: KURDS IN ISTANBUL
 
As in the earlier chapter, before starting to talk about what the Kurds living in 
Istanbul understand by justice through their current predicament, how they constructed 
their identity was asked to them. Although the results show that the ways through which 
the identity is  constructed are not  completely different  from the Armenians'  way of 
identity  construction,  there  are  some  differences.  Among  other  factors,  also  the 
population rate  of the Kurdish people in  Turkey,  their  religion,  the intensity  of the 
political mobilization and the concentration in a region have an impact on this identity 
construction. 
5.1. Identity
The first element that has an indispensable impact on identity can be family. For 
all identity constructions this argument can be valid. However, for most of my Kurdish 
interviewees,  the influence of family on the children is  more powerful.  Since family 
values have a huge impact  on the individual in  the Kurdish culture,  cultural values 
practiced at home lead the children to embrace their Kurdish culture strongly.  If the 
family  members  are  relatively more  traditional  and  emphasize  their  cultural values 
along with their religious values,  then the attachment  to the ethnic identity becomes 
more crucial for  those members.  The members of those families  define  their  ethnic 
identity by Kurdish national values instead of seeing that ethnic identity as composed of 
cultural differences constructed over time.  
In the process of identity construction religion plays an important role for most of 
the Kurdish interviewees. Families who hold the Sunni sect of Islam are most of the 
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time more nationalist than families who are Alawite, or who are not religious at all. In 
that sense, there is a relation between the religiosity of the family and how they see their 
ethnic identity. Among the interviewees, the Sunni sect of Islam leads the family to be 
more conservative and nationalist. These elements are strengthening each other, if the 
family does not give up on one. On the other hand, it is also possible to find some cases 
where religion is used to cover up the Kurdish identity. Especially, families who want to 
refrain from any conflict with the state prefer to embrace their religious identity. In this 
way, they think that they can prevent their children from involving any form of political 
activism.  Since  children  who  are  not  religious  at  all  might  end  up  in  a  socialist 
organization, religious commitment can be used to handle with this situation for some 
Kurdish families.  
On the other hand, if the impact of Sunni Islam is weak on the child or the child 
does not maintain her or his traditional values, then Kurdishness is defined as culture, 
daily practices or language in particular among the interviewees. These people do not 
see Kurdishness  as  a  race.  They think  that  ethnicity  par  excellence does  not  mean 
anything at all. However, they prefer to use the concept of ethnic identity as a tool to 
understand the suppressive nation state phenomenon. Therefore, they embrace it to fight 
against that suppression without a nationalist tendency. For example; Ali79 (age 25), who 
is defining his identity as socialist, states that Kurdishness is  important to him in the 
sense that it is an area where he can criticize nation-state ideology and its ideal citizen:  
“My Kurdishness is a Kurdishness as being suppressed [by the state]. In 
other words, if I am Kurdish, I see myself as a part of a suppressed people  
[whose ethnic identity is ignored by the state] and in the category of the  
suppressed, ideologically. Therefore, for me embracing Kurdishness, in fact,  
is like embracing my [socialist] ideas.”80   
In that sense, the Kurdish identity can be regarded as a mean to comprehend the 
dynamics of the struggle between the state and its citizens. It  is considered a part of 
their  leftist  ideology against  the Turkish nation state  which emphasizes  its  national 
79 All names in this chapter are pseudonyms.
80 Original: “Benim Kürtlüğüm bir ezilmişlik olarak Kürtlük. Yani Kürtsem eğer kendimi bir ezilmiş olarak görüyorum ve ezilenler 
sınıfında görüyorum ideolojik anlamda. Dolayısıyla benim Kürtlüğe sahip çıkmam aslında kendi fikirlerime sahip çıkmak gibi 
geliyor bana.” 
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values through its apparatuses. That is why this kind of approach is seen in people who 
detach themselves  from traditional-conservative values,  because this  detachment  can 
create  a  space  for  them  where  they  can  understand  these  dynamics  and  express 
themselves. 
However, seeing the Kurdish identity as a cultural construction, is not only a part 
of an  ideology whose  struggle  is  against  the  dominant  state  par  excellence.  Those 
interviewees who are not followers of a leftist ideology claim that although they prefer 
to be seen solely as human, free from all identities,  at some point  they are forced to 
embrace that identity as a result of the reactions against them. Murat (age 22) who is a 
university student states that although he does not need to define himself as Kurdish in 
his daily life in Istanbul, the attitude of the state against Kurds puts him in a position to 
defend his Kurdishness. Consequently, this need to defend one's identity strengthens the 
attachment to that identity:    
“For instance,  when someone does not  respect  your identity  or start  to 
exclude you [from the society, from themselves], like you are different, you 
have to  do it,  you need [to embrace that  particular identity]...After that  
point [defining your identity] becomes necessary.”81   
In that sense, the state policies produce a need for some people to embrace their 
ethnicity.  Otherwise,  they feel that  they are going to  lose  their  basic essentials,  the 
language in particular.  These people are not defining themselves as Kurdish because 
their ethnic identity means a lot to them but because they are marginalized by the state. 
For Dilan (age 21) who is also a university student, the assimilation and denial policies 
of the state create a need for her to define her ethnic identity:   
“[The  identity  construction] proceeds  like  this  in  the  psychology  of  the  
suppressed peoples; you are marginalized [by the state]. It  is shown who 
you are by the super ego of the society, by their common understanding. You 
do not individually differentiate yourself. On the contrary, the “powerful” 
system is introducing your identity by marginalizing you. [The state] shows  
who you are, it shows the point that you should stop. That is why we learn  
81 Original: “Birileri mesela kimliğinize saygı duymadığı zaman veya sizi farklı bir şeymiş gibi yani kendilerinden ayırt etmeye 
başladıkları anda..buna bazen mecburiyet duyabiliyorsun, gerek duyabiliyorsun, o noktadan sonra bana önemli gelir.”
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that we are different, we are separate.”82   
In addition to the above feeling which is produced by the state apparatuses, the 
construction  of  the  identity  can  also  be  based  on  an  intellectual  ground  for  some 
educated Kurdish interviewees. Students who are moving into Istanbul to study or those 
entering  into  new  circles  of  friends  develop  awareness,  a  group  consciousness  by 
reading some new materials about history and the dynamics of nation-building. In these 
cases, the discussion based on identity is not limited to their Kurdishness but a general 
view  about  politics  in  Turkey.  That  is  why  they  are  able  to  see  from a  broader 
framework and come with different examples from the history of Turkish Republic, in 
addition to talking about the violations against the Kurdish people. 
For  Kurdish  interviewees,  it  is  also  possible  to  develop  group  awareness  by 
confronting  identity-based differences  within the society.  Mehmet  Ali  (age 36)  who 
came  to  Istanbul  from  Mardin  to  study  law  developed  an  awareness  about  his 
Kurdishness by entering into new circles different from his.  
“Coming to Istanbul, starting university [changed my perspective]... Since 
everyone in your hometown is like you, you are not aware [of the fact that  
you are Kurdish].  Or even if  you are aware of  it,  it  does not  come into 
prominence inside you. But  after you come to  Istanbul,  you meet groups  
different from you. Unavoidably, yours becomes explicit. You realize some 
things, you question some things better. You are starting to question why it is  
like this, why this is not like that.”83  
Whereas  universities  are  the  places  where  the  identity  is  rediscovered  or  the 
places  where  the  questioning  starts  through  intellectual  means,  in  high  schools  or 
elementary schools Kurdish children discover their identity through the discrimination 
that they are facing in their daily lives. In that discrimination, the national oath plays a 
82 Original: “Bu ezilen halkların psikolojisinde şu şekilde ilerliyor; sen ötekileştiriliyorsun. Toplumun süper egosu tarafından, 
genelgeçerlilikleri tarafından sana kim olduğun gösteriliyor aslında. Sen bireysel anlamda bir ayrışmaya girmiyorsun. Aksine 
“güçlü” sistem seni ötekileştirerek sana kimliğini aslında “tanıtıyor”. Sana kim olduğunu aslında gösteriyor, durman gerektiği 
noktayı gösteriyor. Onun için biz öğreniyoruz tabii ki; biz farklıyız, ayrıyız.”
83 Original: “İstanbul'a gelişim, üniversiteye başlamam. Memlekette zaten herkes senin gibi olduğu için çok onun farkında değilsin. 
Ya da farkındaysan bile senin içinde çok önplana çıkmıyor. Ama İstanbul'a geldikten sonra senin dışında başka gruplarla 
tanışıyorsun. İster istemez seninki sende biraz daha belirgin hale geliyor, bir şeylerin farkında varıyorsun, bir şeyleri daha iyi 
sorguluyorsun. Neden bu böyle, neden bu böyle değili sorgulamaya başlıyorsun.”
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crucial role84.  The non-Turkish students feel uncomfortable with reading the oath, if 
they could develop a sense of identity in their early school years. It can hurt their feeling 
of belonging from the very beginning of their school years. Murat (age 22) is only one 
example of those who feel uneasy by taking an oath every day because they are forced 
to claim that they are Turkish by this oath:    
“I  could read  [the  oath]  very comfortably during my elementary school 
years. Then slowly, when I started the middle school, for example on the 6th  
grade I remember, we were making fun of it because you were expected to 
be proud of an identity which was not yours and this seemed so ridiculous.  
We were mocking when reading it. For sure, while we were reading it, our  
teachers and principal who were also Kurdish were reprimanding us, if we  
made fun of it. And sometimes this reprimand might even go to beating.”85   
The  oath is  not  the  only  thing  which  creates  uneasiness  for  the  non-Turkish 
students.  Also,  their  experiences in  the classrooms and their  relationships  with their 
teachers  create  the  same  impact  on  the  students.  Some  Kurdish  students  may  feel 
excluded and discriminated against.  Sometimes the tension may even go further and 
take a more visible form. Salih (age 35) who spent his high school years in  Konya 
suffered  from an obvious  discrimination against  Kurdish  students  in  his  classroom: 
“When I was going to high school, I studied in a small Anatolian township. Kurdish  
children sat on the side of the wall and Turkish children on the side of the windows.”86 
We cannot know how many teachers are separating their students in one classroom like 
that or what the motivation behind it is. It is also hard to say whether this is a policy of 
the school or the preference of the teacher. Some might say that these are individual 
cases and cannot be generalized to the whole system. However, it is obvious that there 
are some people who hold and implement this idea. Eventually, this kind of experiences 
that the students are faced with influence how they see Turkishness, Kurdishness or any 
ethnic identity related topic and shape their identity constructions.    
84 The national oath emphasizes Turkishness and the Turkish identity.  It starts like this; “I am Turk, I am right, I am 
hardworking..” and continues; “Let my existence be a gift to the Turkish existence.” 
85 Original: “İlkokulda rahatça okuyabiliyordum. Sonra ortaokula gelince yavaş yavaş, mesela 6. sınıfta, hatırlıyorum biz andımızla 
dalga geçerdik çünkü senin olmayan bir kimliğin üzerinden senin gurur duyman bekleniyor ve bu çok saçma geliyor. Biz tiye 
alıyorduk okurken. Tabii okurken aynı zamanda Kürt olan öğretmenlerimiz ve müdülerimiz tarafından tiye aldığımızda 
azarlanıyorduk. Bu bazen dayağa kadar gidebiliyordu.”
86 Original: “Mesela ben liseye giderken küçük bir Anadolu ilçesinde lise okudum. Kürt çocuklar duvar tarafında oturur, Türk 
çocuklar pencere tarafında otururdu.” 
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The teaching materials in public schools which are the outcomes of the national 
education policy have no space for the history of the Kurdish people or other peoples in 
general.  If not during their elementary school years, during their high school years most 
of the Kurdish students start questioning the official history-telling in their curriculum. 
Bejna Elif (age 24) who clearly states her desire to study her own nation's history has 
been highly offended by the fact  that  there was no mention of Kurds in  the history 
books when she was going to high school. Therefore, she said she needed to express 
herself one day in one of the history classes:  
“There is no mention about Kurds when they are talking about the lands of  
Kurdistan87 which they name it as East Anatolia, South Anatolia. As if there  
have always been Turks to be talked about. As if there was no human being 
before  1071 Malazgirt,  as  if  there were  no  people  up to  Erzurum,  only  
mountains.  Alparslan came and discovered that place.  As if  there was no 
society, no civilization, no nothing [before].”88 
It is worth to mention here that the Turkish national history is criticized from two 
different perspectives by my interviewees. Whereas some of them criticize all national 
history policies and regard them as part of the history-writing of nation states, some of 
them only  criticize  it  because  it  is  only  focusing  on  the  Turkish  history  and  not 
mentioning Kurdish. In that sense, the latter is not against national history-telling, they 
would just prefer to study theirs. The above quotation exemplifies it. However, it is also 
possible  to  hear  from Kurds  that  history-telling  from the  perspectives  of the  states 
would always be problematic. States always manipulate history like in the case of the 
Turkish nation-state.     
The construction of the Kurdish identity does not only occur through the tension 
between  the  student  and  the  teacher  or  the  student  and  the  education  system.  The 
identity can also be produced by the attitudes of other students. The child who is not 
aware that his identity can be problematic for some parts of the society starts to face 
87 Throughout the text, Kurdistan refers to an unrecognized region where the population of the cities are highly Kurdish.  
88 Original: “Doğu Anadolu, Güney Anadolu diye adlandırdıkları Kürdistan topraklarında hiç Kürtlerden bahsedilmiyor. Sanki 
sürekli orada Türkler konuşulmuş. Malazgirt 1071'den önce sanki orada hiç insan yokmuş, sanki Erzurum'a kadar orada hiç 
insan yokmuş orası sürekli dağlıkmış. Alparslan gelmiş orayı keşfetmiş gibi. Hiç orada bir toplum, bir medeniyet, hiçbir şey 
yokmuş gibi.” 
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with this fact, when other students remind it. Thereby, those Kurdish students are forced 
to find ways to maintain their existence in that particular context; it becomes a survival 
mechanism to fit into the surrounding. For instance; Ayhan (age 35), who studied in a 
city where the rate of the Turkish population was high and the city was known with its 
nationalist tendency, had some hardships in the school regarding to his Kurdish identity. 
In order to safeguard himself,  he tried to cover his ethnic identity by highlighting his 
appreciated qualities:   
“Erzurum started to be claimed as one of the nationalist-fascist centers and 
I studied my elementary school in such a place. It created a huge trauma on 
me. I was at the village till I was 5-year-old. After you are 5, you are going  
to the city center and you are the only Kurd in a school where there are at  
least one thousand students. Then, when I passed to second grade, my uncle  
came, who was one year younger than me. We are two [Kurdish] people, at  
that school we  are two. You need to define a strategy,  in order to bring  
yourself into existence among these children, you need a strategy. My uncle  
was very quarrelsome, in that way he called into being, protected himself.  
For me, I was one of the hardworking students at school. This was how I  
created myself.  In some way, you have to find a way to protect yourself;  
otherwise, they crush you very hard.”89 
Even if a person does not emphasize his ethnicity or he is not well-aware of it, the 
identity can be taught by external sources through conflicts. Whereas on the one hand 
the teaching process brings about the production of the identity, it  can also cause the 
strengthening of the attachment to that identity. The person who rediscovers his identity 
in  a  different  context  can  get  politicized  and  involve  into  some  form of  political 
activism. The daily conflicts result in that individual to be politically active, since the 
pressure coming from outside, from a different ethnicity, can constitute a need to create 
an in-group based on the ethnic identity. Mehmet Ali (age 36) who mentioned above 
that  he  got  awareness  through  encountering  with  other  people  stated  here  that  the 
exclusion by other students led him to form his own group based on the characteristic 
they were excluded for:  
89 Original: “Erzurum, milliyetçi-faşist merkezlerden biri olarak anılmaya başlandı ve ben böyle bir yerde ilkokulu okudum. Bu 
bende çok büyük bir travma yarattı. 5 yaşıma kadar köydeydim. 5 yaşından sonra şehir merkezine gidiyorsun ve en az bin tane 
öğrencinin olduğu okulda tek Kürt sensin. Daha sonra ben 2. sınıfa geçince benden bir yaş küçük amcam vardı, o geldi. 2 
kişiyiz, okulda 2 kişiyiz. Bir strateji belirlemen gerekiyor, bu çocuklar arasında kendini var edebilmenin bir stratejisini 
belirlemen gerekiyor. Amcam çok kavgacıydı, o şekilde kendini var etti, korudu. Ben de okulun en çalışkan öğrencilerinden 
biriydim, ben de o şekilde kendimi var ettim. Bir şekilde orada kendini korumaya alman gerekiyor, yoksa çok kötü ezecekler 
seni.”
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“I felt when I was a freshman, at the dorm in particular, that my classmates  
stayed away from me. Although I had nothing to be afraid of, although I was  
not involved into a political  group, they stayed away from me and were  
sincere to each other...  I clearly felt that there was a de facto discrimination 
going on. That is why we as Kurds came together and did stuff among us. It  
was not something planned but was happening spontaneously.”90 
As mentioned earlier  once again,  even if  the  person does  not  want  to  define 
himself through his ethnic identity,  the experiences like the above example can force 
him to do so. This process can be explained through different examples and experiences. 
Since  each  person  has  a  different  story,  the  ways  that  they  develop  a  group 
consciousness based on their ethnic identity vary. However, in each case experiencing 
such things leads Kurds to create group consciousness, if not involving into a political 
organization to express themselves clearly.   
On the other hand, since some families feel uneasy about the politicization and 
active involvement  in politics,  they try to hide their ethnic identity and prevent  their 
children's  attachment  to  it.  Undoubtedly,  the  preference  to  hide  one's  identity  is 
influenced by many factors; the region that  one dwells  in,  the city dynamics one is 
exposed to or the circles which the family interacts with. If the family lives in a city 
where the rate of the Kurdish population is high, they do not need to hide their Kurdish 
identity,  simply because either they do not feel insecure or it  is  impossible to do so. 
However, in cities where the population is mixed or Turks is dominating the city with a 
hostile attitude, then the families try to protect their children by lessening their visibility. 
Şoreş (age 27), who was born in Istanbul and whose family did not teach their children 
Kurdish cultural codes to prevent any possible exclusion or hardship that their children 
would possibly experience, is one such case:  
“Especially  my grandmother and family elders raised us away from our 
Kurdish identity.  Since my aunt's  husband  was  in  the organization,  they  
scared us of that identity.  My aunt tried to raise her children more liberal,  
more apolitical. In some way, our Kurdish identity was hidden from us. In 
90 Original: “Ben üniversite birinci sınıfta, yurtta özellikle, benim sınıf arkadaşlarımın benden uzak durduğunu yani bir şeyimin 
olmamasına rağmen ki ben o zaman siyasi bir grubun içerisinde de değildim, uzak durduğunu kendi aralarında samimi 
olduğunu..Yani fiili bir dışlanma olduğunu çok net hissediyordum. Öyle olunca biz de benim gibi başka Kürtlerle bir araya gelip 
birlikte sosyal bir şeyler yapıyorduk. Bu planlı bir şey değildi, kendiliğinden oluyordu.”  
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this way,  slowly we  entered into an assimilation process.  First  they quit  
speaking the language; the language was forgotten in our generation. But  
now, this is the moment when I feel completely Kurdish [because now I can  
understand the whole assimilation process and so on].”91  
Although this can be the case for the families who live in Istanbul or cities without 
a dominant Kurdish population, for families who live in the Kurdish cities, it is almost 
impossible not to use the language or hide the cultural codes of that identity from their 
children. The parents may try to lessen the feeling of being Kurdish or try to replace it  
with something else,  such as religion. However, again when the child  grows up, it  is 
very possible for that child to connect to that identity.  
Apart from the family or their attitude towards the ethnic identity, the child can 
develop another  understanding towards his  or her  ethnic  identity.  It  is  likely that  a 
person in his childhood may choose to hide the identity from his friends,  because he 
feels uncomfortable or insecure with that  identity.  This result  can be stemming both 
from peer pressure and systematic denial at schools against Kurds. The desire to conceal 
one's identity sometimes can even go further and lead the child to deny it completely. 
However,  in  either  case  where  the child  embraces  the identity due to  his  daily  life 
experiences,  or  he  tries to  deny it  first,  but  at  the end he  acknowledges that  ethnic 
identity and establishes a bond. The process of acceptance or denial ends up with the 
embracement of that particular identity. However, the degree of this embracement can 
be different from context to context.   
Even  if  the  identity  construction  results  in  claiming  one's  Kurdish  identity 
publicly, problems attached to it may emerge. Due to external pressures or the lack of 
recognition, the person may lose the cultural codes, language or any value that helps 
him to define himself as Kurdish. For example Şoreş (age 27) claims that he is suffering 
from a lack of belonging because he does not find a place for himself in any identity. 
Since he was born in Istanbul and does not speak Kurdish, he is not acknowledged as 
Kurdish by his townsmen back in the village. Since he defined himself as Kurdish, he is 
91 Original: “Özellikle babaannem ve aile büyükleri bizi Kürt kimliğimizden uzak yetiştirdiler. Eniştem örgütün içinde olduğu için 
bizi o kimlikten korkuttular. Halam çocuklarının daha liberal daha apolitik yetiştirmeye çalıştı. Bizden sürekli Kürt kimliğimiz 
bir şekilde gizlendi. Böylece yavaş yavaş bir asimilasyon sürecinin içine girdik. Önce dil konuşulmadı, bizim kuşağımızda dil 
unutuldu. Ama aslında tam da şimdi kendimi bir Kürt olarak hissediyorum”
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not  welcomed  by  the  dominant  majority  of  the  society.  “Today  when  I  go  to  my 
hometown, I cannot speak Kurdish at my own village with my relatives. We are “the  
other” on both sides.  When we go to Kurdistan, we are those who do not know the 
language.  A  general  state  of  “otherness”,  like  refugees”92. Since  language  is  an 
indispensable part of the ethnic identity,  it  plays  a  crucial role in  self-definition and 
belonging.  Therefore,  the lack  of it  creates  an irreparable  harm and  trauma on that 
particular person with respect to his feeling of belonging.    
In other words, the policies of the state; the education system; the pressure within 
the society; the efforts to hide or deny the identity are not successful in destroying the 
identity construction of Kurds.  On the contrary,  these strengthen the intensity of the 
process of identity construction. It does not matter if identity construction starts with 
nationalist tendencies or with a struggle against the suppression. In either case, it creates 
its own reasons to develop a group consciousness. These reasons create its own context 
where the understanding of justice is shaped. That is why the identity construction is 
important to comprehend how this understanding is formed. 
5.2. Justice
When justice is taken from a broader perspective, the Kurdish interviewees claim 
that justice means to be treated equally. The equality means here being free from any 
pressure,  any form of power or any hierarchy among groups. It  is  a space where all 
identities or preferences can be practiced freely,  where people can actualize or fulfill 
their  needs  and  desires.  Additionally,  they  also  raise  the  equality  of outcome  with 
respect to resources. In that sense, for the Kurdish interviewees justice is not only an 
implicit  phenomenon,  it  is  also  the equal distribution of resources.  Whereas in  this 
understanding it seems like that they are asking for a mechanism to adjust the processes, 
they argue  that  the  state  is  supposed  to  be  refrained  from any interference,  except 
granting funds for the implementation of services. The reason behind this argumentation 
is that because most of the time the Turkish State is seen as illegitimate and not capable 
92 Original: “Bugün memlekete gitsem, kendi köyümde Kürtçe konuşamam kendi öz akrabalarımla. İki tarafta da öteki olduk. 
Kürdistan'a gittiğimizde dil bilmeyen adamız. Genel ötekilik, mülteci gibiyiz.” 
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of distributing justice. That is why their understanding of justice broadly is conflicting 
with  the  idea  of  the  state.  However,  there  are  still  some  services  for  Kurdish 
interviewees that the state is supposed to provide. By looking at the sub-categories of 
justice, it is possible to see this deliberation.     
5.2.1. Justice as recognition
Starting the detailed discussion of justice as recognition reveals the fact that for 
Kurdish interviewees, except for the official national identity based on the synthesis of 
Turkishness and the Sunni sect of Islam, no identity is recognized. Kurdish interviewees 
regard the attitude of the state in terms of recognition as the consequence of the nation-
state model. Nation states work in this way; creating a national identity and ignoring the 
others. It is the way how states sustain their entity and power. 
 
Although the power changed hands in the Turkish state governance with the AKP 
elected office in 2002, the situation with respect to legal recognition did not seem to 
have changed at all. It is commonly believed that each government is promoting its own 
ideology by using the state apparatuses; however, what they understand by the national 
identity is not altered so far. Murat (age 22) perfectly reflects here the prevailing idea of 
Kurdish interviewees.  According to him,  each government  creates its  own cadres to 
ensure its  sustainability.  However,  they sacrifice the well-being of its citizens at  the 
expense of their supporters. This eventually damages the functioning of the democracy: 
“I honestly [think] that the anti-democratic countries, like Turkey, position  
themselves  away  from  almost  all  classes  [referring  to  identities];  the  
government is changing in every 10-15 years and with the new government 
these power holders are creating their own class and they are flattering,  
favoring this class. We see that [the government] is favoring this class.”93 
According to Kurdish interviewees, the state or the government is not neutral to 
93 Original: “Ben aslında yani Türkiye gibi gerçekten demokratik ülkelerin hemen hemen bütün sınıflara uzak olduğunu ve her 
neredeyse 10-15 yılda bir iktidarın el değiştirdiğini ve her yeni iktidarla birlikte bu iktidarın kendi sınıfını yarattığını ve bu sınıfı 
pohpohladığını kayırdığını [düşünüyorum]. Bu grubu kayırdığını görüyoruz.”  
103
the identities in the country. On the contrary, whenever the power holders are altered, 
they are producing their own ideology by giving the unofficial definition of the desirable 
citizen. Therefore, the recognition does not  go further beyond the domination of one 
identity over the others. 
Power struggle may determine who is dominating in that particular period of time. 
However, the national identity based on the Turkish-Sunni synthesis stays solid despite 
of  the  changing  dynamics  within  the  country.  Most  obvious  proof  of  that  is  the 
citizenship definition in the current constitution. The Turkish constitution is not seen as 
legitimate  by  Kurdish  interviewees,  because  it  is  ignoring  the  existence  of  ethnic 
identities  or other  identities  such as  LGBTIs94.  Although it  is  possible  to  encounter 
indications of other peoples in the discourse of political authorities, they can barely be 
counted as recognition. Ethnic identities are accepted as folkloric richness rather than a 
recognized legal status.     
Being deprived of a legal status harms the feeling of belonging and creates some 
ontological problems for that particular person or identity group. That person or group 
does not only feel that the state does not embrace them, but they also feel ignored and 
pushed to  the margins.  The  statement  of Şoreş  (age  27)  is  a  good example  of this 
argument.  He  states  that  the  lack  of  recognition  means  ignoring  one's  existence. 
Therefore, the acknowledgment by others is necessary for one to come into existence:   
“[Recognition] is the ground for a human or an individual to come into  
existence, to exist as an individual. It is important to recognize the identity  
which one defines herself through. If I do not recognize your identity, the  
identity you define for yourself, it means you do not exist. It means I do not  
recognize you. If I am the state, it means I do not count your existence, I  
deny it.95” 
The lack of recognition does not only constitute psychological handicaps, it  also 
leads  some  practical  deficiency  for  Kurds.  Kurdish  interviewees  argue  that  the 
94 Abbrevation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex. 
95 Original: “İnsanın kişisel varlığının, birey olarak var olmasının nedeni. İnsanın kendini var ettiği kimlik üzerinden tanınması 
önemli zaten. Eğer ben senin kimliğini, senin kendini tanımladığın kimliği tanımazsam sen yoksun demektir. Ben seni 
tanımıyorum demektir. Eğer ben devletsem senin varlığını saymıyorum, senin varlığını inkar ediyorum demektir.” 
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sustainability of their culture is impeded as a result of the lack of recognition and the 
deprivation of the opportunities stemming from this recognition. Deniz (age 18), who is 
a high school student and living in Bağcılar where the rate of the Kurdish population is 
relatively higher, states that since there is no recognition of Kurds, there is no mention 
about them in the school books either. For her, the lack of recognition deprives her of 
learning the Kurdish history and of speaking her mother tongue:  
“A Turkish child can speak her own language, express herself, and study 
her own conception of history. This is highly important. They can listen to  
their own music, but we cannot. Maybe in books they tell something about 
our folk dance, but why isn't my history there? Why is there no mention  
about the Kurdish history, while they are telling that of the Turks?”96 
 
The  interviewees  do  not  demand  the opportunities  stemming  from recognition 
only for Kurds. They claim that each identity, be an ethnic identity or not, should be 
granted the bases on which it can maintain its norms. Otherwise, this situation inclines 
to the violation of some rights. In the case of Kurds, the issue of language is raised as 
the most prominent one. Every time they hit the barrier of language either within the 
society or within the state institutions because of the denial of their identity. 
Kurdish  interviewees  further  the discussion  by saying  that  although for  some 
identities  that  have  the  minority  status  the  situation  seems  different,  they are  also 
suffering  from the  same  problems.  Minority  schools  where  some  particular  ethnic 
identities are allowed to learn their own language are not what Kurds are asking for. 
These  schools  are considered  as  the  mechanisms  where  the  state  produces  its  own 
desirable  citizens,  where  it  disciplines  them.  That  is  why Kurdish  interviewees  are 
expecting the opportunities stemming from recognition are managed according to the 
will of that particular identity group. The state is supposed to grant the basis, the fund 
for the services but the decisions of how these services are organized and run should be 
left to whom they concern. 
When the discussion comes to whether  Kurds are recognized or how they are 
96 Original: “Türk çocuğu kendi dilinde konuşabiliyor, kendini ifade edebiliyor, kendi tarihini görebiliyor. Ne kadar önemli bir şey. 
Kendi müziğini görüyor mesela. Ama ben kendim göremiyorum işte kitaplarda belki halay şuydu buydu anlatılıyor ama benim 
tarihim neden yok. Neden Türk tarihi anlatılırken bir de Kürt tarihi yok.”
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recognized in Turkey, interviewees argue that even if the state always acknowledges the 
existence of Kurds in its internal correspondence, they are acting the other way around 
when it comes to public recognition. Until very recently, the political authorities were 
denying the Kurdish history and culture, if  not their existence. Nurcan (age 19) who 
came to Istanbul to study reflects that political authorities do not hesitate to deny the 
existence of Kurds and their history:   
“There are some people who think that we, Kurds,  do not exist.  An AKP 
member of the parliament, or a MHP member of the parliament says that  
Kurds do not exist; they say that we [Kurds] make [Kurdishness] up. There  
is  no  such  thing as  Kurds,  Kurdish  history.  We  are  lying  [according  to 
them]. They are defending that even some books written on this [subject]  
are also a lie.”97 
The argument that Kurds do not exist is not valid any more in Turkish politics as a 
common understanding. Starting with the democratization process and continuing with 
the so-called peace process, it  is almost impossible to deny the existence of Kurds in 
Turkey.  However,  the  problem starts  here  again.  For  Kurdish  interviewees,  verbal 
recognition  is  not  a  legitimate  recognition.  It  does  not  mean  anything  to  Kurdish 
interviewees as long as Kurds do not have a legal status through which rights stemming 
from their group identity are ensured. Servet (age 41) who puts his socialist point of 
view into prominence shares his discomfort about this subject. He argues that in order to 
talk  about  equality  in  practice,  legal  status  of identities  and  their  acknowledgment 
before the law have to be provided first.     
“There is no tangible correspondence [to that recognition]. I mean saying  
'in  this  country,  yes,  there  are  Kurds'  is  a  different  thing;  saying  'the  
existence of Kurds should be ensured through their rights or what they own'  
is a different thing. It is not a satisfactory answer to superficially say that  
we are all brothers and sisters,  as tight as a tick, Kurds do exist. Or this  
approach is not a satisfactory situation. In that way, in an abstract sense,  
Kurds are recognized, but when it comes to freedom and rights, there is a  
total denial or even a Turkification of them.”98     
97 Original: “Bizim, Kürtlerin var olmadığını düşünen insanlar var. Bir AKP milletvekili, bir MHP milletvekili Kürtlerin var 
olmadığını söylüyor. Yani diyor ki siz kendi kafanızdan uydurdunuz. Kürtler, Kürt tarihi diye hiçbir şey yok. Tamamen yalan 
söylüyorsunuz. Bu konuda yazılmış kitapların bir kısmının bile yalan olduğunu savunan insanlar var.”
98 Original: “Somut ifadesi karşılığını bulmuyor. Yani bu ülkede evet Kürtler var demek başka bir şey, evet bu ülkede Kürtlerin 
varlığı haklarıyla ya da sahip olacakları şeylerle olmalıdır demek farklı bir şey. Üstünkörü evet bu ülkede hepimiz kardeşiz, etle 
tırnak gibiyiz, Kürtler de vardır demek çok tatmin edici bir cevap değil bence. Ya da böyle bir yaklaşım da çok tatmin edici bir 
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Also the role of the PKK99 with respect to recognition of the Kurdish people is not 
underestimated in changing the attitude of the state towards this issue. The PKK is seen 
as an important figure in forcing the state to settle or at least to initiate the discussion of 
some  things  with  respect  to  the  Kurdish  existence.  On  the  other  hand,  before  the 
democratization process or resolution process, it  would not be wrong to say that there 
was, and maybe still is, an “exclusive recognition”100 towards Kurds. The recognition of 
Kurds is derived from the prohibitions, or the rights that they cannot enjoy, such as the 
ban on the  Kurdish language.  Salih  (age  35)  who  is  LGBTI activist  compares two 
identities without  a  legal status; Kurds and LGBTIs.  He explains  that  although it  is 
possible to see indications of the existence of Kurds by looking at the restrictions put 
against  them,  there  is  no  way that  one can find  any sign showing the existence of 
LGBTIs in state institutions or laws. The state behaves like there is no such thing: 
“In fact, Kurds are recognized legally, on some points. You can talk of their 
existence. At least the prohibitions are set against their existence. They are 
recognized reversely. For instance, the LGBTIs are not, they do not exist,  
they have no rights.”101   
In addition to the aforementioned discussion, another hot topic that can always 
find a place within the recognition deliberation is the recognition of LGBTIs. Although 
the recognition of the LGBTIs are denied and they are deprived of any opportunity by 
alleging that they are against the societal values, my interviewees either be conservative 
or democrat acknowledge the injustice in this situation. They are uneasy with the fact 
that  the  state  acts like  some groups do  not  exist  at  all.  In that  sense,  their  lack of 
recognition helps them to understand other identities who are suffering from the lack of 
durum değildir. O anlamda soyut anlamda evet, Kürtler tanınıyor ama haklar ve özgürlükler meselesine geldiğinde tamamen bir 
reddediş var. Hatta işte bir Türkleştirme var.”
99 Abbrevation for Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party). 
100 Saracoglu, C. (2009). ‘Exclusive recognition’: the new dimensions of the question of ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey. Ethnic  
and Racial Studies, 32(4), 640-658. By exclusive recognition, he means that Kurds are recognized through exclusion and 
discrimination that they are experiencing. However, unlike Saracoglu who looks at the societal dynamics, here I argue that the 
state sets some prohibitions against the Kurdish identity; thereby, it in a way recognizes them.  
101 Original: “Kürtler yasal olarak tanınırlar aslında, belli noktalarda tanınırlar. Varlıklarından söz edilir. En azından yasaklar zaten 
onların varlığına karşı konmuştur, tersinden tanınırlar. Mesela LGBTİler tanınmaz, yokturlar. Hiçbir hakları yoktur.” 
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recognition.   
As mentioned earlier, Kurdish interviewees are complaining of the fact that the 
preferences of people are not the concern of the state. Also, whenever the state interferes 
into this kind of an issue, they think that injustice is inevitable, because the state always 
pursues  its  own interests.  The  only  thing  the  state  is  expected  to  do,  according  to 
Kurdish interviewees, is to acknowledge the existence of each particular identity and 
provide the basis it to be flourished. 
5.2.2. Justice as rights
It is obvious that within the discussion of justice it is very difficult to separate the 
spheres of recognition and rights. They are tightly connected to each other and they give 
birth to one another. Although injustice as rights were touched upon above slightly when 
we were talking about the results of recognition, it  is  still worth reviewing here how 
justice  is  regarded  from  the  perspective  of  rights  in  Turkey  and  what  Kurdish 
interviewees raise as prominent issues with respect to this topic. 
When  rights  are  regarded  as  what  is  given  in  exchange  of  duties  and 
responsibilities,  Kurdish interviewees emphasize the gap between what  is  given and 
what is taken in  response.  Although all citizens in  Turkey have the same obligations 
towards the state, they do not have the same rights. The rights are defined according to 
needs of one dominant group or identity. Salih (age 35) discusses the tendency of the 
state to deprive the rights of those citizens who stay outside of the dominant norms of 
the state and society. In that sense, LGBTIs are deprived of some rights by being alleged 
that they do not fit into the social norms. However, as Salih states, law is not something 
that should go in accordance with the moral norms of a group. It has to be free from 
such  things  simply  because  those  who  are  stigmatized  are  not  exempt  from  the 
obligations or duties towards the state: 
“The responsibilities of the state towards its  subjects should be equal to  
their obligations towards the state. I am not paying less tax because I am  
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immoral; I am paying as much as others do. However, I am enjoying the  
opportunities which the state creates less than others.”102  
It  is  worth here to reconsider the citizenship definition in the constitution once 
again.  In  addition to  the fact  that  this  definition creates a  problem with respect  to 
recognition, it also problematizes the legal status of ethnic minorities, even though some 
of them are recognized by a treaty. In that sense, the constitution is the first point which 
implies that  the rights are defined according to one ethnic  identity.  Therefore,  some 
groups  are going  to  be  deprived of some rights based on their  identities.  A history 
master student,  Ayhan (age 35) attracts attention to historical facts. It is  not only the 
problem of the constitution per se, but also the grounds which the Turkish State leans on 
imply a domination of Turkishness. This, from the very start, creates an inequality and 
impartiality: 
“You are going to arrange the definition [of citizenship] in a way that no 
one can understand that a Turk, a Muslim is the dominant one. The status of  
an Alawite will be equal to the status of a Muslim. The status of a Kurd will  
be equal to the status of a Turk. The status of an Armenian will be equal to  
the status of a Turk. You have to find a definition in law, in the constitution 
where everyone is equal. This is very difficult in Turkey. Even the name of  
the country is Turkey.”103 
The problem in the domain of recognition is carried into more solid grounds here. 
Since there is no acknowledgment towards other needs, the opportunities which the state 
can offer stay limited and are enjoyed only by the ideal citizen that the state creates as a 
concept. Even the crimes and offenses are defined according to this conception. Since 
those who are outside of this ideal citizen concept are regarded as threats to the integrity 
of the state, the acts which criticize or try to change this conception are counted as crime 
or offense. The rule-of-law is constituted with the aim of protecting and promoting the 
status of the ideal citizen of the state.     
102 Original: “ Kişilerin devlete olan yükümlülükleri ne kadar eşitse, devletin de onlara olan yükümlülükleri o kadar eşit olmalı. Ben 
ahlaksız biri olduğum için daha az vergi ödemiyorum, herkesle eşit oranda ödüyorum. Ama o delvletin yarattığı olanaklardan 
eksil yararlanıyorum diğer bireylere göre.”
103 Original: “Vatandaşlık tanımını sen öyle bir yapacaksın ki oradan bir Türk'ün bir Müslüman'ın mutlak hakim olduğu anlayışı 
çıkmayacak hiçbir şekilde. Bir Alevi neyse, bir Müslüman da o olacak. Bir Kürt neyse, bir Türk o olacak. Bir Ermeni neyse, bir 
Türk o olacak. Böyle herkesin eşit olabileceği bir tanım bulman gerekiyor senin hukukta, anayasada. Bu da Türkiye'de çok zor 
hani devletin ismi bir kere Türkiye.” 
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According to  Kurdish interviewees,  it  is  not  possible to  talk  about  freedom of 
expression in  Turkey.  Whereas there is  no  implementation concerning hate speeches 
against ethnic identities, religious identities, sexual orientations, women and likewise, 
even a critique to Turkishness or Islam104 is regarded as a criminal act and prosecuted by 
the penal courts. However, when there is a critique to the dominant ideology of the state, 
the same logic does not apply. The state favors its ideology by the means of rule-of-law. 
Besides  that,  a  couple  of  important  examples  can  be  mentioned  here.  Gay 
marriages are not legal. Cemeveleri, Alawite religious institutions, are not able to use the 
rights that other religious institutions can enjoy. They do not have the status to be a 
religious institution. Until very recently, it  was not possible for the covered women to 
enter  into  public  institutions,  universities  included.  It  is  possible  to  multiply  the 
examples;  however,  those  are  the  most  salient  ones  that  come  up  during  the 
conversations simply because they are the burning issues. 
In  particular,  what  the  interviewees  are  passionately  talking  about  when  the 
discussion comes to the sphere of rights is obviously the use of language. Although the 
right to speak one's mother tongue is one of the basic rights, there have been serious 
problems for the use of Kurdish language105 in Turkey. The use of Kurdish language is 
not prohibited in public any more. However, the use of it is still not possible in the state 
institutions in general and schools in particular. Ali (age 25) who learned Turkish only 
after  he  started elementary school states  that  it  is  a  huge  handicap  for  non-Turkish 
speakers to be treated as if Turkish is their mother tongue. Since non-Turkish speakers 
spend  a  couple  of years  to  learn Turkish,  they start  to  study educational  materials 
provided for public schools later than Turkish speakers. While the non-Turkish speakers 
are struggling to learn Turkish so they can follow the classes, Turkish speakers get the 
upper hand meanwhile: 
104 The court cases regarding the article 301 and 216 of the penal code can be seen.  Whereas the former article prohibits any form 
of humiliation against Turkishness, Ataturk and the like, the latter concerns religious values held by some part of the society. 
However, these religious values mean only Islam or Sunnism, in pratice. 
105 By Kurdish language, I refer to Zazaki and Kurmanji, those are commonly spoken in Turkey by the Kurdish population. 
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“I want to study in my own mother tongue. I am completely deprived of this,  
but Turks are not. This creates an enormous equality [between Kurds and 
Turks]. I start elementary school by knowing no Turkish at all; at least I  
started like that.  I  spent  5-6 years to  learn  Turkish.  When  I  consider  a 
Turkish child who is starting elementary school at the same time with me, he 
has a head start on it, 6-0. First of all, this is a total injustice.”106 (Ali, 25)  
With the peace process, some things start to change. One of these changes is that 
the  students  will  be  able  to  choose  Kurdish  as  an  elective  course  henceforward. 
Although it is not exactly what they are asking for, it can be regarded at least as a step 
forward. However, this time attitude of the state and the society are highly criticized by 
Kurds. The right to education in Kurdish is introduced in the mass media as a favor to 
Kurds.  They, on the other  hand, see this as a reclaim of a  right  which was extorted 
before. That is why there are some discursive issues related to this topic that should be 
solved through a dialogue. It is a long process to solve the problem because it  touches 
upon so many issues at the same time.    
5.2.3. Justice as procedure
Maybe more than the 'haves and have-nots' issue,  the issue of how or to what 
extent these rights are enjoyed among the society is crucial. Procedural injustice is one 
of the forms that  the injustice claims  of Kurdish interviewees are heavily based on. 
Kurdish interviewees state  that  favoritism,  nepotism,  the government's  setting  up its 
own cadre into the public offices are very common in Turkey. Therefore, how much a 
citizen can use those resources, how much a person enjoys the rights depend on that 
person's relationship with the political authorities. Şoreş (age 27), who defines himself 
as a socialist, draws attention to the relationship between the state and bourgeoisie in 
terms of procedural justice. Although he is only one of those who think that the rights in 
Turkey are enjoyed depending one's close ties with the state or government, he also adds 
that the group of people who are favored in terms of procedures are holding the capital 
106 Original: “Ben Kürt'üm, ben anadilimde eğitim görmek istiyorum. Bundan tamamen mahrumum ama Türkler bundan mahrum 
değil. Bu acayip bir eşitsizlik doğuruyor. Ben okula başlıyorum Türkçeyi hiç bilmiyorum, en azından ben öyle başladım. Benim 
5-6 sene Türkçeyi öğrenmekle geçti. Benimle aynı ilkokula başlayan bir Türk çocuğuyla ben bakıyorum, adam 6-0 önde 
başlıyor. Bir kere bu tamamen büyük bir adaletsizlik.”
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in their hands. The capital opens the path for them to enjoy their rights without any 
obstacle:   
“Considering the fact that I cannot cruise107, someone took advantage of the 
government more than I did.  The conditions in Turkey are determined by  
your closeness to the government. While the bourgeoisie constitutes its own 
government,  the  government  also  constitutes  its  own  capital.  If  you  are  
close to the government authorities, you can trade, you can study at the best 
schools, all doors open to you, the state institutions clean the path for you,  
you can pass your project to wherever you want. The state provides its all  
opportunities to its entourage.”108 
The above quotation does not only exemplify the favoritism taking place in the 
state institutions, it does also say that power always brings injustice or unlawfulness to 
the mass.  Kurdish interviewees in  general complain of the arbitrariness  of the state 
institutions and their procedures. According to them, in addition to the lack of a social 
policy to manage the state institutions, there is also no legitimacy of the rule of law in 
Turkey.  The  procedures  of  the  jurisdiction  or  the  state  institutions  in  general  are 
regarded  as  arbitrary  and  lacking  of  integrity  or  impartiality.  One  of  the  striking 
examples of that situation is “yolsuzluk operasyonu”109 the case in which four members 
of the parliament are accused of corruption. As a response to these charges, the positions 
of the prosecutors and judges responsible for this case were replaced by the government. 
The prosecutors and judges are also accused of the misuse of their positions. These acts 
and attempts are seen as the run-away-exits of the government by the public.   
Kurdish interviewees regard the law as something that can be easily violated and 
under the pressure of the power elites. In addition to the discussion of the impartiality of 
107 Bilal Erdoğan, the son of the prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan, bought merchantile vessels during his father's prime ministry. This 
received widespread media attention and caused a huge public discussion on how the prime minister could increase his wealth 
this much in a short period of time. 
108 Original: “Ben gemiyle gezemediğime göre birileri benden daha çok yararlanmış o iktidarın perspektifinden. Türkiye'de şartlar 
iktidara yakınlığınla belirlenir. Sermaye sınıfı hem kendi iktidarını oluştururken, her iktidar da kendi sermayesini oluşturur. Eğer 
sen iktidara yakınsan, sen ticaret yapabilirsin, sen iyi okullarda okuyabilirsin, sana bütün kapılar açılır, devlet kurumları sana yol 
verir, istediğin yere proje sokabilirsin. Devlet kendi olanaklarının hepsini kendi çevresindekilere tanıyor.”
109 Starting on 17 December 2013, a group of people included businessmen, Mps, ministers were charged of misuse of the duty and 
corruption. It had a broad repercussion in press. Following these charges, the prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan appointed new 
prosecutors and judges to the places where he thought that the positions were being misused to undermine the power of the 
government. The series of incidents were framed in the press that there was a conflict between the AKP government and the 
Hizmet movement, and that it was a power struggle of these two fractions. 
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the rule of law, they also raise some additional points. The process of a lawsuit is most 
of the time longer than it is supposed to be. The defendant can be put in a position to 
prove her/his inculpability by violating the presumption of innocence. Also impunity is 
very common with the excuse of the period of limitation or of the lack of a ground for 
legal action. These are accepted as the procedures that everyone in Turkey suffers from, 
if they do not have close ties with the government authorities.  In that sense, Kurdish 
interviewees consider that they are not the only sufferers of procedures.  
In addition to those, Kurdish interviewees also mention about the double standards 
that only Kurds are facing in Turkey with respect to the rule of law. Whereas on the one 
hand they are arguing the existence of state security courts110 or specially authorized 
criminal courts111 to prosecute the cases related to the Kurdish conflict,  on the other 
hand they raise the KCK cases where people are arrested with the claim of being a 
member of an illegal organization. Kurdish interviewees assert that Kurds are exposed 
to a different  kind of the rule of law by being judged by the courts separate from a 
regular procedure. According to the statements of Kurdish interviewees, there are many 
cases for  which Kurds are prosecuted and accused of the crimes  they are not  even 
intending to commit.  Ali (age 25) who is a Kurdish language teacher in one of the non-
governmental  institutions  shares  a  story to  show  how  jurisdiction  works  arbitrarily 
towards Kurds and exemplifies the above argument. He says that one of his friends was 
prosecuted and found guilty of being member of KCK, although there was no legal basis 
of such a claim. The reason why he was found guilty was a phone call that the court 
claimed to be encoded:   
“One of our friends got arrested. He spoke on the phone. In the accusation,  
the proof of guilt is that he said 'makul'  [in the phone call].  When he was 
talking on the phone, he said he was going to the council of makuls. Makul 
means eligible; he used it for the intellectuals as a joke.  He was going to  
meet his friends. In the accusation, they claimed that this was the password.  
He stayed in the prison for 10 months.”112
110 Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri; established in 1973 to prosecute the court cases with respect to internal and external threats of 
the Turkish Republic. Then they were abolished in 2004 and replaced by the specially authorized courts. 
111 Özel Yetkili Mahkemeler; emerged by the replacement of state security courts in 2004. They are working within the framework 
of the penal courts.   
112 Original: “Bizim bir arkadaşımız tutuklandı. Telefonda konuşmuş. İddianamesinde suç olarak suç delili şu; makul demiş. 
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For  Ayhan (age  35)  who  also  personally  suffered  from these  procedures 
states that Kurds are seen as outside of the domain of the regular procedures. They 
are subjected to  a  different  kind of logic when it  comes  to the rule of law in 
particular.  That  is  why  Kurds  can  never  track  down  the  violations  they  are 
subjected to: 
“You are both outside of the rule of law and beyond the rule of law; both 
above it and below it. In other words, you do not have a connection with the  
law; you are kept outside of it. By being kept outside of it, you are also kept  
outside  of  the  system,  you  are  not  accepted.  Therefore,  almost  every  
violation you are exposed to becomes visible, because you are not able to do  
something.”113         
In consideration of the above example,  for  Kurdish interviewees,  the injustice 
stemming  from the  procedures  with respect  to  the rule  of law does not  only occur 
because  Kurds  are  regarded as  perpetrators of a  crime,  but  also  because  the crime 
committed against them becomes invisible. They cannot find any ground to reclaim the 
remedy of the crime that they are subjected to. The bombing on Roboski114 is one of the 
issues in this context due to the lack of punishment. Nurcan (age 19) argues that Kurds 
in  particular  are  experiencing  many violations.  Although she  has  not  experienced  a 
violation as an individual, her observations regarding this issue create awareness. She 
states that the rights of Kurds have always being violated and they still are. The case of 
Roboski is only one of the examples of this attitude: 
“Everything, every form of oppression against Kurds till now was covered 
up. Even the Roboski case was covered up. It was said that the soldiers were  
Telefonda bir arkadaşıyla konuşmuş demiş ki ben makullerin meclisine gidiyorum. Makuller dediğimiz şey Türkçe'de buna 
makbul deniyor işte. Entel dantel kimselerim şeyine şaka olarak söylemiş. Arkadalarının yanına gidiyor işte oraya gidiyorum 
diyor. İddianamede diyor ki bu tamamen şifre diyor. Bunun için adam 10 ay hapis yattı.”
113 Original: “Hem hukuk dışındasın, hem hukukun ötesindesin; hem hukukun üstündesin, hem hukukun altındasın. Yani hukukla 
bir bağın olmuyor hukuk dışında tutuluyorsun. Hukuk dışında tutularak da var olan sistemin içine alınmıyorsun, kabul 
edilmiyorsun. Öyle olunca hemen hemen sana karşı uygulanan her türlü haksızlık bir görünmezlik duvarına çarpıp geri dönüyor 
çünkü sen bir şey yapamıyorsun.”
114 On 28th of December, 2011 Turkish Air Force bombed 34 civilian crossing the Turkish-Iraqi border. They claimed that they 
were acting on the information that PKK militants were crossing the border. In fact, 34 civilians, most of them were children, 
were crossing the border to smuggle cigarettes. The court decided that there was no ground for a legal action.
http://www.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/152632-roboski-katliamina-takipsizlik  
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not guilty of killing people. This shows that the state is not just. It was like  
this before, it was like this 50 years ago, and it still is.”115    
According to Kurdish interviewees, the state sees that the right to life, the right to 
communication, the right to immunity of domicile and similar rights of Kurds can be 
violable.  Therefore,  the  state  does  not  hesitate  to  infringe  these  rights  for  its  own 
interest. This approach is not only specific to one period of time or to one single event. 
Historically,  it  is  possible  to  find  other  cases  and  examples  that  can  support  this 
argument. As an excuse to that situation, the special conditions of the region or physical 
violence within the area were shown by the political authorities. Extraordinary measures 
in the region were taken by the rule of the state of emergency from 1987 to 2002. This 
period was violent. Some people were forced to leave their homes and villages for the 
security reasons as the state claimed so. Süleyman (age 56) is one of those who left his 
village as a result of the forced migration. He is a direct witness and victim of those 
conditions. He states that it is huge violation committed against Kurds who was living 
there:   
“Thousands of  villages were burnt to the ground, destroyed. [The state's  
military  power  and  the  village  safeguards]  burnt,  destroyed  3.800-4000 
villages in this way. What is the crime of these people [Kurds living there]? 
They did not become village guards116. They did not want to, they did not  
become. You do not have a right to burn down these villages, to make them 
emigrate,  to  kill  them.  They  got  some  of  them  killed.  There  are  17548 
unsolved murders.  Did they deserve to  be killed? What  for did they get  
killed? Because they were Kurdish intellectuals, because they were aware of  
who they were,  because they refused to be a village guard. These village 
guards raped hundreds of women, got them pregnant”117 
   
115 Original: “Şu ana kadar yapılmış birçok şeyin üstü kapatıldı. Kürtlere yapılan her şeyin, zulmün. Bir Roboski davasının bile şu 
anda üstü kapatıldı. İnsanların ölümünden askerlerin suçları olmadığı söylendi. Bu da zaten devletin adaletsiz olduğunu gösterir. 
Eskiden de böyle, 50 yıl öncesinde de böyleydi, şimdi de böyle.” 
116 Kurds living in that region were given two options by the state. They were either going to be a village safeguard and help the 
state to fight against the political activism in the region, or they were going to to leave their villages and migrate somewhere 
else. 
117 Original: “Binlerce köy yakılmış, yıkılmış. 3800-4000'e yakın köy yaktılar, yıktılar bu şekilde. Bu insanların suçu nedir? Korucu 
olmadılar. Olmadılar, olmadılar. Senin hakkın yok ki bu köyleri yakmaya, bu insanları göçertmeye, bu insanları öldürtmeye. Bu 
insanların bir kısmını da öldürttüler. 17548 tane faili meçhul var ortada. Bunlar öldürülmeyi hak ettiler mi acaba? Ne için 
öldürdüler? Bunlar Kürt aydınları olduğu için, kendini bildikleri için, koruculuğu yapmadıkları için. Yüzlerce kızlara bu 
korucular tecavüz ettiler, hamile bıraktılar.” 
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The experiences in the cities with higher Kurdish population, the areas of state of 
emergency are different from the experiences in Istanbul, obviously. Süleyman is one of 
those who were born in somewhere else and then moved to Istanbul. The perceptions of 
Kurdish interviewees change depending on where they were born or where they grew 
up. For the families who were forced to migrate or whose villages were evacuated or 
burnt, the issues related to procedural injustice are more severe. They are expressing 
more violent  side of the issue.  However, the experiences of the Kurdish residents of 
Istanbul  and  Kurds  who  were  born  in  Istanbul  diverge  from  those.  They  are 
experiencing discrimination through more daily practices, if they are not exposed to any 
legal accusation. 
In the metropolitan cities, in Istanbul in particular, Kurds are often subjected to 
identity  checks.   Servet  (age  41),  who  works  at  Taksim,  says  that  he  is  very 
uncomfortable with the fact that the police is treating him as if he is a criminal. Asking 
the identity cards of persons by looking at their appearance reflects the idea that the 
state or its officers hold against Kurds118: 
“One day when I decided to walk from Mecidiyeköy to Taksim, I passed 6  
check points. I think this is a huge number, it is incredibly high. The reason  
of this can be... [that the policemen] say this is for our security. However, it  
is  an  issue  in  itself  to  search  people  by  looking  at  their  color,  
disappearance, or even their outfit and so on, to pick them according to a 
criterion they set in their minds and call them to the check point. Here you  
do not know how to express yourself. If you are passing 6 check points in a  
day, or the like,  there can be no situation to make you feel that you are  
living in equal conditions.”119  
Those  who  did  not  experience  severe  physical  violence  in  their  past  raise 
problems related to the state institutions instead. They do not accept the state institutions 
118 This is interesting actually, because there are also Kurdish policemen or police officers. Their attitudes can be different. 
However, again this subject is related to how these people constructed their identity. 
119 Original: “Mecidiyeköy'den Taksim'e yürümeye karar verdiğim bir gün 6 kez arama noktasından geçtim. Bu bence muazzam bir 
rakam, bu inanılmaz fazla bir rakam. Bunun gerekçesi şu olabilir, güvenliğiniz için deniyor zaten genelde. Ancak sokakta 
yürüyen insanların rengine, görünüşüne belki de giyim tarzına bilmem neyine göre kendi kafalarında oluşturdukları kriterlere 
göre ayıklanarak arama noktasına çağrılması zaten bir olaydır. Burada kendinizi nasıl ifade edeceğinizi bilemezsiniz. Siz eğer 6 
kere bir arama noktasından geçiyorsanız, ya da farklı noktalardan 6 kez geçiyorsanız bir gün içerisinde sizi burada eşit bir 
şekilde yaşadığınızı hissettirecek herhangi bir durum yoktur ortada.” 
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as  impartial.  The  procedures  within  the  state  institutions  are  discriminating  people 
according to their ethnicity, sex or sexual orientation. People are not welcomed on the 
basis of their identities. 
Discriminatory attitudes are more common when the physical appearance of that 
person talks for itself. That is why women or LGBTIs go through this discrimination 
most of the time. In particular, LGBTIs are refused to be employed with the claim that 
they are against the moral values of the society. This means that the rules or the laws are 
actually based on some kind of morality which is supposed to find no place within this 
domain because of its claim to be impartial and neutral. 
5.2.4. Justice as social inclusion
Examples taking place in  the state institutions can also be observed within the 
society.  For  Kurdish  interviewees,  the  patterns  of  social  exclusion  resemble  to  the 
patterns  of procedural  injustice.  Although  the  ways  these  patterns  are  working  are 
distinct, the state of mind behind processes of social exclusion and procedural injustice 
is mostly similar. Kurdish interviewees state that those who position themselves outside 
of  the  state's  official  ideology  are  also  excluded  from  society.  The  unrecognized 
identities  of  the  state  are  reflected  upon  the  society.  Those  citizens  who  are  not 
welcomed by the state also become unwanted for the broader society. The ideal citizen 
definition  of  the  state,  through  its  constitution  or  ideological  state  apparatuses120, 
produces the idea among the Turkish-Sunnis that they are the primary, rightful members 
of the society. Lezgin (age 23) who defines his identity as a Sunni-Kurdish states that it 
is very uncomfortable when a part of the society thinks that they are better than you, and 
when they are treating you in this way. For him, before the AKP government, the group 
who  thought  that  they  were  better  was  the  seculars,  it  was  slightly  changed  now. 
However, there are still people who maintain this idea:   
120 Althusser, L. (1971). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). Lenin and philosophy and 
other essays, 1971-127. Althusser states that, other than the repressive state apparatuses, there are ideological state apparatuses 
through which the ideology of the state is transmitted. These apparatuses are the religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family 
ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA, the trade-union ISA, the communications ISA, and the cultural ISA. 
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“[People who  think that  they are  superior are]  Turkish-Hanefi  for now, 
before that they were the seculars.  They are always the primary citizens.  
There is no one who does not know [that there are more preferable citizens  
for the state]. Since [Turkish-Hanefi citizens] think they are [better than the 
rest of the society], are they not trying to [suppress you?]. [They have the  
power to ask] what is on your head that you have; why you are speaking  
Kurdish;  [you  have  to]  dress  in  this  way,  come  to  that  way.  These  
expressions  are  all  reflections  of  the  idea  that  I  am superior,  I  am the  
essential one.”121  
According to Kurdish interviewees, the patterns of social exclusion within society 
are directly constructed by the state ideology. This is a top-down process intertwined by 
all  ideological  apparatuses of the  state.  That  is  why without  changing  the  ideology 
within these mechanisms, in schools in particular, it is not likely to break the chains of 
exclusion and discrimination within the society.       
Although Kurdish interviewees have  all individual experiences with respect  to 
social exclusion, most of them claim that they do not have a trauma resulting from these 
social exclusion experiences. Since every person prefers to stay at her or his own safety 
networks, they feel safe and comfortable as long as they are not entering into new social 
circles.  The problem mostly has  to  do with the general attitude that  the rest  of the 
society has. For example, Bejna Elif (age 24) who studied university in Hatay states that 
she does not have discriminatory experiences when she is  with her friends. However, 
her college years were challenging for her because her Kurdish identity was undesirable 
for  some  students  at  her  school.  Bejna  Elif  stated  that  these  people  were  clearly 
expressing their discomfort stemming from her existence.  Below you can see one of the 
examples she shared with me. It is possible to hear more of these stories from her when 
you ask more about her social exclusion experiences in the past.  
“My phone was ringing, and I had one of these popular songs [as the ring  
tone] at that time. One of students came and told me 'turn it off, you cannot 
listen to it here'. I asked why [I should have turned it off]. She said that  
music was prohibited [on the campus]. This was happening on the campus. I  
said if this music had belonged to France, England, Spain or Latin America,  
121 Original: “Türk-Hanefi şu an için dediğim oydu. Öncesinde işte laikti. Onlar her zaman birincil vatandaştır. Bunu bilmeyen yok. 
Zaten öyle olduklarını düşündükleri için birilerini şey yapmaya çalışmıyorlar mı..O başındaki ne; sen niye Kürtçe konuşuyorsun; 
böyle giyin; bu şekilde gel..Bunların hepsi ben üstünüm, aslolan benimin yansıması.”
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she  would  not  have  bullied  like  this.  Is  the  whole  problem  this  being  
Kurdish? I asked whether the problem was stemming from the fact that this  
song was Kurdish. She answered 'Do not respond to me. If I say turn it off,  
you will turn it off.'”122  
Social  exclusion in  daily  life  is  experienced  mostly  through the  usage  of the 
Kurdish language in public spaces. People may look at those who are speaking Kurdish 
with discomfort.  Stigmatization or labeling is also one of the means through which the 
social  exclusion  takes  place.  Kurds  can  be  stigmatized  as  backward,  inferior  or 
incapable  by  some  people,  by  showing  the  reason  that  cities  with  higher  Kurdish 
population  are  relatively rural.  Therefore,  disdain,  humiliation,  scorning  can  be  the 
motives  of  the  attitudes  of  these  people  against  Kurds.  If  a  person  holds  hostile 
tendencies against Kurds, that person may even also imply that they are terrorists. Since 
stereotyping  is  very common in  Turkey and  in  the Westerns cities against  Kurds,  a 
Kurdish citizen can easily be marginalized or stigmatized as being a terrorist, even if he 
or she has nothing to do with any form of physical violence. Most of the time, Kurds are 
regarded as subversive by the earlier residents of the city which they moved into. After 
waves  of  migration,  these  cases  started  to  be  seen  more.  Because  of  the  lack  of 
integration among people,  social polarization between groups is  very likely in  these 
contexts.  
More severe  confrontations  are  mostly  between earlier  dwellers of a  city  and 
Kurdish migrants  who  had  to  leave  their  villages  due  to  evacuations  or  the forced 
migration. Because of the high rates of social polarization, the tension between groups 
in  the  same  neighborhood  leads  the  level  of  discrimination  to  be  harsh.  The  early 
dwellers  show  their  discomfort  by  not  renting  their  homes,  not  giving  jobs  to  the 
Kurdish immigrants and by accusing them of stealing their job opportunities.   
The psychology of being marginalized by the broader society leads some Kurds to 
feel that they should hide their identity. Especially, during their childhood these kinds of 
confrontations create insecurity for Kurdish children. Particularly in  the cities where 
122 Original: “Benim telefonumda o zaman çok moda olan bir müziği vardı. Bir tanesi geldi o müziği burada dinleyemezsin dedi. 
Niye dedim. O müzik dedi burada yasak. Okulun behçesinde oluyor. Ben de dedim ki, şimdi bu müzik Fransa'ya, İngiltere'ye, 
İspanya'ya ya da Latin Amerika'ya ait olsaydı sen gelip bana böyle dayılanmayacaktın. Bu Kürt diye mi bütün problem. Yani 
bütün problem bu şarkının Kürtçe olması mı, dedim. Bana dedi, akıl verme, bunu kapat diyorsam kapat.” 
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Kurds are treated as strangers,  the intensity of the need to hide their  ethnic identity 
escalates.  Even sometimes the need to be hidden goes further to the denial of some 
elements of their ethnic identity and even the embracement of Turkishness. As the child 
grows,  as  Kurdish  children  increase  their  self-confidence,  they start  to  reveal  their 
identity and even start to connect to that identity more tightly. The exogenous pressures 
cause some Kurds to embrace their identity powerfully during their adulthood years.      
  
Since the size of the Kurdish population is relatively higher than other populations 
that are named as minority, Kurds can build areas to be comfortable more easily. Kurds 
are able to create their own secure spaces in big cities, because there are enough Kurdish 
residents in Istanbul in particular to build their own neighborhoods. This situation may 
lessen  their  experiences  of social  exclusion.  However,  sometimes  building  Kurdish 
neighborhoods leads to ghettoization. Staying in the Kurdish neighborhoods may cause 
Kurds to be isolated from the rest of the society. However, the economic well-being of 
the families also has an influence on this ghettoization process. There can also be some 
other elements that should be taken into consideration in this discussion 
Towards  other  identities  based  on  ethnicity,  religion,  sexual  orientation,  the 
society in Turkey again is not very welcoming. For some groups, this process might be 
even more painful considering their social status and financial capabilities on the other 
hand. Ardil (age 19) who does not want to be categorized as woman or man states that 
the way people look at her/him and their attitudes make her/him feel like s/he is  not 
welcomed:  “With my LGBTI identity, whenever I enter into a store, if I act a little bit  
feminine, I can see that people laugh at me.”123  For sex workers or transgenders, the 
experiences  could  be  more  severe.  They  are  regarded  as  marginal,  deviant  by  the 
dominant majority. Also this dominant majority do not hesitate to humiliate these people 
who are regarded as marginals publicly.  
It  is important to regard the impact of the resolution/peace process and whether 
this process has changed some perceptions within the society. Whereas for some Kurds, 
123 Original: “Ben LGBTI kimliğimle bir mağazaya bile gittiğimde eğer birazcık feminen davranırsam insanların bana güldüğünü 
görebiliyorum.”
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this process creates awareness about those who are marginalized within the society and 
Kurds  in  particular,  for  some  other  Kurds the attitude of people became even more 
exclusive,  because  the  “unwanted”  part  of  the  society  becomes  more  visible  and 
consequently obtrusive. The dominant majority start to feel more uncomfortable when 
the identity of Kurds is acknowledged, even if it is not a proper recognition.  
5.2.5. Justice as (re)distribution
There is no doubt that the dynamics of aforementioned forms of justice are also 
influenced  by  the  socio-economic  conditions.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why 
redistributive  justice  is  crucial.  The  inadequate  socio-economic  conditions  of  some 
people with particular group identities can deepen their experiences of injustice related 
to  recognition,  rights,  procedural injustice  or  social  exclusion.  In  these  cases,  class 
emerges as one of the components that have an impact on these forms of injustice, as 
mentioned above. 
Additionally,  distributive  justice  also  plays  a  role  in  social  justice in  itself  by 
reproducing or preventing economic inequality within the society.  If the distribution 
mechanisms of the state do not work well, then this situation eventually creates injustice 
within the society.  The reason of it is not only because there will be some people who 
are deprived of their basic needs, but also because there will be some people who are 
enjoying the resources which others cannot.   
Kurdish interviewees argue that the mechanisms of redistribution should not work 
like a charity system. The mechanisms of redistribution are not supposed to be designed 
simply to  help  the  poor  or  take  care  of them.  Kurdish interviewees  regard charity 
systems as tools which sustain the economic structure that creates this inequality in the 
first  place.  Maintaining  the charity works can only prolong income inequalities  and 
deprivations stemming from this inequality. 
Kurdish interviewees  state  that  the system of redistribution needs  a change  to 
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adjust the inequality, to provide relatively equal incomes, and to raise the life standards 
in Turkey as high as possible. Mehmet Ali (age 36) while criticizing the charity system, 
asserts that the state is supposed to solve the root causes of inequality not to redress 
these problems:  
“It is the charity thing and also [giving] zekat124 in Islam which sustain this 
[capitalist] system. This [charity work] is one of the tools of the capitalist  
system to preserve itself, because as long as you do it, everybody will be  
satisfied with their conditions and obey the structure. Let's say that a person 
does not have shoes, then the state has to solve the shoe problem. It is not  
the business of the state to donate shoes.”125      
In other words, the state should not be run like a charity organization. Rather, the 
state is  supposed to  develop a system that  can eliminate economic deprivations and 
inequalities attached to them. On the other hand, Kurdish interviewees do not expect the 
state to withdraw from providing the needs of its citizens. On the contrary, the state is 
regarded as a mechanism to provide the needs of people. However, instead of doing a 
charity work the state should be run in a way that it can help people to flourish, to fulfill 
their potentials.  Ardil (age 19), who is a university student argues that the obligation of 
the state is  to provide opportunities for its citizens to maximize their potentials.  The 
state has the resources to support its citizens in the best way it can. Only in that way, we, 
as the society, can be better off:     
“I know that [the state authorities] have the power, the budget to provide  
[opportunities] for everyone, because they are charging high taxes. I know 
that by using these taxes,  [the state institutions] can make the education,  
transportation, health insurance or everything free of charge. The state is 
obliged to meet the needs of its citizens after all. Therefore, I think that we 
would be better off, if they smooth the things for people.”126     
124 Meaning alm, in Islam. 
125 Original: “Sistemi ayakta tutan şey yardım olayı, hatta dindeki zekat olayı da. Yani kapitalist sistemin gelir adaletsizliğini ayakta 
tutan sac ayaklarından biri çünkü hani sen onu yaptığın sürece herkes durumuna razı olacak herkes bu gidişata boyun eğecek. 
Bence o kişinin diyelim ayakkabısı yoksa onun ayakkabısızlığını çözmek gerekiyor yoksa ona bir ayakkabı bağışlamak devletin 
işi değil. 
126 Originial: “Baktığımızda aslında her insana [fırsat] sağlayacak güçlerinin olduğunu biliyorum, bütçelerinin olduğunu biliyorum. 
Çünkü aldıkları çok fazla vergi var ve vergiler üzerinden bile sadece eğitimi, ulaşımı ya sa sağlık sigortasını her şeyi ücretsiz 
yapabileceklerini biliyorum. Devlet zaten kendi ülkesindeki vatandaşlara bakmakla yükümlüdür. Dolayısıyla halkın işini ne 
kadar kolaylaştırırsa aslında o kadar doğru yola gideceğimizi düşünüyorum.”
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Although the expectation is in this way, the interviewees argue that the resources 
that a person can reach are determined by the relationship that person can set with the 
power  authorities.  In  that  sense,  the redistribution mechanism of the state  does not 
position  itself  equally  towards  all  citizens.  Practices  of  favoritism  and  nepotism 
determine who gets what and how the redistribution system works. Dilan (age 21) is 
only one of the many who assert that the state is for the benefit of the powerful. Since 
the state favors those who are powerful, its mechanisms and institutions are working in 
favor of the power holders: “The state is a space for interests where the powerful gets  
more power.”127 In other words,  the state is  not regarded as a mechanism which can 
adjust the inequalities and eliminate them. On the contrary, the state is accepted as a 
mean which deepens the gap among the classes or groups by favoring power elites.
Another salient  point in the discussion of redistribution is  the fact  that Kurdish 
interviewees  consider  the  redistribution  mechanisms  of  the  state  from  a  macro 
perspective.  That  is  why they are focusing on the regional inequalities or making a 
comparison between western and eastern cities of Turkey. Comparison between regions 
or cities is  important to grasp their understanding of justice based on ethnic identity, 
because  on the east  side of Turkey there are cities with higher  Kurdish population, 
unofficially  known as the Kurdish cities.  Therefore,  when Kurdish interviewees are 
comparing  the  resources  of  eastern  and  westerns  cities  have,  they  are  actually 
comparing the resources that Turks and Kurds can enjoy.  By making this kind of a 
comparison, Kurdish interviewees argue that the opportunities or the resources of the 
state are not spread equally across the cities. Additionally, Murat (age 22) adds another 
point to this argument. He asserts that this is a systematic policy of the state and it is 
driven by an obvious purpose; to assimilate the Kurds in Turkey by economic means:  
“[I think that] the East is set back on purpose.  [The state officials were 
claiming  that]  they  were  always  sending  to  the  East  construction 
equipments, tools to run a factory, but the members of the PKK attacked on 
them, they looted them. These are lies that even children would not believe.  
I honestly think that from the beginning of the Republic, the state has been  
127 Original: “Devlet zaten bir rant alanı, güçlünün ensesini kalınlaştırdığı bir rant alanı yani.”
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depriving the east  and southeast  side of  the country in  particular  in  an 
economic  sense.  There are  some  varied theories  about  this  subject,  like 
making Kurds migrate to the West and assimilate them culturally.”128
Most  of the interviewees believe that the inequality between the regions or the 
cities is the result of the state's systematic and voluntary actions. It is a state policy to 
deprive some of its citizens based on their ethnic identity of some resources. In that 
sense, Kurdish interviewees are seeing a huge redistributive injustice in relation to their 
ethnic identities. 
In relation to this topic, the subjects of the forced migration who were evacuated 
from their homes, villages are also brought up as an issue. The subjects of the forced 
migration were separated from their  households  and their  livelihoods.  However,  for 
Kurdish interviewees the state did not provide a sufficient remedy to them129. They state 
that in order to ensure redistributive justice, the state, at least, is expected to recover the 
financial damage it caused and take care of the needs of these citizens stemming from 
the harm which the state created itself. Ayhan (age 35) emphasizes the fact that after the 
subjects of the forced migration came to the big cities, they could not able to find jobs 
and houses. Unfortunately, the state did not provide housing or any source of living for 
them to sustain their lives: 
“[After the forced migration, there are] too many people [in the big cities]  
without a job or housing. These people migrated to the closest city centers  
when their villages in Kurdistan were burnt down with [the policies of] the 
forced migration. It is estimated that 4 thousand villages were burnt down.  
Then, 2-3 million of these people migrated to the West; however,  most of  
them piled up at the centers in Kurdistan like Diyarbakır, Antep, Van. Most  
128 Original: “Doğunun bilinçli bir şekilde geri bırakıldığını yani şu zamana kadar mesela biz Doğuya iş makinesi gönderiyorduk, 
fabrika açmak için şu aletleri gönderiyorduk, PKK tarrafından yağmalandı, şöyle saldırı oldu. Bu tür şeyler yani çocukların bile 
inanmayacağı türde yalanlar. Ve ben gerçekten devletin, cumhuriyetin başından beri özellikle doğu ve güneydoğu coğrafyasınını 
ekonomik açıdan geride bıraktığını düşünüyorum. Hatta yani çeşitli teoriler var bu konuda. Kürtleri doğudan batıya göç ettirip 
çeşitli kültürel asimilasyona tabi tutmak gibi.”
129 On 27.07.2004, the law no 5233 on compensation of the harms stemming from the state of emergency between 1987 and 2004 
was passed. However, the compensations that the state provides do not properly recover the expenses of harms and losses. 
Therefore, the implementation of this law is not accepted by the Kurdish population as driven by good intentions. It is alleged 
that the state is convinced to give some kind of restitution in order to prevent the victims of the forced migrations from applying 
to the European Court of Human Rights and from getting reparations. In order to be able to apply to the European Court of 
Human Rights, the litigator has to exhaust domestic remedies. In other words, by giving low remedies, the state actually is 
eliminating to be put on trial at the European Court of Human Rights.  
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of them still do not have housing.”130 
With the impact of the forced migration, it is also crucial to discuss the issues of 
the marginalization of these people in the economy. The subjects of the forced migration 
are not only exposed to social exclusion in the cities they are moved into, they are also 
marginalized within the economy by not being recruited. They have to work either for 
low, unwanted, unqualified jobs to get  involved into the undocumented economy, or 
they are forced to smuggle because of the lack of sources of income. 
Unfortunately, Kurds are not the only sufferers of this problem. Also transsexuals, 
refugees, persons with disabilities are pushed to the margins of the economy. Kurdish 
interviewees can extend this issue to the people with other identities and discuss it under 
the broader category of exclusion in the economy. The marginalization in the economy 
can find a place on the agenda of Kurdish interviewees, because as they state that it is 
an unavoidable result when a particular part of the society holds the power. When there 
is  one  dominant  national  identity,  the problems of the lack  of recognition or social 
exclusion penetrate into the domain of economics and how resources are distributed 
among the members of the society.  
5.2.6. Justice as retribution and restoration
When  injustice  is  taken  as  a  crime  or  a  violation of a  right,  a  discussion on 
retributive and restorative justice gains significance. The interviewees were asked which 
mechanism of retribution or restoration in order to recover their sense of justice were 
needed after a violation. It is not possible to say that Kurdish interviewees prefer one 
over the other. Rather, they acknowledge the fact that both are crucial and should be 
implemented in  combination. According to Kurdish interviewees, whereas retributive 
justice is needed to deter future violations, restorative justice is needed for the healing 
of the society in general. 
130 Original: “Çok fazla insan yoksul, çok fazla insan konutsuz. Çünkü zorunlu göçle Kürdistan'daki köyler yakılınca, 4 bin köyün 
yakılmasından bahsediliyor, bu insanlar en yakındaki kent ilçe merkezlerine geldiler. Daha sonra 2-3 milyon batıya göç etti ama 
büyük bir kısmı da Kürdistan'daki Diyarbakır, Antep, Van gibi merkerzlerde birikti. Bu insanların çoğunun evleri bile yok yani.” 
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Kurdish interviewees assert that retributive justice is an essential pillar to renew 
the feeling of injustice by ensuring the punishment in response to violations or crimes. 
They regard it as a necessity, even though they claim that reducing the pain stemming 
from the violation of a right is not very likely. In that sense, it does not matter whether 
the criminal is old or not eligible to be imprisoned. For justice to be served, the criminal 
or anyone who gets involved into the crime or violation has to be punished. Punishment 
is very crucial in repairing justice for Kurdish interviewees, since it is expected to deter 
the future crimes and violations. Only in this way, they claim, the state can acknowledge 
the fact that there is a wrongdoing committed towards its citizens.   
Another  important  fact  is  that  the  state  par  excellence is  considered  as  the 
criminal who committed most of the past crimes and violations of rights against Kurds. 
Even  if  the  state  is  not  the  perpetrator,  it  is  accepted as  the  instigator  by Kurdish 
interviewees.  Therefore,  since  the  acts  of  the  state  are  not  accepted  as  legitimate, 
Kurdish interviewees do not expect much from the retributive justice of the state or do 
not believe that the state brings justice for its past violations. They do not have a belief 
that  the  perpetrators  are  going  to  get  the  punishment  they  deserve,  if  they  get  a 
punishment at all. While asserting the state is the real perpetrator, Şoreş (age 27) also 
expresses the fact  that  the instigators in  the state are not  put  on trial.  Rather,  these 
instigators are picking triggermen to get rid off the responsibilities and let them do their 
dirty works:      
“We know that the perpetrators  are [the authorities]  in the state,  in the  
government [institutions]. [Those who are guilty] are not only the children 
who pull the trigger, but also those who lead them, give directions to them.  
[the chain of command] will go to the top. Today, who is guilty is always the 
state.”131      
Since the state is  considered as the primary actor of the crimes,  by retributive 
justice they are ideally expecting the elimination, discharge and retribution of those who 
are holding offices and who are involved into the perpetration of the crimes in one way 
131 Original: “Suçlular biliyoruz ki devletin, iktidarın içinde. Sadece tetiği çeken çocuklar değil, onları yönlendirenler, onlara emir 
verenler de. Ta tepeye kadar uzanacak zaten. Bugün suçlu olan her zaman devlet kurumudur.”
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or another. As long as the state continues to be a mechanism to protect these people who 
are responsible  for  the crimes,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  talk  about  any form of 
retribution. In that sense, Kurdish interviewees are expecting the law to protect citizens 
against any form of injustice not to protect the state. However, today it works other way 
around as Kurdish interviewees claim; the law is positioning itself to sustain the power 
of the state.
Although  sometimes  retributive  and  restorative  justice  are  taken  as  the  two 
opposite polars, Kurdish interviewees raise the fact they should be working in a way to 
support each other. As in Dilan's (age 21) statement, if retributive justice does not work 
well, if would-be perpetrators do not see any constraint against their acts, then there can 
be no feeling of safety within the society either. The healing of the society is strongly 
dependent on the feeling of security which can be ensured through retribution:   
“The  violation  of  rights,  massacres,  genocides  cannot  be  compensated.  
There can be no remedy for the trauma they caused. If an Armenian does  
not say her own name in the public, [if that person] does not sit at her home 
in peace, [if] still today old women, Armenian women are killed by getting 
their throat cut...Although you punish the criminals, you cannot wipe out the 
trauma of these people or you cannot wipe out the [traumatic] psychology  
of Alawites whose door were crossed and who got killed.”132  
Although retributive justice is necessary, it is not sufficient. The role of restorative 
justice is not underestimated by Kurdish interviewees. For the healing of the society in 
general  and  of  the  Kurdish  people  in  particular,  restoration  is  regarded  as  an 
indispensable  part  to  acquire  harmony  and  peace  within  the  society.  That  is  why 
shaming, confrontation, healing, dialogue, exposure of the earlier crimes and violations, 
rehabilitation or apology are a must, as Kurdish interviewees claim. These are the only 
mechanisms that can help to build peace within the society. Although most of the time 
justice is not regarded as something that can be easily restored or fixed, these means 
should be used to share the pain of the victim at least. Since it is very unlikely to restore 
the feeling of injustice among Kurds, the state and the society should focus on bringing 
132 Original: “Yapılan hak ihlallerinin, katliamların, soykırımların telefisi asla olamaz. O insanlarda yarattıkları travmanın telafisi 
asla olamaz. Ermeni kendi adını söyleyemiyorsa, bugün hala evinde rahat oturamıyorsa, bugün hala boynu kesilerek 
öldürülebiliyorsa yaşlı başlı kadınlar, Ermeni kadınlar...Sen nasıl suçluları cezalandırırsan cezalandır bu insanların travmasını 
silip atamazsın bir kerede. Ya da sen kapısı çizilip öldürülen Alevilerin psikolojisini silip atamazsın.”
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peace to the people. Mehmet Ali (age 36) draws attention to the means of restoration 
and how much they are important  to  move forward. However,  at  the same time he 
mentions the consequences of the forced migration. For these cases, although the state 
provides some sort of restitution, it causes more harm psychologically on the subjects in 
particular, Kurds in general. Since the amount of money that is compensated does not 
reimburse the losses of these people, their feeling of injustice accelerates:   
“Apology,  exposure,  revealing,  and  confrontation  are  crucial.  You  [the 
state] would displace tens of thousands of people from their land, from their  
villages, homes, livestock and also burn, destroy [their homes as a result of  
the forced migration]. After 10 years, you [the government] would pass a  
law and say you [as the state] are giving restitution. You would give 3-5 
thousand liras133. You would neither investigate these incidents, nor reveal  
them, or expose those who did these. In this way, justice cannot be served.  
People  applied  for  his  compensation  because  they  needed  this  money.  
However,  are they satisfied; do they make peace with the state? No, they  
even hate it more.”134  
As  much  as  using  mechanisms  to  restore  justice  or  peace,  the  state  or  the 
authorities also have to ensure the satisfaction of people and take care of their needs 
stemming from these crimes and violations. Restorative justice has to gratify victims, to 
take their consent about the ways in which this restoration will take place. Otherwise, it 
is not likely to restore justice or take a step towards peace. 
Considering the so-called peace process/the resolution process in  Turkey, more 
than the agreement  between the power authorities,  reconciliation between peoples is 
crucial. That is why the resolution process needs socialization of the problems and aims. 
People  should  have  the  power  to  lead  the  ways  through  which  mechanisms  of 
retributive and restorative justice can work in this resolution process. In order to achieve 
this,  public  opinion  needs  to  be  constituted  through  the  involvement  of  non-
133 The worth appraised for the harms and losses is found significantly low by the public. The compensated money does not only 
inadequate to cover the damages of their homes or to buy new livestocks as a source of income, it does also not recover the rent 
that these people have to pay when they are away from their houses. 
134 Original: “Özür dilenmesi, bunların teşhir edilmesi, bunların çıkarılması, bunlarla yüzleşilmesi bunlar çok önemli şeyler. Sen on 
binlerce kişiyi yerinden yurdundan edeceksin, evinden köyünden, barkından edeceksin, hayvanlarından edeceksin hem de 
yakacaksın, yıkacaksın, talan edeceksin. Aradan 10 yıl geçtikten sonra bir yasa çıkaracaksın diyeceksin ki ben bunu tazmin 
ediyorum. Vereceksin insanların eline 3-5 bin lira. Ne bu olayları araştıracaksın, ne bu olayları gün yüzüne çıkaracaksın, ne 
bunları yapanları teşhir edeceksin. Bu şekilde adalet sağlanmaz. İnsanların ihtiyacı var, elbette başvurdular. Ama tatmin oldular 
mı, devletle barıştılar mı? Hayır, yani belki daha çok nefret ettiler.”
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governmental organizations or other public organizations which can reveal the thoughts 
and experiences of people in general and of the victims of the perpetrated crimes in 
particular.  Salih (age 35) as an LGBTI activist, and as a  person who thinks that  the 
grassroots movements are crucial to solve the problems draws attention to the fact that a 
resolution process is not something one can start and end between power elites. It has to 
involve  the  subjects  of  this  particular  issue.  Otherwise,  it  can  only  come  into  a 
deadlock:  
“A resolution process is not something you [the state] can do by sitting at 
the table with a rebellious group [the PKK], and ignoring the rest of the 
society.  A mass resolution process requires this; you, as the state,  shape 
your media, discourses to build the peace process and ensure the equality 
[among the  parties].  If  the government  today  with its  media and  so on 
recognizes the Kurdish struggle  and acknowledges its  own mistake,  if  it  
mentions about the all deprivations, unjust treatments that we are talking in 
this  half  an  hour,  this  could  be  what  we  call  resolution.  If  [the  state]  
explains that they are sitting at the table with “terrorists”, because they are  
living with us and they cannot enjoy [what the rest of the society can enjoy],  
another public opinion is possible.”135 
During  the  discussion  with  respect  to  retributive  and  restorative  justice,  the 
Roboski bombing was the case that Kurdish interviewees frequently talked about and 
gave examples from. Undoubtedly, the whole process in the Roboski bombings hurt the 
feeling of justice of Kurds and of the society in general.  Kurdish interviewees expect 
both means  of retributive  justice  to  punish those who are responsible  even if  these 
people are in the state or military offices, and justice to be restored through an apology 
by the state and through compensation of the needs of the victims. As examples, below 
Murat (age 22) and Servet (age 41) share their thoughts and feelings about the Roboski 
bombings  and  what  could  have  been done  to  lessen  the  pain  for  those  families  in 
particular, and for the wounded justice of the society in Turkey in general: 
“Let's take Roboski, Uludere massacre as an example. Who are responsible  
135 Original: “Çözüm süreci senin orada isyan etmiş örgütle masaya oturup da toplumun geri kalanını hiçbir şekilde beslemeden 
yapabileceğin bir şey değil. Yani kitlesel bir çözüm süreci şunu gerektirir; sen devlet olarak bütün medya organlarını , söylemini 
bu barış sürecini inşa eder ve eşitliği böyle kurarsın. Gerçekten bugün iktidar medyasıyla, şuyuyla buyuyla Kürt mücadelesini 
kabul etse, devletin hata yaptığını söylese, bugün şurada yarım saatte bahsettiğimiz mağduriyet ve mahrumiyetlerden bahsetse, 
çözüm dediğimiz şeydir. “Teröristle” şu yüzden masaya oturuyorum çünkü bu insanlar bizimle birlikte yaşıorlar ama şunlardan 
faydalanmıyorlar dese, başka bir toplumsal vizyon gelişebilir.” 
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for  this?  Are  a  couple  of  commanders,  soldiers  [responsible  for  this 
incident?] Or is there really a bigger power, or the whole military behind  
it? If it is the whole military, then the whole military has to be put on trial.  
In short,  no matter what  the punishment is,  it  must  be implemented and  
justice  has  to  be  served.  This  is  what  [the  families  of  the  victims]  are  
expecting from the very beginning, and an assurance that [incidents like  
this] is not going to happen again.”136 (Murat, 22) 
“I think [apology is] important. It is not going to lessen the pain of those  
families  and  beyond  the  families  -even  ours-  who  are  affected  by  it.  
[Apology] is not going to be enough. However, it will show that this crime is  
systematic and it cannot be avoided by seeing them as only bombings. It will  
be revealed that there is a targeted ethnic group. So we will know that this  
apology means the acknowledgment of this [that the state is targeting an  
ethnic group]. This may relieve people.”137 (Servet, 41)        
The Roboski incident is the most salient one of the recent incidents. In order to 
recover  the injustice  and  pain stemming  from it,  the state  needs  to  act  as  soon as 
possible and repair its past mistakes The state is both expected to reveal and punish the 
responsible people and try to heal the harm emerged as a result of this dreadful loss. 
Otherwise, the feeling of injustice among Kurds will stay tremendous and cause future 
handicaps to reconcile with the state. 
5.3. Injustice as a source of conflict
The feeling of injustice among Kurdish interviewees results in losing their trust 
towards the state. The state loses its legitimacy, because it is regarded as an entity which 
is  not  interested in the well-being of its  citizens in  general and Kurds in  particular. 
Rather, the acts of the state are considered as the moves only to maintain its existence 
under any circumstances. Not only for Kurds also maybe for the broader society,  the 
experiences of injustice produce a will to leave the country and settle down somewhere 
136 Original: “Roboski'yi ele alalım, Uludere katliamını. Bunların sorumlusu birkaç komutan mı, birkaç asker mi yoksa gerçekten 
arkasında daha büyün bir güç mü var, tüm ordu mu var? Tüm ordu varsa tüm ordu yargılanmalı. Yani cezası neyse de kesilmeli 
ve bu konuda adalet sağlanmalı. En başta bekledikleri bu zaten ve bir daha olmayacağına dair herhangi bir güvence.” 
137 Original: “Bence [özür] önemli. O ailelerin acılarını hafifletmeyecek hatta biz o ailelerin dışında olan insanlar ciddi etkilenen 
kesimler olarak bu yeterli olmayacaktır. Ama bu suçun sistematik olduğunu gösterecektir ve aslında bu suçun sadece basit bir 
bombalama olayıyla geçiştirilemeyeceğini ortaya koyacaktır. Bir etnik grubun hedef alındığına dair bir durum ortaya çıkacaktır 
ve bu özrün de bunun kabulü anlamına geleceğini bileceğiz biz. Bu belki rahatlatır.”
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else where their concerns on justice are taken into consideration. 
Kurdish interviewees think that if  people or a group of people are deprived of 
something and if they cannot receive any response to their legal claims, then a violent 
reaction is inevitable. If legal claims are not satisfied, people lean towards more violent 
means to raise their voices against the suppression of the authorities. All rebellions and 
other forms of violent reactions in the history are considered as a result of a state of 
outburst. In other words, the political authorities create their own enemies by not giving 
them the  adequate space  which  people  can flourish as  they wish  or  maintain  their 
existence. 
The PKK is one of the examples of the above argument. The emergence of the 
PKK is regarded as a consequence of the lack of response of the state to the demands of 
the Kurdish people. The result of being ignored is to react violently, for some Kurdish 
interviewees. For some others, the injustice towards Kurds causes them to feel missing, 
deficient. Since they are not welcomed by the state and some parts of the society, their 
feeling of belonging  gets hurt.  Also  the repression that  Kurds  are exposed to  leads 
Kurdish children to grow up with a trauma and end up being aggressive towards the 
society.   
On the other hand, Kurdish interviewees also argue that they cannot understand 
why and how a system which ignores the claims of its citizens and does not respond to 
them can possibly sustain its existence. They assert that such a system is expected to be 
faced with so much violent reaction from the public, if not fall apart or be replaced by 
something else. According to Kurdish interviewees, it is a mystery that in spite of the 
dissatisfaction with the political structure, people in Turkey in general do not raise their 
voices against or take some reaction. Since Kurdish interviewees think that Kurds are 
not the only ones who are suffering from injustice, they are expecting every part of the 
society to take some form of action to change the political structure in Turkey.  
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5.4. Discussion
Social exclusion and procedural injustice play a very important  role in Kurdish 
interviewees'  understanding  of  injustice.  Maybe  even  more  importantly,  Kurdish 
interviewees raise the lack of recognition and the lack of access to resources as the 
crucial issues to ensure justice138. When we look at the dynamics among these forms of 
injustices, a relationship can be seen among them. 
The reason why the weak redistribution mechanisms of the state are regarded as 
that much important from the perspective of Kurdish interviewees is the possibility to 
talk  of  a  region  where  Kurds  are  congregated.  Therefore,  any  unequal  economic 
distribution  between  the  cities  is  read  by  Kurdish  interviewees  as  a  discrimination 
policy of the state. Besides that, it is also crucial to remember how Kurds in particular 
are marginalized within the economy and forced to work for unqualified, low-paid jobs. 
Therefore, distributive justice rises as an important issue to enjoy the resources of the 
state and of the country in general for Kurdish interviewees. 
On the other hand, the lack of a legal recognition by the state produces so many 
tangible handicaps for Kurds in the domains of social inclusion and procedural justice. 
The problems experienced within the society and within the state institutions are seen as 
the  inevitable  results  of  the  lack  of  recognition.  Kurdish  interviewees  see  their 
unacknowledged identity and language as the bases of their problems. In that sense, the 
lack of legal recognition is the source of injustice Kurds are facing with. That is why 
Kurdish interviewees are frequently talking in the “we” form. Even their discourses are 
shaped by the understanding of not being acknowledged as a group. 
Talking in the “we” form is also crucial from the point of justice as restoration. 
Kurds  are  holding  a  collective  trauma;  or  a  “chosen  trauma”139 transformed  from 
generation to generation. In that way, even those who did not experience such things 
138 Although for Kurds the language right is one of the predominant issues in discussing justice, rights are not fully on the focus as 
the source of injustice. In that sense, the language right is linked to non-recognition and considered in that context.  
139 See Volkan, V. D. (2001). Transgenerational transmissions and chosen traumas: An aspect of large-group identity. Group 
Analysis, 34(1), 79-97.
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narrate stories regarding past injustices against Kurds. Since those Kurds who did not 
experience any violation towards themselves are also embracing all past violations, the 
restoration  of  the  past  violations  and  crimes  becomes  more  crucial.  Restoration 
mechanisms during the resolution process have to take into consideration the fact that 
every Kurdish  individual  feels  discriminated  against  because  of the  past  violations 
Kurds suffered from. That  is  why resolution process is  required to be inclusive and 
integrative towards every part of the society.    
To sum up, what Kurdish interviewees understand by justice is influenced by their 
relationship with the Turkish State. However, while healing the problems of Kurds with 
respect to justice,  it  is  not  sufficient  to focus solely on the experiences of Kurds in 
relation to the Turkish State. Justice is not something that you can fix the part which 
you think is damaged. Rather, it is a totality. That is why every form of justice should be 
evaluated in accordance with the others.    
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CHAPTER VI | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Armenians and Kurds in Turkey are two ethnic identities, which have similarities 
and differences at the same time. On the one hand, both of them are theoretically ethnic 
minorities in the Turkish Republic since the formulation of the Turkish State is based on 
Turkishness.  In  that  sense,  Armenians  and  Kurds  are  left  outside  of the  dominant 
majority, which directly or indirectly is entitled to the state institutions or mechanisms. 
On the other hand, the Armenians and Kurds in Turkey have a major difference beyond 
other factors mentioned above; legal recognition by the state. Whereas the Armenians in 
Turkey are legally recognized by the state and have some rights stemming from this 
recognition, the Kurds in  Turkey are not  legally acknowledged as an ethnic identity. 
That is why the policies and procedures that these two ethnic identity groups are facing 
with  can  be  different  from  time  to  time  depending  on  the  situation  and  context. 
Throughout this chapter, while  I am comparing their understandings of justice, at the 
same time I try to link these understandings with their experiences based on their ethnic 
identities and conclude my study with a brief summary part. 
Although justice as recognition is  only one of the sub-categories of justice, the 
impact  of the lack  of it  is  more  extensive  than that.  The problems stemming  from 
recognition  penetrates  into  other  spheres  of  justice.  That  is  why  the  dynamics  of 
recognition and the lack of it are important components to see the broader framework. 
Therefore, the understanding of justice as recognition should be the first step in order to 
comprehend how both the Armenians and the Kurds in Istanbul shape their ideas with 
respect to justice. I will be talking about how justice as recognition has an impact on 
other forms of justice.  However,  first  it  is  crucial to discuss what  the differentiating 
points are in Armenians' and Kurds' understandings of justice as recognition and how 
these two ethnic identity groups problematize recognition in the context of Turkey.  
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Armenian interviewees consider problems deriving from recognition as a result of 
the lack  of implementation of that  recognition.  Although they are recognized  as an 
ethnic identity and provided with some cultural rights stemming from this recognition, 
these cultural rights are not implemented as expected. The Armenians in Turkey have 
Armenian schools,  where  they can study in  Armenian,  or churches  where they can 
practice their religion. However, the curriculums or functioning of these schools show 
that Armenians are having some problems with respect to the sustainability of Armenian 
culture. Education materials are not prepared in a way to include the Armenian history, 
culture or other components of that particular ethnic identity to the curriculums. Schools 
and churches are not funded by the state because of their special status different from 
the  state  institutions.  Although  the  functioning  of  schools  and  churches  is  strictly 
controlled by the state authorities, they cannot enjoy the opportunities that the state is 
supposed to assign. In that sense, the legal recognition fails to ensure the opportunities 
and needs based on that recognition. 
On the other hand, for the Kurds in Turkey, the situation is completely different. 
Since it  is not possible to talk about the existence of a legal recognition, Kurds do not 
have any ground to claim the means to sustain their culture, history or anything that can 
be associated particularly to their ethnic identity. In that sense, the use of the Kurdish 
language can be  counted as the most  prominent  issue among Kurdish interviewees. 
Since the Kurdish language is regarded as one of the indispensable parts of the ethnic 
identity,  the  legal  impossibility  to  use  it  in  the  state  institutions  creates  a  sense  of 
injustice among Kurdish interviewees.   
The interviewees  are using  the term “legal recognition” by emphasizing  legal, 
because Kurdish interviewees in general are well-aware of the fact that the state and its 
institutions only unofficially acknowledge the existence of the Kurds in Turkey. We can 
track this argument in the discourses of the political authorities, in the practices against 
Kurds, or the prohibitions against the Kurdish language and identity. However, it is far 
from being a legal recognition as a result of which the state is obliged to fulfill the needs 
of that  recognition.  This  also  can  be  seen  as  one  of  the  reasons  why  for  Kurdish 
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interviewees recognition and rights are inseparable.  Kurds cannot  enjoy any cultural 
rights because of the lack of a legal recognition.    
Another  important  point  is  the  fact  that  being  deprived of a  legal recognition 
causes Kurdish interviewees to talk in the form of a community (“we”) when they are 
expressing  their  experiences  of  injustice.  The  interviewees  are  not  sharing  their 
experiences from a singular perspective. Rather, they are group-specific and narrating 
stories  that  sometimes  they  themselves  did  not  experience  directly.  The  injustice 
experienced  in  the  past  by  other  members  of  the  ethnic  identity  is  embraced  and 
narrated by those who did not experience them. In that sense, the lack of recognition 
leads Kurds to produce a collective memory. It is important to consider the fact that the 
lack of recognition drives Kurds to produce a sense of togetherness and to talk in the 
'we' form, instead of using 'I' as the subject.   
On the other hand, Armenian interviewees evaluate the issue of recognition with 
respect to their individual experiences. This does not mean that they do not have group 
awareness or do not raise events and issues that can be directly linked to the Armenian 
identity. However, their attachment to the past incidents is not as tight as Kurds. They 
discuss  past  issues  and  events  from a  rather  detached  perspective.  The  1915  Meds 
Yeghern can be an exception to this argument considering the fact that Armenians in 
Turkey have  a  collective  trauma.  However,  even  in  that  case  instead  of sharing  a 
collective story, Armenian interviewees try to give examples from their families.  
The  main  differentiating  factor  between  the  Armenians  and  Kurds  living  in 
Istanbul with respect  to  recognition is  the  fact  that  whereas  Armenian interviewees 
consider injustice as the lack of implementation, Kurdish interviewees are focusing on 
the lack of legal recognition. That is why Kurdish interviewees' sense of injustice with 
respect to recognition is considerably stronger than that of the Armenian interviewees. 
There are also some common points that these two ethnic identity groups share 
with respect to recognition. Either because of the lack of recognition or because of the 
lack of implementation, Armenians and Kurdish interviewees' sense of belonging to the 
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Turkish State is hurt. Not being recognized by the state or not being acknowledged as an 
indispensable part of the society creates a psychological handicap for both Armenian 
and  Kurdish  interviewees.  The  discriminatory discourses  of  the  political  authorities 
strengthen this feeling and imply that they are not welcomed by the state.  However, 
approaching  justice  solely from the  point  of recognition would  not  be  sufficient  to 
comprehend this sense of injustice. The impact of non-recognition should only be seen 
as one side of the issue.  
Since the needs of the society in Turkey are defined according to the dominant 
national identity, this situation creates a form of injustice for those who are not taken 
into account and consequently are marginalized. Consequently, Armenian and Kurdish 
interviewees can extend their understanding to other unacknowledged identities and see 
the broader framework. Armenian and Kurdish interviewees state that those who are 
outside of the national ideology of the state are suffering from the non-recognition of 
their identities. In that sense, being an “outsider” helps them to understand dynamics of 
recognition and the experiences of injustice that other identity groups are going through. 
On the other hand, extending the understanding of injustice to other identities is 
highly correlated with other elements,  such as the education level,  or financial well-
being of that particular individual. Regardless of the ethnic identity, those who are well-
educated or financially better-off are more prone to see the injustice that other identity 
groups,  especially  LGBTI's,  are subjected  to.  Also  the city or  the  town where  that 
particular person was born and raised is another important element. Living in ethnically 
or religiously diverse surroundings helps the person to be more tolerant and sympathetic 
towards differences. 
When  justice  is  taken  from  the  perspective  of  rights,  there  is  a  very  clear 
distinction  between  the  understandings  of  the  Armenian  and  Kurdish  interviewees. 
Although regardless of their ethnic identity some of them raise the same issues in the 
context  of  rights  as  mentioned  in  the  results  chapters,  Kurdish  and  Armenian 
interviewees  do  not  see  injustice  as  rights  from  the  same  perspective.  Whereas 
Armenian interviewees claim that rights are not discriminatory, but the problem is how 
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these rights are implemented, Kurdish interviewees argue that there are some rights that 
some parts of the society are deprived of based on their identity. 
For Kurdish interviewees, there is inequality in rights, because first of all they, as 
Kurds, lack their language rights. Considering language as the crucial component of the 
Kurdish identity, it  makes sense that their understanding of justice as rights is shaped 
according  to  this  criterion.  Kurdish interviewees  raise  the issue  of rights  as  a  very 
crucial form of injustice. That is why the spheres of recognition and rights are highly 
connected according to Kurdish interviewees. They state that since the Kurdish identity 
is not acknowledged by the state, they lack some rights based on their identity. On the 
other hand, since they do not have these rights, it  is not possible to state that there is 
recognition  towards  Kurds.  Without  one  of them,  it  is  not  likely  to  talk  about  the 
existence of the other. These two spheres are working in relation.  
Whereas Kurdish interviewees consider  recognition and  rights inseparable  and 
influencing one another, Armenian interviewees evaluate justice as recognition and as 
rights  separately,  because  they problematize  the  implementation of recognition,  not 
holding that status. At this point, the understanding of justice as recognition infiltrates 
into  justice  as  rights for  both Armenian  and  Kurdish  interviewees.  Since  Armenian 
interviewees see the problem of recognition as implementation, they do not  see any 
form of injustice regarding rights.  Their  sense of injustice is  highly associated with 
procedures  that  I  will  be  discussing  in  advance.  On  the  other  hand,  since  Kurdish 
interviewees consider  a  problem with respect  to recognition by the state,  they draw 
attention to how rights are written and what is unequal about them. 
Although  Armenian  and  Kurdish  interviewees  understand  different  things  by 
justice as rights, their understandings of procedural justice are nearly similar. Whereas 
both Armenian and Kurdish interviewees raise issues of procedural injustice in relation 
to their ethnic identities on the one hand, they all state the impossibility of talking the 
existence of procedural justice in Turkey in general on the other hand. In that sense, 
neither  Armenian  nor  Kurdish  interviewees  regard  the  state  or  its  institutions  as 
impartial, neutral or non-arbitrary. The acts of the state and its institutions are not seen 
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as legitimate.  They are all complaining of the fact  that  favoritism and nepotism are 
embedded within the state  institutions and  judiciary cannot  be  kept  apart  from this 
understanding. 
Armenian and Kurdish interviewees argue that the rule-of-law in Turkey does not 
function properly and is  under the suppression of power elites.  The main points that 
undermine  the  sense  of procedural  justice  of all  are impunity and  partiality.  As  an 
example, whereas Kurdish interviewees review the due processes of KCK140 court cases, 
Armenian interviewees raise the assassination of Hrant Dink and the process following 
the assassination. 
In addition to the functioning of judiciary, the sense of justice of both Armenian 
and Kurdish interviewees are also undermined as a result of discriminatory daily life 
experiences. For Armenian interviewees, the treatment during the military service, the 
attitude of the officers in the state institutions, and the impossibility to be employed in 
those institutions constitute the main part of the injustice stemming from procedures. In 
that sense, the visible features of the Armenian identity, like their names or religious 
preferences, play an important role in their experiences of injustice. On the other hand, 
Kurdish interviewees assert that the arbitrary identity controls, the violations of right to 
life,  right  to communication, right  to immunity of domicile  are the prevailing issues 
with respect to procedural injustice. 
Although the  examples  of procedural injustice  can vary across  Armenian  and 
Kurdish interviewees, they all think that  the state  par excellence,  its  institutions and 
jurisdiction in particular are corrupted. This understanding is not associated solely with 
any  particular  identity.  Rather,  procedural  injustice  is  regarded  as  something  that 
everyone in Turkey suffers from, if they do not have close ties with the power holders. 
However,  Kurdish interviewees additionally  mention about  some practices that  only 
Kurds  are  subjected  to.  In  this  statement,  Kurds'  strong  group  awareness  is  highly 
influential.  Since most of the Kurds are strongly attached to their group identity, the 
140 People who are politically active or in some way support the Kurdish movement are taken into custody and arrested by the 
accuse of being member of KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan/ Group of Communities in Kurdistan) which is defined as an illegal 
organization by the Turkish state.
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experiences of injustice are regarded from this perspective.            
Moving from the domain of procedural injustice to social exclusion gives more or 
less the same picture. Both Armenian and Kurdish interviewees are subjected to social 
exclusion and  they all state that  the social polarization within the society is  highly 
drastic.  The dominant  majority in  particular is  not very welcoming towards different 
preferences. The dominant majority tends to exclude and stigmatize identities different 
than theirs. 
In order to explain the root causes of the social polarization and social exclusion, 
the interviewees draw attention to the fact that the society is the reflection of the state 
ideology.  The  state  through  its  institutions  and  other  means  produces  the  social 
exclusion within the society. That is why those who are excluded from the society are 
those who do not fit into the definition of the national identity of the state. 
When we look at the patterns of social exclusion specific to a particular ethnic 
identity,  Armenian  interviewees  assert  that  religion is  the  basis  on which  they are 
discriminated against most of the time. People who try to insult them pick words that 
can be related to religious preferences. In addition to that, Armenians are also facing 
some questions and comments implying that they are foreigners and do not belong to 
Turkey. In that sense, discourses and hate speeches play a crucial role to understand the 
dynamics of social exclusion. 
In addition to the discriminatory discourses that Armenians are exposed to, Kurds 
also encounter some cases in which their identity or existence is denied by the society. 
Recently, with the peace process, these examples start to diminish. However, it can still 
be possible to see the impacts of the denial policies of the state lasted for years on the 
society. On the other hand, for Armenians it  is not very likely to hear that there is no 
such thing as Armenians. Considering the legal recognition by the state, it does not seem 
possible to deny the existence of Armenians in Turkey.   
The difference between the understandings of Armenian and Kurdish interviewees 
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with respect to social exclusion is the fact that since for Kurds it is possible to talk about 
the existence of a region with a high Kurdish population intensity and since the rate of 
Kurdish population is higher in comparison to the other ethnic minorities, their rate of 
social mobilization is higher. They can build their own surroundings more easily or be 
comfortable  in  the  surroundings  that  they  are  entering  into.  On  the  other  hand, 
Armenians prefer to stay in their own surroundings and try to prevent any risk factor 
coming from outside.  
When justice is taken as redistribution, what Armenian and Kurdish interviewees 
understand by justice is not similar. Although most of them think that the duty of the 
state is to provide services and resources, the way or the aim of this redistribution varies 
across Armenian and Kurdish interviewees.  Therefore,  also the expectation from the 
state in terms of redistribution differs between them.  
On the one hand, those Armenian interviewees who run their own businesses do 
not expect the state to take care of the needs of its citizens. They state that redistribution 
mechanisms  should  follow the  rules  of the  free  market  and  people  acquire  money 
according to their merits or labor force. However, the rest and the most of the Armenian 
interviewees raise the need for a welfare state. They argue that the basic needs of the 
citizens have to be provided by the state. The state is obliged to take care of its citizens 
who are in need. In that sense, these people draw attention to the necessity of a charity 
system that can ensure the minimum needs of the citizens. However, while ensuring the 
needs, equality cannot be the aim of the redistribution mechanisms, because it is not fair 
to those who work for their income as opposed to those who get help from the state. 
However,  for  Kurdish  interviewees  the  expectation  from  the  redistribution 
mechanisms is  pretty much different.  Kurdish interviewees focus on the equality of 
outcome. That is why instead of ensuring the basic needs, they argue that the state is 
obliged to provide the opportunities for  people  to  fulfill  their  potential and flourish 
within the society. They argue that a charity system does not only inhibit the fulfillment 
of potentials, but it also sustains the system that creates this inequality at the first place. 
Therefore, redistribution mechanisms should not be run like a charity system.  
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Another  main  difference  between  Armenian  and  Kurdish  interviewees  with 
respect to redistributive justice is their level of analysis. Unlike Armenian interviewees, 
Kurdish interviewees consider redistribution from a macro perspective. They discuss the 
inequality  between  cities  and  regions.  In  this  understanding,  again  the  regional 
concentration of Kurds in a specific area plays an important role. They argue that in the 
cities where the rate of Kurdish population is higher, citizens cannot enjoy the resources 
of  the  state  as  much  as  the  other  cities  do.  For  Kurdish  interviewees,  the  state  is 
systematically creating this inequality through its policies. In this context, as examples 
Kurdish interviewees give the victims of the forced migration or those who are pushed 
to undocumented economy and marginalized. That is why they are relating economic 
deprivations to the ethnic identity, if not to the other disadvantaged identities. 
Also,  both  Armenian  and  Kurdish  interviewees  have  concerns  about  the 
functioning of the redistribution mechanisms of the state. For Kurdish interviewees, the 
state is adjusting its redistribution policies according to the interests of power holders. 
Those who can enjoy the resources or opportunities of the state are those who are in 
good relations with the state  cadres.  Again,  favoritism and nepotism emerge  as the 
motives  of  redistributive  injustice.  For  Armenian  interviewees,  the  patterns  of 
redistributive injustice are also similar.  They also do not hold trust towards the state 
institutions in terms of redistribution or resources. Because of the corruption within the 
state institutions, they do not opt for high taxes for those who are in need. Armenian 
interviewees claim that the taxes or money granted for charity works do not reach to the 
right destinations to help the poor. 
Last  but  not  the least,  justice as restoration and retribution do not  vary much 
across Armenian and Kurdish interviewees. They have similar ways of understanding to 
ensure the justice after a violation of a right or a crime. Both state that retribution and 
restoration mechanisms should be implemented in cooperation. While retributive justice 
can deter future crimes, restorative justice can help the healing of the society or of a 
particular group. 
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In terms of retributive justice, Armenian interviewees raise the issues related to 
impunity. They state that if the rule-of-law in Turkey ensures the proper functioning of 
the jurisdiction, then their sense of justice is not undermined this much. On the other 
hand, for Kurdish interviewees, the crucial point to ensure the retributive justice is to 
reveal and eliminate those who are involved into the wrongdoings, but still are working 
in the state institutions and offices. 
Besides, Armenian interviewees see retributive justice mechanisms as means to 
punish the individual crimes in which the perpetrator and the victim are persons whose 
identity  can  be  specified.  Otherwise,  for  other  cases  retribution  is  not  regarded  as 
sufficient  to  rehabilitate  the  conditions  after  a  wrongdoing  or  violation.  However, 
Kurdish interviewees state that regardless of the crime or the violation, retribution is a 
must.  The  reason  why  retribution  is  regarded  as  this  much  important  by  Kurdish 
interviewees is the idea that whereas retribution leads the perpetrator to be revealed in 
the public,  it  also introduces an acknowledgment  of the violations committed against 
one person, or a group of people by making the perpetrator responsible of his or her 
crimes.  Considering  the  Kurds'  powerful  attachment  to  their  ethnic  identity,  the 
acknowledgment of the wrongdoing towards Kurds also means the recognition of the 
Kurdish ethnic identity. 
On the other hand, Armenian and Kurdish interviewees are expecting more or less 
the same things from restorative justice. Apology, the confrontation of the parties, the 
acknowledgment  of  the  pain  and  wrongdoing  and  the  revealing  of  the  crimes  and 
perpetrators  are  the  main  pillars  of  restorative  justice  for  Armenian  and  Kurdish 
interviewees.  Armenian  interviewees  understand  restorative  justice  as  ensuring  the 
mutual  trust  environments.  Thereby the  healing  of the society can be  provided  and 
peace  can  become  possible.  Similarly,  Kurdish  interviewees  are  emphasizing 
information  dissemination,  socialization  of  the  issues,  dialogue  and  the  like. 
Additionally,  Kurdish interviewees also discuss the issues of how the trauma can be 
overcome and how the victims can be satisfied psychologically. 
When  we  compare  the  understandings  of  justice  of  Armenian  and  Kurdish 
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interviewees, we can see differences and similarities depending on the sub-category of 
justice. There are points that they share and that they differ from each other. Similarly, 
when we look at justice from a broader perspective, the same pattern can be seen here. 
Whereas Armenian and Kurdish interviewees together share the sense of injustice in the 
areas of procedural justice and social inclusion, additionally Kurdish interviewees also 
raise  issues related to  recognition and  redistribution.  In that  sense,  while  Armenian 
interviewees focuses on justice in terms of values, attitudes, and perceptions, Kurdish 
interviewees  emphasize  also  more  solid  presentations  of  justice,  such  as  rights, 
resources or policies.     
For  Armenian interviewees,  what  is  very disturbing  in  relation to  their  ethnic 
identity are their experiences of social exclusion and procedural injustice.  They state 
that since recognition is not properly implemented, the perceptions within the society 
and the state institutions are shaped accordingly. The values and discourses of the state 
in terms of recognition or the way it acts are internalized by the society and institutions. 
Consequently, through the transfer of the ideology of the state to the society the lack of 
implementation of recognition results in social exclusion and procedural injustice for 
Armenians. 
However,  Armenian interviewees share their  experiences through their personal 
narratives. They refrain from generalizing their experiences to the Armenians in Turkey 
or from associating these experiences directly to their ethnic identity. The reason behind 
it can be the fact that they do not have strong group awareness, or they do not develop a 
collective memory with respect to their daily life experiences. 
On the other hand, for Kurdish interviewees the situation is slightly different. In 
addition to the problems deriving from social exclusion and procedural injustice, in their 
understanding  also  the  experiences  of injustice  stemming  from non-recognition and 
inadequate  redistribution  are  crucial141.  Whereas  the  lack  of  legal  recognition  itself 
undermines the sense of justice for Kurdish interviewees, it also leads to experiences of 
141 Justice as rights can also be added to this point. However, Kurds mention justice as rights only in relation to their language rights 
and in the context of recognition. That is why I did not prefer to say that their sense of injustice are predominantly stemming 
from the issue of rights. Rather, for them it is directly linked to the issue of recognition. 
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social exclusion and procedural injustice. They state that the lack of legal recognition by 
the  state  influences  the  attitudes  of  people  and  procedures  functioning  against 
themselves.  The  state  ideology is  transferred into the society,  and  produce different 
forms of justice that is generated in the domain of recognition at the first place. On the 
other hand redistributive injustice is regarded as the consequence of the direct acts of 
the state instead of the indirect impact of the state ideology. In other words, whereas 
social exclusion and procedural injustice are produced indirectly as a result of the lack 
of recognition, the state explicitly creates redistributive justice through its mechanisms. 
There are three main points that can differentiate the understanding of justice of 
Kurdish interviewees from Armenian interviewees'. The first point has to do with the 
discourse of victimhood. Whereas Kurdish interviewees talk in the “we” form and share 
collective stories, most of the Armenian interviewees prefer to narrate stories that they 
directly experience. In that sense, unlike Armenian interviewees, Kurdish interviewees 
are holding a collective memory and transforming their stories among the members of 
the ethnic group142. That is why in their stories it is very likely to the see the discourse of 
victimhood as a result of the collective memory that they are sustaining. Especially, the 
Kurdish youth is adapting and narrating the stories that they hear from their parents or 
older members of the family and in this way embracing their trauma.  
Secondly, among Kurdish interviewees the experiences of injustice are sharpened 
as much as the income level decreases. Those who are financially worse-off suffer more 
harshly from discrimination in their daily lives and face with cases of social exclusion 
and procedural injustice more frequently and intensely.  However, it  is  not possible to 
see this kind of a relationship among Armenian interviewees. It can either be because 
they take care of each other with the benefit of being a small community in Istanbul, or 
they do not have recent economic or political migration history that causes economic 
devastation.  
As the third point; whereas Kurdish interviewees claim that  the discriminative 
ideology against Kurds is embedded within the state institutions, Armenian interviewees 
142 For Armenians, the 1915 massacres can be taken as an exception. Studies show that although the impact of the incidents varies 
across the generations, it is still possible to talk about a chosen trauma (Özdoğan et al., 2009)
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regard their experiences of injustice from a broader perspective and state that all people 
outside of the dominant ideology suffer from injustice in the same manner. It is possible 
to say that since Kurds have strong group awareness, they regard their experiences of 
injustice from their perspective,  or they can be aware of the discriminatory policies 
functioning  solely against  them.  In that,  again the  population  size  of the  Kurds  in 
Turkey and their regional concentration should be taken into account. 
The last thing that is worth mentioning in this discussion then whether the sense 
of injustice  among  Armenian  and Kurdish interviewees  lead to  conflicts within the 
society or between these identity groups and the state. Although answers to this question 
vary across Armenian and Kurdish interviewees, it is still possible to present patterns for 
Armenians and Kurds. 
The  experiences  of  injustice  among  Kurds  lead  them  to  develop  forms  of 
resistance and struggle tactics against the institutions and authorities that are producing 
or maintaining the root causes of this injustice. Both the reason and the result of this 
tendency among Kurds is the fact that Kurds are more organized in comparison to the 
other identity groups. However, Armenians are mostly passivized and prefer to remain 
silent  towards the state of injustice embedded in  their  daily lives.  Undoubtedly,  it  is 
possible to find reverse examples to this passivity. However, the picture seems roughly 
like that. Again in that, the relatively small size of the Armenian population, the lack of 
an  Armenian  region  or  their  intense  integration  to  the  broader  society  have  to  be 
considered to understand the dynamics that lead Armenians to be more recessive. 
To sum up, the comparison between the understandings of justice of Armenians 
and Kurds reveals the fact that the state through its institutions and policies has a huge 
impact how the injustice within the society or any other domain to be reproduced. That 
is why injustice in one category is transmitted to others. The injustice stemming from 
the state policies reflects upon other domains of justice. Therefore, as mentioned in the 
literature review chapter, justice is not something whose forms and categories can be 
discussed separately from each other.  Rather,  it  has  to  be  looked as a  totality.  The 
transitions and overlaps across the sub-categories of justice confirm this understanding. 
146
That is why, without understanding the context, how the relations between the identity 
and  the  understanding  of  justice  are  constructed  and  the  transition  across  these 
understandings, it is not possible to grasp the whole picture.       
In conclusion, the aim of this study was to reveal the understandings of justice of 
the Armenians and Kurds living in Istanbul considering the historical background and 
their earlier experiences with respect to their ethnic identity. The reason why these two 
ethnic groups are chosen for this study is their difference in terms of legal recognition 
by the state. In that sense, by looking at their understandings of justice, also learning 
how the legal recognition by the state is affecting their conceptualizations is one of the 
concerns of this study.  
In order to discuss justice from various perspectives empirically and make sense 
of the experiences of the interviewees in a particular context, justice is divided into six 
sub-themes driven from the literature as focus of attentions.  Justice is  considered as 
recognition,  rights,  social  inclusion,  procedures,  distribution,  and  restoration  and 
retribution. 
In order to be able to explain the meaning of the statements of the interviewees, 
the social context and the main concepts to comprehend this context are presented. In 
addition to the nation-state phenomenon, also specifically the Turkish Nation-State, and 
the Armenians and the Kurds living within the borders of this nation-state are briefly 
discussed. The demographics of these ethnic groups and the prevailing events linked to 
the subject are introduced in the presentation of the social context that the research takes 
place in. 
The participants are contacted through more than one gatekeeper to ensure the 
diversity  among  the  sample  groups.  Thereby,  the  participants  are  from  different 
backgrounds,  ages, income levels, education levels, sexes, sexual orientations, or any 
other  characteristics.  The  only common feature in  each sample  group is  the  ethnic 
identity  of the  participants  and  the  city  they are  living  in.  However,  although  the 
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participants are chosen according to their ethnic group and discussions are held around 
this identity, also the agency of the participants is acknowledged. It is considered that 
whereas all these participants share some common characteristics or culture because of 
their  ethnic identity,  each one of them also has his or her  own perspective and life 
experience to comprehend the events. 
This  present  research unveils  the facts that  the experiences of injustice of the 
Armenians living in Istanbul are mostly stemming from social exclusion and procedural 
injustice, whereas the Kurds living in Istanbul raise injustice as the lack of recognition 
and redistribution in addition to their experiences deriving from social exclusion and 
procedural injustice.  In other  words,  whereas both ethnic  groups are suffering from 
social exclusion and procedural injustice, Kurds also add the practices of injustice based 
on non-recognition and inadequate redistribution. 
What  is  more  interesting  in  these  findings  is  that  the experiences  of injustice 
stemming from social exclusion and procedural injustice are connected to recognition 
by the  state.  For  Armenian interviewees,  the lack  of implementation of recognition 
penetrates into the society and the state institutions. Since there is no proper recognition 
in  practice,  Armenians  are  not  acknowledged  and  treated  equally.  Therefore,  these 
practices create the problems of social exclusion and procedural injustice. For Kurdish 
interviewees, whereas the lack of recognition itself is one of the origins of injustice, it 
also  infiltrates  into  other  domains  of  justice,  and  leads  to  social  exclusion  and 
procedural injustice. Since the state does not recognize Kurds on legal basis, within the 
society and the state institutions they are disregarded, if not recognized by exclusion143. 
Additionally, with the impact of the concentration of the Kurdish population in a 
region,  the  lack of legal recognition of Kurds leads them to consider  redistributive 
injustice as functioning discriminatory towards themselves. In that sense, redistributive 
injustice  is  regarded  from a  macro  perspective  through  which  the  socio-economic 
development  of the  region,  where the Kurdish population is  considerably higher,  is 
interrupted  by  the  official  or  unofficial  policies  of  the  state.  Different  from social 
143 See Saracoglu, C. (2009). ‘Exclusive recognition’: the new dimensions of the question of ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey. 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32(4), 640-658.
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exclusion and procedural injustice, redistributive justice is perceived as a phenomenon 
that is influenced by the lack of recognition through the direct acts of the state. The link 
between recognition and redistribution is  not explained through the internalization of 
the values or discourses that the state is producing, but through the explicit involvement 
of the state. 
While comparing these two ethnic groups that differ from each other in terms of 
legal recognition, the research reveals the fact that the lack of recognition, either at the 
implementation  level  or  at  the  legal  level,  is  the  root  cause  of  the  injustice  that 
Armenians  and  Kurds  suffer  from.  Although  each  sub-theme  of  justice  cannot  be 
considered separate from the others, and justice has to be regarded as a totality that the 
elements of it are intertwined to one another, justice as recognition should be addressed 
as the starting point to comprehend the broader framework. 
If  we  set  aside  the  cases,  what  we  have  learned  from  this  research  at  the 
theoretical level is that the sub-categories of justice are connected to each other, and it is 
not  possible  to  evaluate  one  of  them without  looking  at  the  others.  That  is  why 
discussing one sphere of justice requires the consideration of the others. In this sense, it 
can be said that  justice is  a  holistic  phenomenon. Without  achieving justice in  each 
sphere of it, it is not possible to talk about the existence of justice. That is why political, 
cultural and socio-economic factors are intertwined. Also, these spheres include both 
outcomes and processes of justice. In order to discuss the dynamics of justice, it is not 
sufficient to evaluate its outcomes solely; also the processes that prepare these outcomes 
are crucial. 
On the other hand, considering the impact of recognition by the state to the other 
sub-categories of justice, the state rises as an important element in constructing justice 
as either outcomes or processes. If there is  no justice at the level of recognition as a 
result of the state ideology, then it is not possible to produce justice at the societal level 
either.  The  state  ideology  infiltrates  into  its  institutions  and  then  into  the  society. 
Thereby it creates the sources of discrimination and inequality, if not reproducing them. 
Therefore,  if  the state  par  excellence is  not  just,  then the  state  institutions  and  the 
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society as the bearers of this ideology cannot be expected to be just either.  
This research also brings about some implications for future research. Considering 
the understandings of justice of Armenians and Kurds, the research can be furthered. 
The dynamics of how the Armenians and Kurds living in  Istanbul are responding to 
their experiences of injustice in the context of Turkey, and which mechanisms, means 
and tools they are using to handle these forms of injustice can be explored. Also by 
including  the  understandings  of  justice  of  other  ethnic  groups,  the  picture  can  be 
enriched or the discussion can be deepened. In addition, by choosing different contexts 
than  Istanbul,  with  the  impact  of  diverse  constructions  of  identity  how  the 
understandings of justice vary from context to context can be analyzed.   
By understanding the justice claims of subjects, this research can also be helpful 
to the preparation of policies and regulations in order to eliminate the root causes of 
injustice within the society or the state institutions, to ensure the well-being of citizens 
and  enhance  the prosperity,  or  to  eradicate  discrimination and  inequality embedded 
within the society.  
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A P P E N D I X  
PROTOCOL
Identity 
Hepimizin bir çok kimliği var. Siz kendinizi anlatırken, kimliğinizi nasıl 
tanımlıyorsunuz?
Bu kimlik tanımlamasında sizin Kürt/Ermeni kimliğiniz ne derece önemli?
Türkiye'de Kürt/Ermeni olmak ne demek, bundan biraz bahsedebilir misiniz?
Kürt/Ermeni kimliğinizi baskın olarak hissettiğiniz durumlar oluyor mu?  
Kimliksel farkındalığınız, Kürt/Ermeni olduğunuzu fark etmeniz, bakış açınızda neleri 
değiştirdi, ya da bir şey değiştirdi mi?
Farklı etnik kimliğinizden dolayı zorlandığınız anlar oldu mu? 
Justice 
Recognition: Devlet farklılıklara nasıl yaklaşmalı? Bireysel ve grup farklılıkları
Kültürel haklarınız ve değerleriniz sizce devlet tarafından tanınıyor mu? Kültürel 
haklarınızın kullanılmasında herhangi bir baskı görüyor musunuz? 
Kurumlar kültürel değerlerinizi gerçekleştirmede nasıl bir tutum içerisindeler? 
Etnik kimliğinin tanınmadığı bir durum varsa: Böyle durumlarda nasıl hissediyorsunuz?  
Kürt/Ermeni olarak tanınmak sizin için neden önemli?  
Devletin bu konuda nasıl bir tutum içerisinde olmasını isterdiniz?
Rights: Türkiye'de herkesle eşit vatandaşlık haklarınız olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? 
Neden?
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Eğer mahrum olduğunu söylediği haklar varsa: Sizin için vatandaşlık temelinde eşit 
olmamak ne ifade ediyor? 
Türkiye'de bu haklara sahip olduğunu düşündüğünüz gruplar var mı?  
Redistribution: Sizce devlet kaynakların paylaşımını hangi esasa göre yapılmalı? 
Doğuştan eşit koşullara doğmayan insanların durumunu iyileştirmede devlet bir rol 
oynamalı mı?
Toplumdaki ekonomik farklılıkların sosyal adaletsizlik yarattığını düşünüyor musunuz? 
Neden?
Adaletsizlik varsa: Devlet bunu gidermek için bir şey yapmalı mı? Ne yapmalı? 
Kürt/Ermeni halkının ekonomik ve maddi kaynaklara erişmesinde, burada devlet 
kurumlarını da düşünebiliriz, adaletsizlik olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
Kürt/Ermeni halkının erişemediği kaynakların bu halkların etnik kimliklerinden 
kaynaklı olduğunu mu düşünüyorsunuz yoksa bu devletin bütün vatandaşları için geçerli 
olan genel politikası mı? 
Social Inclusion: Kürt/Ermeni kimliğiniz yüzünden bireysel ya da grup olarak toplumda 
dışlandığınızı hissediyor musunuz? 
Dışlanma varsa: Sizce bu dışlanmaya sebep olan toplumsal faktörler nelerdir? 
Toplumda üzerinizde sosyal bir baskı hissediyor musunuz? (Farklı gruplarla aranızda 
hiyerarşik bir ilişki olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?)
Böyle düşünmenize sebep olan deneyimleriniz nelerdir? 
Sizce devlet bunu engellemek için neler yapmalı?
Procedure: Devleti ve kurumlarını işleyiş bakımından meşru görüyor musunuz? 
Türkiye'deki  kurumlardaki yöntemlerin ve süreçlerin adil olduğunu düşünüyor 
musunuz? Karar alma süreçlerinde ve size karşı olan tutumlarında devletlerin ve 
kurumların adil olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? 
Bu süreç ve yöntemlerde, tarafsızlık, etik, tutarlılık, baskı, doğruluk ve düzeltilebilirlik 
ilkelerinden hangisi ya da hangilerinin ihlal edildiğini düşünüyorsunuz?  
Size karşı olan  ve adil olmadığını düşündüğünüz tavır ve yöntemler hakkında ne 
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hissediyorsunuz? Neyle ilişkilendiriyorsunuz?  
Restorative – Retributive: Tc.nin kuruluşundan itibaren olan süreçte vatandaş olarak 
yara aldığınız ve devlet kurumlarının adaleti tesis edemediğini düşündüğünüz bir durum 
ya da olaylar var mı? Neden?
Adalet duygunuzu yerine getirmek için devlet ne yapmalıydı? Şimdi ne yapmalı? 
Suçluları cezalandırmak adalet duygunuzu yerine getirmek için yeterli mi? Suçtan ya da 
hak ihlalinden etkilenen kişiler için devlet nasıl bir yol izlemeli? 
Zarar görenler ve hak ihlallerine sebep olanlar bu adalet arama sürecinin neresinde 
bulunmalılar, ne kadar dahil olmalılar?
Özellikle çözüm sürecinden bahsettiğimiz bir dönemde devlet Kürt halkının adalet 
duygusunu onarmak için neler yapmalı sizce? Siz bireysel olarak kendi deneyimlerinizi 
düşündüğünüzde, nelerin yapılması sizin devletin meşruiyetine olan inancınızı 
iyileştirirebilirdi? 
1915 olaylarını düşündüğümüzde, ya da Ermeni halkının el konulan mallarını, devlet bu 
süreçte nasıl bir yol izlerse size karşı yapılan hak ihlallerinin bir nebze de olsa adalete 
kavuştuğunu düşünürdünüz? 
 
Conflict 
Farklı alanlarda zarar gören adalet kavramından konuştuk. Değindiğimiz ve 
değinmediğimiz birçok farklı şekli var. Her birey ve her grup için adaletin içerdiği 
kavramların önem sırası değişebilir mutlaka. Sizin kimliğinizle ve tarihinizle 
bağdaştırdığınız ve diğerlerine oranla daha önemli olduğunu düşündüğünüz adaletin 
hangi yönü? Neden? 
Adaletin sizin için daha önemli yönlerini de göz önünde bulundurarak, Türkiye'de 
adaletsizliğin toplum için nasıl bir tehlike oluşturduğunu düşünüyorsunuz, hangi 
anlaşmazlıklara sebep oluyor sizce? 
Adalet duygunuzun incinmesi sizde nasıl bir psikoloji oluşturuyor? Devlete ve toplumun 
geri kalanına bakış açınızı nasıl etkiliyor?  
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Sum up 
Eklemek istediğiniz ya da bu konuyla ilgili değinmediğimiz ve sizin için önem arz eden 
bir şey var mı? 
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